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Professor Shelly Kagan: Last time, I invited you to
think about life on the experience machine,
where the scientists are busy stimulating your brain in such a
way as to give you an exact replica, from the insides of
what it would be like having identical experiences to the
ones you would have if you were really doing--well,
whatever it is that's worth doing.
Climbing the alps, writing the great American
novel, raising a great family that loves you,
being creative. Whatever it is you think is
worth having, the experience machine gives
you all the experiential side of those things.
But you're not really doing those things.
You're actually just floating in the scientist's lab.
And we ask ourselves, would you want to live a life
on the experience machine? Would you be happy or would you
be unhappy, to discover that you actually have been living a life
on the experience machine? Most of us, when we think about
this, find ourselves wanting to say, no, we wouldn't want to
have a life on the experience machine.
I've been discussing this sort of example for many,
many years. And there's always a group of
people who think, yes, life on the experience
machine is perfect as long as you've got the right tape
playing. But the vast majority always
says, no, there's something missing from that life.
It's not the ideal of human existences;
it's not the best possible life we can imagine ourselves having.
But that means, if we think something's
missing, we then have to ask yourselves, what's missing?
What's wrong with the experience machine?
The one thing we can conclude immediately is,
if you think life on the experience machine is missing
something, that the hedonist--and views
like hedonism--must be wrong, insofar as they say that all
that matters for the best possible life is--for
well-being--is getting the right kinds of experiences,
getting the right kinds of mental states.
Because by hypothesis, the experience machine gets the
mental states right, get the insides right.
So, if something's missing from that life, there's more to the
best kind of life than just having the right mental states,
than just getting the insides right.
Well, we ask ourselves then, well, what's missing?
I think different people will answer that in different ways.
And if we had more time we could spell out rival theories
of well-being, which could be interestingly
distinguished one from another in terms of how they answer the
question, "What's missing from the
experience machine?" on the one hand,
and "Why are the things that are missing from the experience
machine worth having?" Different theories of
well-being might answer that in different ways.
Instead of trying to pursue those alternative theories in a
systematic fashion, let me just gesture toward some
of the things that seem to be missing from that kind of life.
Well, first of all, and most, perhaps,
obviously--if you're just spending your life floating in
the scientist's lab, you're not actually
accomplishing anything. You're not actually getting the
things out of life you thought you were getting.
You wanted to be climbing the mountain, but you're not
actually climbing a mountain. You're just floating there.
You wanted to be writing the great American novel,
but you're not writing the great American novel.
You're just floating there. You wanted to be finding the
cure for cancer, but you're not actually finding
the cure for cancer. You wanted to be loved,
but you're not actually loved. You're just floating there.
Nobody other than the scientist even knows that you exist.
So, there's a variety of things you wanted.
You wanted to know your place in the universe,
but you don't even have that kind of knowledge either,
because you think you're writing novels,
finding the cure for cancer, climbing Mount Everest.
You're completely deceived about all those things.
So you don't have the kind of self-knowledge that many of us
value. Well, as I say,
different theories would try to systematize these examples in
different ways; that we don't have any kind of
accomplishments, we don't have knowledge,
we're not in the right kinds of loving relationships.
Different theories might have different explanations as
to--are these things valuable because we want them,
or do we want them because we recognize they're valuable?
Rather than trying to pursue those questions--,
And indeed, trying to work out the details of these views would
be complicated as well. Take the example of
accomplishment. Well, we all think
accomplishment's important, but it's not as though any old
accomplishment is important. If somebody sets themselves--or
so it seems to me at least--if somebody sets theirself the goal
of making the biggest rubber band ball in the Eastern United
States, I suppose there's a sense of
the word that that's an accomplishment if they've got
it, but it doesn't strike me as the
kind of accomplishment which makes for a particularly
valuable life. So, we might have to
distinguish between any old accomplishment and genuinely
valuable accomplishments. But again, just put those
details aside. We can say that there are
certain things that are good above and beyond
experiences--the right kinds of accomplishments,
the right kind of knowledge. After all, not every bit of
knowledge is equally valuable. It's one thing to know your
place in the universe, or to know the fundamental laws
of physics. It's another thing to know what
was the average rainfall in Bangkok in 1984.
