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English transcript
ROB LEWORTHY: Welcome to today's Talks at Google event.
My name is Rob Leworthy.
And I'm very pleased to welcome John Kay today.
John is an economist whose career
has spanned the academic world, business and public affairs.
John is currently a visiting Professor of Economics at LSE
and a Fellow at St John's College, Oxford.
He's a Fellow at the British Academy
and at the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
He's a director of several public companies
and contributes a weekly column to the "Financial Times."
He's the author of many books, including "The Truth About
Markets."
And his latest book-- "Other People's Money"--
towards a financial system for the needs for the economy
rather than financial market participants--
is published by Profile Books and out now.
Please join me in a massive round of applause
in welcoming John Kay.
John.
[APPLAUSE]
JOHN KAY: People who don't know very much about finance
often ask me, what do people in the city and on Wall Street
actually do?
And the answer is-- to an extent that almost defies belief--
what they do is they trade with each other.
Let me give you some examples.
World trade in goods and services has grown a lot.
We all know that.
But World trade in foreign exchange--
the amount that's traded on foreign exchange markets--
is 100 times the total of trade in goods and services.
Some of you probably still think that what banks do
is they take your deposits and they lend them out
to businesses.
Actually if I look at the assets of British banks,
then I discover that lending to non-financial businesses
accounts for about 3% of their total assets.
Lending to other financial institutions
accounts for about 70% of it.
That is, what they do is that they lend to each other
and borrow from each other.
The total volume of assets that are
subject to derivative contracts that contract
to buy securities at some price or sometime in the future--
the total volume of exposures under that
amounts to three times the value of all the assets in the world.
And about 10% of that each is held by JP Morgan
or by Deutsche Bank.
Some of you will have heard of high-frequency trading, which
now accounts for more than half of all
the trading on the London and New York Stock Exchanges.
That's essentially done by computers
that are programmed with algorithms
that trade with each other.
And speed, obviously, matters critically
in doing this with the result that a company called
Spread Networks has recently built
a link through the Appalachians which is designed to reduce
the time it takes to transmit data between Chicago and New
York from 7.3 milliseconds to 6.6 milliseconds.
Just to give you some idea of what that means,
the physical irreducible minimum is 4.3 milliseconds,
which is the time it takes light to travel from Chicago to New
York.
Now I think you might ask two questions about all of this.
One, what is it all for?
And secondly, why is it so profitable?
Because if we shut the doors of this room
and lock them and spent the rest of the day exchanging bits
of paper with each other, what we'd
walk out with at the end of the day-- in aggregate--
would seem to be very much the same as what
we walked into it with.
What I'm going to talk about this morning
is what I call in the book-- it's
not an original word for me and it's not a very nice word--
it's called financialization.
It's essentially the process over the last 30 to 40 years
by which the activity I've just been describing-- people
trading secondary assets with each other--
has grown to be such a large part of our economy
and such a dominant part of the financial system.
It's essentially the change in the financial world
that looks like that to the financial world that
looks like this.
This was the plaque when Lehman went bankrupt.
It was actually sold for quite a large amount of money.
This was Gordon Brown opening Lehman Brothers London.
Well, I guess you guys are lucky enough not
to have a chief executive who's quite like that
in your particular business.
But that's the impact of financialization
which I've been describing.
And I want to point out two consequences of that
because lots of people think that financial crises are
inevitable.
That is, they're just something that
happens, like hurricanes or earthquakes that
happen every few years.
This is a story.
It's a graph of what has happened
to the incidence of banking crises
over the last two centuries.
And you can see a rather clear pattern
in this, which is you get a steady increase
across the 19th, early 20th century.
Then you get a spike in 1929 with the Great Depression
in the early '30s.
And then you get a period of extraordinary stability
from the Second World War through to about the 1970s.
And then the process which I've described as financialization
takes place, and you get this steady increase again followed
by the global financial crisis of 2008
we're all familiar with.
This is another illustration of what
has happened as a result of this financialization process.
