Advertisement
English transcript
PROFESSOR ROBERT SHILLER: OK, good morning.
Well, today I want to talk about what, to me, is a very
interesting topic, and that is futures markets.
Not very interesting to most people.
Most people have no idea what they are.
But I think that, well, futures markets, what we're
really talking about is --
There are different ways of viewing it.
Futures markets for things like agricultural commodities,
or interest rates, or financial securities, are
markets about the future.
They're markets that, in some sense, predict the future.
And future matters, right?
We live a life.
We have a long horizon.
I said before, I think that your planning horizon must be
at least a century, because you'll probably live that long
anyway, with modern medicine.
And you care about other people, too.
So, the beauty of futures markets is that we have prices
for the future.
We talked already about forward markets.
We talked about forward interest rates.
And that is related to what we're talking about.
Forwards and futures are similar concepts.
Futures is the more precise concept.
Or the more developed concept.
And I'll explain the difference between forwards
and futures.
But just in a nutshell, futures markets are organized
markets, like the stock market, that trade
standardized contracts, representing things that will
happen at future dates.
And because they're
standardized, they're worldwide.
Everybody looks at them and uses them.
Whereas forward markets are more specialized markets that,
typically, are not as easy to interpret or as clear.
So, futures markets are, in some sense, more fundamental
and important.
I have a particular interest --
I've been interested in futures markets myself for
many years.
And wondering, why they're not even
bigger and more important.
So, in 1993, I wrote a book called Macro Markets, about
let's make our markets bigger and more
important, and more pervasive.
And I've been trying to do that.
Notably, in 2006, I was working with the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, which is the biggest futures
market in the world.
And we created home price futures.
And they've been trading now for five years.
But I'm not really going to talk about them, because they
have so far disappointed.
They're not important, at least not yet.
But I'm going to talk about some
important futures markets.
First, I want to put just a couple of definitions up.
Futures, that's what we're going to talk about most in
this lecture, and it has a special meaning in finance.
And I was contrasting that to forwards.
But both of these together are derivatives.
And that means that the price in these markets derives from
a price in some other market.
There's a primary or underlying market, which has
its own price.
And then there's a derivative market that has a futures
price or a forward price.
I guess I'm speaking in kind of abstract terms. Well, let
me just start --
I want to give you an example, and we'll see better what I'm
talking about.
But let me just first comment just on this word,
derivatives.
To people in finance, derivatives are an exciting
development of financial markets.
We start out with a simple market and we develop
derivative markets, that add more detail and information
than was in the underlying or primary market.
That's exciting.
I find it exciting.
However --
I don't know how often you hear this word, derivative --
it's become a four-letter word.
It's become an ugly word.
Why is that?
I think it's, because people blame the current financial
crisis on derivatives, whether rightly or wrongly.
And it's because, I think, there's a public anger about
derivatives that is largely due to misunderstanding.
I mentioned before that I think that finance tends to
attract sociopaths.
I mentioned that, I defined that for you.
People who want to manipulate, and fool, and deceive people.
But I don't think the financial community is
particularly populated by sociopaths.
You might think so, reading some accounts.
But I think, it's not true.
And I think, it's not true, because the financial
community knows about this problem
and ejects such people.
They get caught.
And you can't make a career in finance if you're a sociopath.
So, if you think you have this problem, that you have
sociopathic tendencies, I would advise you not to go
into finance, because you will get caught and ejected.
So, save yourself the trouble.
Don't go into finance.
Pick some field where you can't hurt anybody.
And that would be a smart thing to do, if
you have such a problem.
So, I think we need to regulate derivatives markets,
and that's what I'm talking about.
And we need self-regulation of the markets themselves, but we
need government regulation as well.
But there's nothing evil about derivatives.
And in fact, derivatives are fundamental to the way I think
a modern economy works.
So, I had you read an article --
I put it on an earlier section of the reading list --
by Charles Conant, who wrote a book in 1904 called Wall
Street and the Country.
And you should have read that by how.
He starts out by saying, it's just amazing, how public
opinion thinks that speculation is evil.
And they don't understand that speculation is just business.
I mean, business decisions involve
guesses about the future.
And so, when you have well-developed markets, these
guesses become market prices.
And so, the prices go into the calculations
that everyone makes.
And the calculations are just done better.
Somehow, there's just a failure for most people to
understand it.
And I'm hoping in this lecture to try to give some more
understanding of these markets.
I think they're fascinating.
Most people apparently don't, because you don't hear them
brought up very much.
I want to just say a little bit more about hostility
toward derivative markets and futures markets, and
speculation in general.
In 1991, that was 20 years ago, I wrote a joint
paper with a --
I don't remember whether I mentioned this,
probably not --
with a Russian, a young man from Russia that I met when I
was visiting the Soviet Union, just before the end of the
Soviet Union.
And we were talking about how antagonistic Russians are
toward capitalism.
And he said, this is a big problem.
Russia just can't embrace capitalism.
These people hate it.