I'm not clear that that kind of knowledge gives a whole lot of
value to your life. So, we need the right kinds of
accomplishments and the right kind of knowledge and the right
kinds of relationships. But imagine you've worked that
out. The crucial point is that it
takes more to have the best kind of life than just getting the
insides right. It also requires getting the
outsides right--whatever that comes to--having in your life
not just experiences but the right kinds of goods or
accomplishments or whatever term we use for it.
Now, let's say, instead of pursuing the
questions of how exactly that theory should go,
notice that if we had that theory we could still evaluate
in principle--whatever the practical difficulties might
be--in principle we could still evaluate rival lives.
We could talk about adding up all the positive experiences
along with all the--ask yourself how many goods,
how many accomplishments of the right sort were in that life?
And that's on the positive side of the ledger.
And against that we would then have to subtract the sum total
of the negative experiences, all the failures and deceptions
or what have you. Those would count against the
overall value of your life. We could still say it's--how
good your life is, is a matter of adding up the
goods and subtracting the bads. But we would now have a
somewhat broader, or more encompassing or
inclusive, list of goods,
and a more broad and encompassing list of bads--not
just experience, but also these various other
accomplishments, whatever exactly that list
comes to. So, we could still evaluate
rival lives. My life would've gone better
had I chosen to become a farmer instead of chosen to become a
doctor. Or my life would've gone better
for this period of ten years, but then it would've become
worse. Or what have you.
Or when we ask ourselves, how will things go for me over
the next couple of weeks if I go on vacation versus staying back
here? We add up the goods,
subtract the bads--whatever our favorite list is--and we come to
our best educated guess about the rival evaluations of not
just lives as a whole, but chunks of lives.
Now, what do those totals come to?
Well, you might think it's an empirical question,
and in fact I am inclined to think it's an empirical
question, varying from person to person.
But it's worth taking a moment to flag the fact that there are
people, there are philosophers, who think we can generalize
across all humans. You might say that optimists
are people who think that for everybody in every case,
in every circumstance, the total is always positive.
"Life's always worth living; it's always better than
non-existence." That's what the optimist
thinks--not just for themselves individually,
but for everybody, the total is always positive.
Against that, I suppose, you've got
pessimists--pessimists who say, "No, no.
Although life perhaps has some good things, the overall grand
balance is negative for everybody in every circumstance.
We'd all be better off dead, or perhaps more accurately
still, all be better off never having been born in the first
place." That's what the pessimists say.
And in between the optimists on the one hand and the pessimists
on the other, you've got moderates who say,
"It varies. And for some people the balance
is positive, for some people perhaps the balance is negative,
whether for their life as a whole or for certain stretches
of their lives." We then have to get down to
facts about cases, try to describe the instance,
perhaps somebody who's in the terminal stages of some illness
where they're in a great deal of pain.
And the various other external goods of life,
they can't--because they're bedridden,
they can no longer accomplish things, perhaps their family has
abandoned them. Whatever the details might be,
we could describe lives and say, whether or not their life
was good as a whole, what the future holds out for
them is negative. That's what the moderates would
say. It varies from case to case.
Well, however we settle that issue, notice there's still one
other assumption that all these positions still have in common.
We've expanded our list of goods so that--Nobody's going to
deny that among the goods of life are pleasure and other
positive experiences. And among the bads of life are
pain and other negative experiences.
But we've expanded the list of goods so it includes external
goods and not only experiential or internal goods.