There's been a lot of talk about inequality
in the last year or two.
And you can see that in the four countries
I take on this slide-- Britain, US, France,
and Germany-- in all four of these countries, what you get
in the first half of the 20th century
is a steady decline in inequality.
Then in two of the countries-- Germany and France--
you get a levelling out.
But what you get in two other countries--
Britain and the United States-- is the sharp reversal
of that trend.
And that is clearly very much to do
with both the effect of the growth of the financial sector
itself and the impact of the financial sector
on the behavior of people in large businesses.
I could talk a lot more about financialization
and its origins and effects, but I
want to go back to the question with which I began.
If we are all sitting in this room passing around bits
of paper to each other, how do we actually all
make profits out of doing it?
Well, if I go back to that great crash story,
I find out a little bit about that story.
Because perhaps the best little book about the 1929 crash
is by John Kenneth Galbraith, who's
one of the few economists who writes well.
I hope to try and imitate him a bit.
Galbraith created what he called the concept of the bezzle.
And what he meant by the bezzle was
that there's a kind of magic interval between someone
actually stealing some money and the people
from whom it's been stolen finding out
that they've lost it.
And in that interval both parties
imagine they're enjoying the same wealth.
Now one of the ways we can create profit is by bezzle.
You see, I might have this bit of paper here,
which is called a very complicated
financial instrument.
It's actually a subsenior tranche of collateralized debt
obligation based on subprime mortgages,
but you probably don't want to know about that.
You certainly don't want to read the thousands of pages
which the lawyers have constructed
to explain what's in it.
And probably no one in the world has ever
read these 1,000 pages that explain what is in it.
All you need to know-- and it's really quite important for you
to know this-- is that it yields more than 1%
more than a US treasury bond and it's rated by rating agencies
as at least as safe as a US treasury bond.
Now I'd be willing to beg-- I imagine
you might be willing to pay a modest premium for that.
And actually when you explain the attractions of it
to your colleague sitting beside you,
she might be willing to pay a little bit of a premium to you.
And we can pass this round and we can all
make a little bit of profit out of passing it on to each other.
And I bet you at the back over there are now thinking,
can't we join in and make profits in this kind of way
as well?
And what we can do is we can pass this bit of paper
around until everyone appears to have made a profit out of it.
Now one day someone is going to discover that this bit of paper
isn't worth as much as people thought.
But so long as that hasn't yet happened,
we've created a pool of imaginary wealth
which will benefit everyone in the room.
Now that's a caricature, but not a very great caricature
of what happened between 2003 and 2008,
which was that banks announced they
had made very large profits, paid out a large share of these
to their senior employees, and then announced in 2008 that it
had all been a mistake-- more or less wiped
out bank shareholders-- and actually, as we know,
needed lots of money from taxpayers to keep them going.
Another way of creating this kind of bogus wealth
is what I generally describe as tailgating.
I have a house in France.
And those of you who have driven in France
will know that if you drive in a French autoroute,
you will find that unless you're 20 kilometers an hour
above the legal speed limit, you will be tailgated by someone
who's your tail, flashing their lights,
and trying to persuade you to get out of the way.
And the thing about tailgating is it works 99% of the time.
The tailgating driver gets to his destination a minute
or so earlier than people who drive
in some kind of sensible, more rational way.
One time in 1,000, it doesn't work.
But actually what then happens is
that there's a kind of cognitive dissonance
that separates the accident, which
happens one time in 1,000, from the behavior
of which the other 999 times gave rise to in this.
And there's always a reason for that.
Because the reason there's an accident
is that someone else made a mistake on the road
or there was an obstruction in the way or something like that.
So there's always an explanation of why this happened.
But actually the real cause of the accident
is the driving behavior that gives rise
to it in the first place.
But these kind of strategies, by which
you can make sequences of small profits punctuated
by occasional large losses, are characteristic
of a whole variety of financial market strategies.
So for a moment instead of talking
about what it is that these guys in the finance sector do,
I'm going instead to talk about what finance is actually for.