They hate the profit makers and the financiers.
And I said to him, well, you know, it's the same in the
U.S. How do you know it's any worse in Russia?
And so, we decided to do a questionnaire survey.
And I was going to read one of the questions, comparing
people in Moscow and people in New York, to see, which one
understands capitalism better.
So, one of the questions that we had was the following --
We wrote these questions and translated them into Russian.
And we tried to make them exactly the same questions
between Russian and English.
So, here's the question we asked in both cities: ''Grain
traders in capitalist countries sometimes hold grain
without selling it, putting it in temporary storage in
anticipation of higher prices later.
Do you think this speculation will cause more frequent
shortages of flour, bread and other grain products?
Or will it cause such shortages to become rarer?''
What do you think, people said?
Does the process of speculating in grain cause
problems or solve problems?
Well, we found that, in the USA, 66% said it will make
shortages more common.
But in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, only 45% thought it
would make shortages more common.
Both of them were wrong.
A lot of them were wrong, but the Russians were better,
closer to the truth than the Americans.
Living in the financial capital of the USA, most
people think that speculating in grain creates problems. But
wait a minute, what is speculation in grain?
That means holding it off, expecting higher
prices later, right?
Isn't that what you have to do if you are
managing a grain market?
Now, think of it this way -- and I'm coming now to
agricultural futures.
In the simplest world, there's one harvest
of wheat every year.
And that harvest comes in a certain time of the year,
every year.
Once a year.
And it has to be held in storage over the year, right?
Because people don't eat it all at once.
You eat it over the whole year.
So, somebody is storing grain.
This is a fundamental problem.
That's a business.
So, you have to know that somewhere there's some
warehouse holding the grain that you will be consuming in
six months time.
And that warehouse is run by some
professionals who do that.
If they think prices are higher later, they'll keep it
longer in the warehouse.
And what does that do?
That evens out the price.
It doesn't make it worse.
If they think there's going to be a shortage of grain, they
hold it back now and the price of grain goes up.
And so, everyone starts consuming a little less
because of the higher price, and it smoothes things out and
it works better.
And this is elementary economics, but it's not
understood, I think, by most people.
And the futures markets are just sophisticated markets
that help that process.
So, I'm going to start with agricultural futures in
talking about this.
And I want to start also with a very homely -- it's not
homely -- it's a very elementary example, because
it's the first futures market.
So, where do you think futures markets started?
You would think, it started in New York, or Chicago, or
London, or Paris.
It actually started in Japan in a place called Dojima,
which is in the city of Osaka.
And they started in the 1600s.
So, let's go back.
If we can go back to the year 1673, in Osaka in Japan.
Japan was heavily dependent on rice.
And the rice farmers would farm all over Japan, but there
was a rice market in Dojima, which was the
national rice market.
And I have data here.
According to a study, there were 91 rice warehouses in
Dojima in 1673.
That's a long time ago, isn't it?
So, it was a big storage place for rice, and they were
storing it all year.
And people would come, people who were merchants for rice,
and they would come to Dojima and they would sign contracts
to get rice.
I live in some town 20 miles from
here, I'm a rice merchant.
I need a regular supply of rice from your warehouse.
Can you supply it to me?
And the guy would give you a terms, and that would be a
forward contract.
And this is what was happening before the futures market.
Forward contracts precede futures contracts.
So, do you see what it is?
You're a rice merchant.
You make a deal.
You sign a contract that I will pay you so much in
currency at every month, and you'll give me so much rice.
And you'll deliver it here, and I'll take it, and I'll
sell it in my town.
Problems developed in the forward market that led to the
development of a futures market.
And the problem is, one of the problems is that there's
counterparty risk.
You are a rice merchant.
You make a deal with a warehouse.
That's one person dealing with one person, right?
What if one of the guys reneges on the deal?
So, for example, what if the price of rice falls?
Then you, the merchant, will say, I'm not going to go back
and buy according to this contract, because
it's cheaper now.
I'll buy it somewhere else.
So, I just don't show up, and then the warehouse is saying,
what happened to our contract?
And you're nowhere to be found.
Or if it goes the other way, if rice goes up, the warehouse
might renege.
They'd say, we signed this contract but there's something
wrong with it, and we're not going to honor it.
So, it messes up.
It is also possible that one of the two counterparties is
just a sociopath or something, or is an alcoholic, or
something is wrong.
So, the market doesn't work well.
So, what they invented in Japan was the first true
futures market.
And the market worked like this: There was a trading
floor in Dojima.
And rice traders would come there, and there were certain
hours of the day, when you would trade contracts for
future delivery.
But they were standardized contracts, mediated by the
exchange, so that there would be no
problem with the contract.
And then every day, there would be a trading time, and
you could buy and sell contracts for future delivery.
Moreover, they enforced trading hours.
And this is something that's kind of
an interesting invention.
They didn't have --
I guess they didn't have clocks.
I don't know what they had.
But they had a certain time, when trading would stop, and
they wanted to stop all the trading at the same time.