Still, the views that I've been sketching all still have the
following assumption in common. How good it is to be alive is a
matter of adding up all of the--call it the contents
of life. Add up your experiences and
your accomplishments and the particular details of your life
as what the story is about. It's as though we've been
assuming, and I have been assuming up to this moment,
that being alive per se has no value.
It's--life itself is a container which we fill with
various goods or bads. And deciding how valuable it
is, how good it is for me to be alive is a matter of adding up
the value of the contents of the life.
But the container itself is a mere container.
It has no value in and of itself.
We could say that what I've been presupposing up to this
point is the "neutral container theory" of the value of life.
Hedonism is a version of the neutral container theory.
How valuable--how well off you are, how valuable your life is,
is a function of the contents, the pleasure and the pain.
We've expanded the list of goods that can go within
your life, but for all that, we've still been acting as
though the neutral container theory is the right approach.
But against this there are those who think,
no, in addition to thinking about the value of the content
of life, we have to remember--so these
people claim--that life itself is worth having.
There's a benefit to me above and beyond the question of
what's going on within my life--am I loved,
am I accomplishing things, am I having nice experiences or
not? Above and beyond the question
of the contents of my life, we have to remember that the
mere fact that I'm alive gives my life some value.
So, these are "valuable container" theories.
Now, think about what it would mean to accept a valuable
container theory. You're saying that being alive
per se has some positive value. Well, actually,
the first remark is, probably wouldn't be completely
accurate to say, to describe these views as
saying, "It's being alive per se."
After all, a blade of grass is alive, and I presume that even
fans of the, what we might call valuable container theories,
don't think that, "Oh, wouldn't it be wonderful
if--as long as I was alive in the way that a blade of grass is
alive." Life may have value in and of
itself, but it's not mere life.
What we want is the life of a human.
We want a life in which we're accomplishing things,
there's agency, and the life of knowing things.
Because you have to be a knower in order to have knowledge.
The life of somebody who can have an emotional side.
So, it's something like the life of a person that,
when we say, when there are people who are
inclined to say, that being alive per so is
valuable, presumably what they mean is being alive as a person
per se is valuable. All right.
Note that point; keep it in mind.
For simplicity I'll talk about these views as though they say
life per se is valuable. Actually, I suppose there could
be a more extreme view still. It seems implausible to me,
but I suppose it's worth noticing there are people who
think, "No, being alive per se,
right--even though there I am and my brain has been so
thoroughly destroyed that I'm not longer able to know
anything, no longer able to relate
emotionally to anybody, no longer able to accomplish
anything, there I am in a persistent
vegetative state, but at least I'm alive."
You can imagine somebody who has that view.
I've got to say I find that a pretty implausible view.
So I'm going to restrict myself, at least when I think
about it, to versions that say, it's the life of a person per
se that's valuable. Now, notice that if we accept
this view to decide how well off I am, or somebody else is,
you can't just add up the contents of the life.
You can't just add up all the pleasures and subtract the
pains, or add up all the accomplishments and subtract the
failures, or add up all the knowledge and
subtract the ignorance and deception.
Doing that in terms of the contents gives you a subtotal,
but that subtotal is no longer the entire story.
Because we also have to add in, if we accept a valuable
container theory, we also have to add in some
extra positive points to take account of the fact that,
well, at least you're alive or have the life or a person--or
whatever it is that you think is valuable in and of itself.
So first we get the content subtotal;
then we add some extra points for the mere fact that you're
alive. Now, notice that since we are
adding extra positive facts, extra positive points,
for the fact that you're alive, even if the contents subtotal
is negative, the grand total could still be positive.
Suppose that being alive per se is worth plus a hundred points,
just to make up some number. Even if your content subtotal
was negative ten, that doesn't mean you're not
better off alive, because negative ten plus the
extra hundred points for the mere fact that you're alive is
still going to give you a positive total,
plus 90.
So, the point of thinking about the possibility of accepting a
valuable container theory is to remind us that in deciding are
you better off dead, has death deprived me of
something good or not, it's important to not just
focus on the contents but to also remember to add some
positive points above and beyond the content subtotal to take
into account the value of the sheer fact that you're alive.