Because let's be quite clear, economies need finance.
We need finance really for four kind of purposes.
We need finance, first of all, to operate a payment system
so that we can pay our bills, receive wages and salaries so
that businesses can trade with each other.
We need finance to help us with wealth management.
That means we need to transfer wealth across our lifetimes
because we have education when we're young,
eventually we'll be retired.
The pattern of earnings over our lifetime
is different from the pattern of consumption
we want to maintain.
We need finance for capital allocation.
That is to take the savings of the country
and translate them into the capital stock of the country.
To take our everyday savings and build
houses and roads and bridges and businesses with all of that.
And finally, we need finance to help us with risk mitigation.
Finance can help share the risks of life among groups of people
so that the costs of them don't fall in such an extreme way
on particular individuals.
Now what I try to do in the book, which people have found
surprisingly original in a sense,
is to ask them the question instead of asking what people
in the finance sector do, ask the question,
what would a finance sector that was devised
to meet the needs of the real economy actually
look like in terms of these kind of four functions?
Now I don't have time to talk about all of that this morning.
So what I'm going to do is to focus on one of them, which
is actually risk mitigation.
And in order to do that, I'm going to introduce you
to a rather elegant venue in the United States,
which some of you may have heard of, called Jackson Hole.
Because way back in 2005, not long
before the global financial crisis,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
held a beanfeast, which it does every year as a matter of fact.
But this one was to celebrate the imminent retirement
from the chairmanship of the Federal
Reserve of Alan Greenspan.
And there were a whole series of laudatory papers about him
with one exception, which is a guy called Rag Rajan who
was then the Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund
and is now a governor of the Central Bank of India.
And Rajan warned about the tailgating problem
which I've been describing.
That is, Rajan said, we have this problem
with-- more technically you call it heavily out of the money
options, which is going to come around
and hit us in the next few years.
Anyway, what Rajan said did not go down well--
to put it mildly.
The discussant of his paper was a guy
called Don Kohn, who said, by allowing institutions
to diversify risks, to choose their risk profiles more
precisely, to improve the management of the risks they
take on, financial innovations have
made institutions more robust.
These developments have also made the financial system
more resilient and flexible, better able to absorb shocks
without increasing the effects of these shocks
on the real economy.
And Kohn was followed by another Federal Reserve governor called
Ben Bernanke then, who said that banking organizations-- he
said-- have made substantial strides over the past two
decades in their ability to measure and manage risks,
resulting in greater resilience of the banking system.
Another Federal Reserve member called Tim Geithner said,
financial institutions are now able to measure and manage risk
more effectively.
Risks are spread more widely across a more diverse group
of financial intermediaries within and between countries.
These changes have contributed to a substantial improvement
in the financial strength of the core financial intermediaries
and in the resilience of the financial system of the United
States.
Two questions that might raise in your mind.
One is, how could these guys have been so wrong?
And secondly, how was it that the fact that they
were so wrong was actually no obstacle--
to put it mildly-- to their subsequent advancement?
It was Bernanke who succeeded Greenspan as chairman
of the Federal Reserve.
Kohn, whom I began with, who was then appointed as his deputy.
And the third speaker I talked about-- Tim Geithner--
became US Treasury Secretary when Barack Obama became
president of the United States.
One thing you certainly learn from that--
and it's relevant to understanding finance--
is what another economist called the unimportance of being
right in large bureaucracies.
[LAUGHTER]
So that's one question you should raise.
But the other question is, why were they so wrong?
And they were so wrong because they actually
misunderstood the nature of the risk process
which they were facing.
Now a French economist called Michel Albert actually
was an academic economist who became
chairman of one of France's large insurance companies--
wrote a paper in which he described
two origins of the world insurance industry.
The first was this one.
This is an image of Edward Lloyd's coffee
shop in the city of London.
And in the 18th century, English gents
would gather in Lloyd's coffee shop
and take bets with each other on all kinds of things.
They would bet on the longevity of King George
I and other grandees.
But one of the things they liked to bet on
was actually the movement of tides
and the movement of ships.
And this developed in due course into a marine insurance market.
And you will know that Lloyd's of London,
which is the institution that developed out of Lloyd's coffee
shop, is actually still a leader in world marine insurance.
The other origin of the insurance industry
was here up in Switzerland, where
Swiss peasants-- Swiss villagers-- would
gather together and agree if any of their animals died,
the village would club together to buy a new one.
There were two ways then in which insurance started.
One was as the result of people gambling with each other
on uncertain events.
And the other was mutualization, socialization of risks
so that we manage them collectively rather than
managing them individually.
And that contrast between risk trading
as insurance and risk trading as gambling
remains important today.
It became very important.
And this is relevant to how the financial crisis developed.
In the 1990s, when there was a-- one
of the financial innovations I was
describing that was invented was something called the credit
default swap.
And the credit default swap was essentially
an insurance policy for a loan.
If you took out a credit default swap, that
meant you would pay or get paid a certain amount of money
if a particular loan was defaulted on.
Now the International Securities and Derivatives Association
asked the London QC Mr. Potts whether this activity
was gambling or whether it was insurance.
And you can see that if it was gambling,
it would be subject to the kind of regulation
and tax we impose on gambling.
But if it was insurance, it would
be subject to the kind of regulation
and tax we impose on the insurance industry.
Which was it?
Well, any of you who have ever consulted lawyers in London
will know that you will stand a very high chance of getting
the opinion you want when you ask this kind of question.
And the opinion that is wanted and the opinion they got
was that it was neither.
It wasn't gambling, so it couldn't be regulated
as if it were a gamble.
And it wasn't insurance either, so it
wasn't subject to insurance regulation.
That left the question of what it was,
but we can perhaps leave that for a little longer
in this talk.
And that was important to the development--
to the explosive development, in fact--
of this market in credit default swaps over the next decade
or so.
And most of these contracts were actually
written in London because of this rather benign
interpretation of English law.
But by 2006--
Oh, right.
Sorry.
I should have mentioned that.
If you want to-- no, we'll leave that for a moment.
We'll go back to our Swiss villagers.
What was going on in the credit default
swap market was pretty clearly-- by 2006-- not mutualization
of this kind.
It was actually gambling.
So there are two mistakes that these guys at Jackson Hole
were actually making.
The first was that they thought they were looking
at mutualization-- risk sharing, risks spreading--
that was actually designed to reduce risk,
when actually it was people taking bets
with each other on what would happen to packages
of [INAUDIBLE] mortgages in the United States.
The second mistake that they were making
was a much more fundamental one, which
was that the kind of risks they were talking about
weren't the kind of risks that bother ordinary people
in everyday life.
What bothers ordinary people are risks
that are to do with illness and mortality.
They're risks that are to do with redundancy
and relationship breakdown.
They're risks now that are to do with accident and catastrophe.
And as it happened, just as they were having
their conference at Jackson Hole,
Hurricane Katrina was blowing into New Orleans.
That is actually the kind of risk
that actually matters to people.
And it wasn't the kind of risk that
was being talked about at Jackson Hole.
The risk that was being talked about at Jackson Hole
was almost entirely a risk that had already
been generated within the financial system itself
by the kind of transaction which I've been describing.
So that by 2006 what we had had got to in this kind of market
was a world in which essentially what we had was gambling.
Some of you may have read one or two of the Michael Lewis books.
There was a recent one which has partly
a description of the high-frequency trading and data
link from New York to Chicago I was talking about earlier.
But an earlier book was called "The Big Short."
And "The Big Short" is about one of the most successful hedge
funds in the course of the financial crisis--
a hedge fund which bet against a batch of subprime mortgages
in what was called the Abacus transaction facilitated
by Goldman Sachs.
And this is the guy who in the end
became the fall guy for that particular exercise--
a guy called "Fabulous Fab" Tourre.