If you're a fan of the neutral container theory,
you won't have anything extra to add, because life per se is
just a zero. It's strictly a matter of the
contents. But if you accept a valuable
container theory, you have to add something more.
And so even if, you might say,
the way my life is going in terms of its contents is bad,
being alive per se might still be a good thing.
Have to add some extra points. How much extra?
Well, here we're going to have, of course, more modest and more
bold versions of the valuable container theory.
Let me just distinguish two broad types.
What we might call modest versions of the valuable
container theory say, although being alive per se is
good, if the contents of your life
get bad enough, that can outweigh the value of
being alive so that the grand total is negative.
Modest container theories, that is, say there's a
value to being alive, but it can in principle be
outweighed. Whether it gets outweighed
easily, or whether it's very, very difficult and the contents
have to be horrible to outweigh it,
depends on how much value you think being alive per se has.
So, those are modest theories--positive value for
life, but it can be outweighed. Against that,
you can imagine someone who thinks being alive per se is so
incredibly valuable that no matter how horrible the
contents are, the grand total will always be
positive. It's as though being alive is
infinitely valuable in comparison to questions about
the contents. We could call this the
"fantastic valuable container theory" as opposed to the
"modest valuable container theory."
I suppose that label gives away where I want to come down on
this. I find the fantastic valuable
container theory fantastic in the sense of incredible.
I can't bring myself to believe it, which--I have some
sympathies for valuable container theories,
but I also have some sympathy for neutral container theories.
Sometimes I'm drawn toward the neutral view;
sometimes I'm drawn toward the thought that being alive per se
is good for you. But even in those moments when
I'm drawn towards valuable container theories,
it's always the modest version. I don't find myself drawn
toward the fantastic version. Now, if we make these
distinctions, then again, remembering that
the question we've been asking ourselves is,
"So why is death bad?" The deprivation account says,
death is bad for you insofar as, or it's bad for you when,
by virtue of dying now, what you've been deprived of
is, another chunk of life that would've been good for you to
have. And what we now see is that--to
see whether that could be the case or not, we've got to get
clear in our own minds about whether we believe in a neutral
container theory, a positive, valuable container
theory or--and among those, between a fantastic and a
modest container theory. If we are neutralists,
we're going to say, the question is,
what would the contents of my life have been,
for the next year, ten years, whatever?
If that would've been worth having, then--if the next chunk
of my life would've been worth having--then it's bad for me
that I die now instead of living for the next ten years.
On the other hand, if the balance from here on out
would've been negative, then it's good for me that I
died now instead of being kept alive with a life not worth
living. That's how the neutralists put
it. If we are valuable
container theorists, we think the answer has got to
be, well, look at the contents,
but don't forget to add some extra points,
even if the next five years for you would've been,
in terms of the contents, modestly bad--perhaps the value
of at least being alive at all outweighs it,
so it still would've been better for you to be alive.
But if the contents get bad enough, then you'd be better off
dead. Notice that on the modest view,
if we ask ourselves, would it have been good to be
immortal? the answer's going to depend on
not just whether we accept Bernard Williams' claim that
immortality would be bad for you,
because we now realize that what Williams was talking about
was the contents of an immortal life.
And that's no longer an adequate view,
or at least it's no longer a complete story,
if we are valuable container theorists.
We could say--you could imagine somebody saying,
"Oh yes, you're right, Williams,
the contents get negative, but that's still outweighed by
the mere fact that you're alive. So on balance,
being immortal is a good thing."
Whether that's right or not depends on just how bad would it
be to be immortal. Because, of course,
if you're a modest, if you accept the modest
version of the valuable container theory,
then if the contents get bad enough,
that can outweigh the positive value of life.
Against that, fans of the fantastic valuable
container theory can say, it doesn
…

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