And this is him writing to his gir
…
My name is Rob Leworthy.
And I'm very pleased to welcome John Kay today.
John is an economist whose career
has spanned the academic world, business and public affairs.
John is currently a visiting Professor of Economics at LSE
and a Fellow at St John's College, Oxford.
He's a Fellow at the British Academy
and at the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
He's a director of several public companies
and contributes a weekly column to the "Financial Times."
He's the author of many books, including "The Truth About
Markets."
And his latest book-- "Other People's Money"--
towards a financial system for the needs for the economy
rather than financial market participants--
is published by Profile Books and out now.
Please join me in a massive round of applause
in welcoming John Kay.
John.
[APPLAUSE]
JOHN KAY: People who don't know very much about finance
often ask me, what do people in the city and on Wall Street
actually do?
And the answer is-- to an extent that almost defies belief--
what they do is they trade with each other.
Let me give you some examples.
World trade in goods and services has grown a lot.
We all know that.
But World trade in foreign exchange--
the amount that's traded on foreign exchange markets--
is 100 times the total of trade in goods and services.
Some of you probably still think that what banks do
is they take your deposits and they lend them out
to businesses.
Actually if I look at the assets of British banks,
then I discover that lending to non-financial businesses
accounts for about 3% of their total assets.
Lending to other financial institutions
accounts for about 70% of it.
That is, what they do is that they lend to each other
and borrow from each other.
The total volume of assets that are
subject to derivative contracts that contract
to buy securities at some price or sometime in the future--
the total volume of exposures under that
amounts to three times the value of all the assets in the world.
And about 10% of that each is held by JP Morgan
or by Deutsche Bank.
Some of you will have heard of high-frequency trading, which
now accounts for more than half of all
the trading on the London and New York Stock Exchanges.
That's essentially done by computers
that are programmed with algorithms
that trade with each other.
And speed, obviously, matters critically
in doing this with the result that a company called
Spread Networks has recently built
a link through the Appalachians which is designed to reduce
the time it takes to transmit data between Chicago and New
York from 7.3 milliseconds to 6.6 milliseconds.
Just to give you some idea of what that means,
the physical irreducible minimum is 4.3 milliseconds,
which is the time it takes light to travel from Chicago to New
York.
Now I think you might ask two questions about all of this.
One, what is it all for?
And secondly, why is it so profitable?
Because if we shut the doors of this room
and lock them and spent the rest of the day exchanging bits
of paper with each other, what we'd
walk out with at the end of the day-- in aggregate--
would seem to be very much the same as what
we walked into it with.
What I'm going to talk about this morning
is what I call in the book-- it's
not an original word for me and it's not a very nice word--
it's called financialization.
It's essentially the process over the last 30 to 40 years
by which the activity I've just been describing-- people
trading secondary assets with each other--
has grown to be such a large part of our economy
and such a dominant part of the financial system.
It's essentially the change in the financial world
that looks like that to the financial world that
looks like this.
This was the plaque when Lehman went bankrupt.
It was actually sold for quite a large amount of money.
This was Gordon Brown opening Lehman Brothers London.
Well, I guess you guys are lucky enough not
to have a chief executive who's quite like that
in your particular business.
But that's the impact of financialization
which I've been describing.
And I want to point out two consequences of that
because lots of people think that financial crises are
inevitable.
That is, they're just something that
happens, like hurricanes or earthquakes that
happen every few years.
This is a story.
It's a graph of what has happened
to the incidence of banking crises
over the last two centuries.
And you can see a rather clear pattern
in this, which is you get a steady increase
across the 19th, early 20th century.
Then you get a spike in 1929 with the Great Depression
in the early '30s.
And then you get a period of extraordinary stability
from the Second World War through to about the 1970s.
And then the process which I've described as financialization
takes place, and you get this steady increase again followed
by the global financial crisis of 2008
we're all familiar with.
This is another illustration of what
has happened as a result of this financialization process.
There's been a lot of talk about inequality
in the last year or two.
And you can see that in the four countries
I take on this slide-- Britain, US, France,
and Germany-- in all four of these countries, what you get
in the first half of the 20th century
is a steady decline in inequality.
Then in two of the countries-- Germany and France--
you get a levelling out.
But what you get in two other countries--
Britain and the United States-- is the sharp reversal
of that trend.
And that is clearly very much to do
with both the effect of the growth of the financial sector
itself and the impact of the financial sector
on the behavior of people in large businesses.
I could talk a lot more about financialization
and its origins and effects, but I
want to go back to the question with which I began.
If we are all sitting in this room passing around bits
of paper to each other, how do we actually all
make profits out of doing it?
Well, if I go back to that great crash story,
I find out a little bit about that story.
Because perhaps the best little book about the 1929 crash
is by John Kenneth Galbraith, who's
one of the few economists who writes well.
I hope to try and imitate him a bit.
Galbraith created what he called the concept of the bezzle.
And what he meant by the bezzle was
that there's a kind of magic interval between someone
actually stealing some money and the people
from whom it's been stolen finding out
that they've lost it.
And in that interval both parties
imagine they're enjoying the same wealth.
Now one of the ways we can create profit is by bezzle.
You see, I might have this bit of paper here,
which is called a very complicated
financial instrument.
It's actually a subsenior tranche of collateralized debt
obligation based on subprime mortgages,
but you probably don't want to know about that.
You certainly don't want to read the thousands of pages
which the lawyers have constructed
to explain what's in it.
And probably no one in the world has ever
read these 1,000 pages that explain what is in it.
All you need to know-- and it's really quite important for you
to know this-- is that it yields more than 1%
more than a US treasury bond and it's rated by rating agencies
as at least as safe as a US treasury bond.
Now I'd be willing to beg-- I imagine
you might be willing to pay a modest premium for that.
And actually when you explain the attractions of it
to your colleague sitting beside you,
she might be willing to pay a little bit of a premium to you.
And we can pass this round and we can all
make a little bit of profit out of passing it on to each other.
And I bet you at the back over there are now thinking,
can't we join in and make profits in this kind of way
as well?
And what we can do is we can pass this bit of paper
around until everyone appears to have made a profit out of it.
Now one day someone is going to discover that this bit of paper
isn't worth as much as people thought.
But so long as that hasn't yet happened,
we've created a pool of imaginary wealth
which will benefit everyone in the room.
Now that's a caricature, but not a very great caricature
of what happened between 2003 and 2008,
which was that banks announced they
had made very large profits, paid out a large share of these
to their senior employees, and then announced in 2008 that it
had all been a mistake-- more or less wiped
out bank shareholders-- and actually, as we know,
needed lots of money from taxpayers to keep them going.
Another way of creating this kind of bogus wealth
is what I generally describe as tailgating.
I have a house in France.
And those of you who have driven in France
will know that if you drive in a French autoroute,
you will find that unless you're 20 kilometers an hour
above the legal speed limit, you will be tailgated by someone
who's your tail, flashing their lights,
and trying to persuade you to get out of the way.
And the thing about tailgating is it works 99% of the time.
The tailgating driver gets to his destination a minute
or so earlier than people who drive
in some kind of sensible, more rational way.
One time in 1,000, it doesn't work.
But actually what then happens is
that there's a kind of cognitive dissonance
that separates the accident, which
happens one time in 1,000, from the behavior
of which the other 999 times gave rise to in this.
And there's always a reason for that.
Because the reason there's an accident
is that someone else made a mistake on the road
or there was an obstruction in the way or something like that.
So there's always an explanation of why this happened.
But actually the real cause of the accident
is the driving behavior that gives rise
to it in the first place.
But these kind of strategies, by which
you can make sequences of small profits punctuated
by occasional large losses, are characteristic
of a whole variety of financial market strategies.
So for a moment instead of talking
about what it is that these guys in the finance sector do,
I'm going instead to talk about what finance is actually for.
Because let's be quite clear, economies need finance.
We need finance really for four kind of purposes.
We need finance, first of all, to operate a payment system
so that we can pay our bills, receive wages and salaries so
that businesses can trade with each other.
We need finance to help us with wealth management.
That means we need to transfer wealth across our lifetimes
because we have education when we're young,
eventually we'll be retired.
The pattern of earnings over our lifetime
is different from the pattern of consumption
we want to maintain.
We need finance for capital allocation.
That is to take the savings of the country
and translate them into the capital stock of the country.
To take our everyday savings and build
houses and roads and bridges and businesses with all of that.
And finally, we need finance to help us with risk mitigation.
Finance can help share the risks of life among groups of people
so that the costs of them don't fall in such an extreme way
on particular individuals.
Now what I try to do in the book, which people have found
surprisingly original in a sense,
is to ask them the question instead of asking what people
in the finance sector do, ask the question,
what would a finance sector that was devised
to meet the needs of the real economy actually
look like in terms of these kind of four functions?
Now I don't have time to talk about all of that this morning.
So what I'm going to do is to focus on one of them, which
is actually risk mitigation.
And in order to do that, I'm going to introduce you
to a rather elegant venue in the United States,
which some of you may have heard of, called Jackson Hole.
Because way back in 2005, not long
before the global financial crisis,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
held a beanfeast, which it does every year as a matter of fact.
But this one was to celebrate the imminent retirement
from the chairmanship of the Federal
Reserve of Alan Greenspan.
And there were a whole series of laudatory papers about him
with one exception, which is a guy called Rag Rajan who
was then the Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund
and is now a governor of the Central Bank of India.
And Rajan warned about the tailgating problem
which I've been describing.
That is, Rajan said, we have this problem
with-- more technically you call it heavily out of the money
options, which is going to come around
and hit us in the next few years.
Anyway, what Rajan said did not go down well--
to put it mildly.
The discussant of his paper was a guy
called Don Kohn, who said, by allowing institutions
to diversify risks, to choose their risk profiles more
precisely, to improve the management of the risks they
take on, financial innovations have
made institutions more robust.
These developments have also made the financial system
more resilient and flexible, better able to absorb shocks
without increasing the effects of these shocks
on the real economy.
And Kohn was followed by another Federal Reserve governor called
Ben Bernanke then, who said that banking organizations-- he
said-- have made substantial strides over the past two
decades in their ability to measure and manage risks,
resulting in greater resilience of the banking system.
Another Federal Reserve member called Tim Geithner said,
financial institutions are now able to measure and manage risk
more effectively.
Risks are spread more widely across a more diverse group
of financial intermediaries within and between countries.
These changes have contributed to a substantial improvement
in the financial strength of the core financial intermediaries
and in the resilience of the financial system of the United
States.
Two questions that might raise in your mind.
One is, how could these guys have been so wrong?
And secondly, how was it that the fact that they
were so wrong was actually no obstacle--
to put it mildly-- to their subsequent advancement?
It was Bernanke who succeeded Greenspan as chairman
of the Federal Reserve.
Kohn, whom I began with, who was then appointed as his deputy.
And the third speaker I talked about-- Tim Geithner--
became US Treasury Secretary when Barack Obama became
president of the United States.
One thing you certainly learn from that--
and it's relevant to understanding finance--
is what another economist called the unimportance of being
right in large bureaucracies.
[LAUGHTER]
So that's one question you should raise.
But the other question is, why were they so wrong?
And they were so wrong because they actually
misunderstood the nature of the risk process
which they were facing.
Now a French economist called Michel Albert actually
was an academic economist who became
chairman of one of France's large insurance companies--
wrote a paper in which he described
two origins of the world insurance industry.
The first was this one.
This is an image of Edward Lloyd's coffee
shop in the city of London.
And in the 18th century, English gents
would gather in Lloyd's coffee shop
and take bets with each other on all kinds of things.
They would bet on the longevity of King George
I and other grandees.
But one of the things they liked to bet on
was actually the movement of tides
and the movement of ships.
And this developed in due course into a marine insurance market.
And you will know that Lloyd's of London,
which is the institution that developed out of Lloyd's coffee
shop, is actually still a leader in world marine insurance.
The other origin of the insurance industry
was here up in Switzerland, where
Swiss peasants-- Swiss villagers-- would
gather together and agree if any of their animals died,
the village would club together to buy a new one.
There were two ways then in which insurance started.
One was as the result of people gambling with each other
on uncertain events.
And the other was mutualization, socialization of risks
so that we manage them collectively rather than
managing them individually.
And that contrast between risk trading
as insurance and risk trading as gambling
remains important today.
It became very important.
And this is relevant to how the financial crisis developed.
In the 1990s, when there was a-- one
of the financial innovations I was
describing that was invented was something called the credit
default swap.
And the credit default swap was essentially
an insurance policy for a loan.
If you took out a credit default swap, that
meant you would pay or get paid a certain amount of money
if a particular loan was defaulted on.
Now the International Securities and Derivatives Association
asked the London QC Mr. Potts whether this activity
was gambling or whether it was insurance.
And you can see that if it was gambling,
it would be subject to the kind of regulation
and tax we impose on gambling.
But if it was insurance, it would
be subject to the kind of regulation
and tax we impose on the insurance industry.
Which was it?
Well, any of you who have ever consulted lawyers in London
will know that you will stand a very high chance of getting
the opinion you want when you ask this kind of question.
And the opinion that is wanted and the opinion they got
was that it was neither.
It wasn't gambling, so it couldn't be regulated
as if it were a gamble.
And it wasn't insurance either, so it
wasn't subject to insurance regulation.
That left the question of what it was,
but we can perhaps leave that for a little longer
in this talk.
And that was important to the development--
to the explosive development, in fact--
of this market in credit default swaps over the next decade
or so.
And most of these contracts were actually
written in London because of this rather benign
interpretation of English law.
But by 2006--
Oh, right.
Sorry.
I should have mentioned that.
If you want to-- no, we'll leave that for a moment.
We'll go back to our Swiss villagers.
What was going on in the credit default
swap market was pretty clearly-- by 2006-- not mutualization
of this kind.
It was actually gambling.
So there are two mistakes that these guys at Jackson Hole
were actually making.
The first was that they thought they were looking
at mutualization-- risk sharing, risks spreading--
that was actually designed to reduce risk,
when actually it was people taking bets
with each other on what would happen to packages
of [INAUDIBLE] mortgages in the United States.
The second mistake that they were making
was a much more fundamental one, which
was that the kind of risks they were talking about
weren't the kind of risks that bother ordinary people
in everyday life.
What bothers ordinary people are risks
that are to do with illness and mortality.
They're risks that are to do with redundancy
and relationship breakdown.
They're risks now that are to do with accident and catastrophe.
And as it happened, just as they were having
their conference at Jackson Hole,
Hurricane Katrina was blowing into New Orleans.
That is actually the kind of risk
that actually matters to people.
And it wasn't the kind of risk that
was being talked about at Jackson Hole.
The risk that was being talked about at Jackson Hole
was almost entirely a risk that had already
been generated within the financial system itself
by the kind of transaction which I've been describing.
So that by 2006 what we had had got to in this kind of market
was a world in which essentially what we had was gambling.
Some of you may have read one or two of the Michael Lewis books.
There was a recent one which has partly
a description of the high-frequency trading and data
link from New York to Chicago I was talking about earlier.
But an earlier book was called "The Big Short."
And "The Big Short" is about one of the most successful hedge
funds in the course of the financial crisis--
a hedge fund which bet against a batch of subprime mortgages
in what was called the Abacus transaction facilitated
by Goldman Sachs.
And this is the guy who in the end
became the fall guy for that particular exercise--
a guy called "Fabulous Fab" Tourre.
And this is him writing to his gir
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