They didn't want people dribbling out.
They wanted it to be a good market.
So, they would light a fuse, and it would be a bright light
in the middle of the trading floor.
And you'd see the fuse burning down, and when it burned out,
all trading stopped.
So, they had trading hours.
Moreover, they had a problem that some of the traders
wouldn't stop trading.
So, this is something that they did in Dojima, they had
men called watermen, who came out with buckets of water.
And they would throw the buckets of water on anyone who
was still trading.
So that worked.
It stopped trading.
They also had hand signals.
This was big.
This is big time.
You were trading rice for all of Japan.
And you may think the 16- or 1700s are long ago, but a lot
of rice was traded and it got really noisy and difficult.
They found that it was so many people trading on the floor,
that you couldn't hear anyone talk.
And there'd be shouting and it was noisy, and so, they
devised a system of hand signals.
And the Dojima hand signals were, I don't know exactly,
but something like this.
If your hand was out, you put your hand
out, that means sell.
You put your hand this way, it meant buy.
And if you put three fingers up, it means
selling three contracts.
That kind of thing.
I don't know the whole system, but that's where it started.
That whole concept was copied all over the world in
subsequent centuries.
So, what is it that happened?
And the other thing is, what were the contracts that you
bought and sold?
The problem with the forward market is that the contracts
are all different.
One guy made a contract with one guy, and he said, I want
my delivery here.
And I don't like this kind of rice.
I want this kind.
And you better make sure that there's not a single insect in
it, or I'm going to reject the whole thing.
But that's all different.
So, you don't know what --
these contracts, you don't even know what the
price of rice is.
If someone said, I paid so much to get rice
in the future --
but you have to say, well, under what circumstances?
And what kind of rice?
And where?
And what are the terms for possible failure?
You know, there's so many terms in the contract, so you
don't even know what the price of rice is.
But at the futures market, they
standardized the contract.
So, it may not be exactly what you want, but it's
standardized.
So, you deliver rice --
I don't know all the details of Dojima, but I'm talking
about futures markets, as they evolve.
In a modern futures market, agricultural futures market,
you deliver your --
the contract is to deliver some commodity like rice at a
specified future date, at a specified future warehouse,
which would be run by the exchange.
And there's inspectors at the warehouse who
are expert on grain.
And they verify, because they know rice.
They know it really well.
And they know that some rice has bugs in it.
They know how to find out.
They have a standard.
Of course, there can always be some bugs in it, but they have
a standard and they have a way of measuring,
and they get it right.
And so, all those contracts are exactly the same.
And so, they become the price.
It turns out, funny thing, the futures market almost becomes
the real market, because they're all standardized.
The futures price --
You know where it's delivered.
You know what's delivered, exactly.
The futures market becomes the market, in a sense.
The fact that it's in the future is, in effect, a help,
because since it's a comfortable time in the
future, it's well defined.
Whereas the spot market --
the spot market is the market for rice, or whatever it is,
today as it's traded.
The spot market is inscrutable.
It's hard to understand.
So, let's think about a farmer today, who grows rice, or
wheat, or soybeans, or something.
If you drive through farming countries, listen to the
radio, regularly they'll give prices.
Soybeans, wheat, rice, et cetera.
Why do they give that?
Because farmers care.
They're raising this stuff.
It's their whole livelihood, whether they make a profit or
not, depends on it.
What prices do they quote?
They quote the futures prices, even though
they're in the future.
But they quote them, because they mean something and
they're standardized.
So, that's why the futures market
becomes the central market.
I want to just say something about futures --
Japan started the futures markets in the 1600s, and they
were the world leader in rice futures until 1939.
And then, at World War II, the Japanese government shut the
futures market down.
And to this day since, there is no rice
futures market in Japan.
Believe it or not.
The inventors, they're talking now of starting it up again.
Where do they trade rice futures?
Well, the USA is the main market, even though you don't
think of the U.S. as a market for rice.
But the point is, that markets have to be centralized.
And that people want the centralized market, and if it
happens to be in Chicago, so be it.
So, it becomes a huge international rice market.
And so, I looked up --
this is called Rough Rice Futures, and this is the
futures curve as of last Friday
[addition: March 18, 2011].
So, what we have is different delivery months.
This is May of this year.
And then, there's other delivery months, and then
there's next year.
It goes out about a year, different delivery dates.
And this is cents per 100 weight.
100 weight is 100 pounds of rice.
And since this is USA, we mean 100 U.S. pounds of rice.
But anyone in the world can figure this out and trade in
this market.
And it's in dollars, because it's what we're
trading in the USA.
So, someone in Japan, who wants to trade in the futures
market, has to come to the USA, change their yen into
dollars, and do this.
Now, you see that the futures price is going up.
This was all quoted last Friday
[addition: March 18, 2011].
This is the market, essentially, right now.
But you see, it's a futures market, because it's giving
prices of rice at dates in the future.
These prices way out here, next year, are not so
reliable, because there's not much trade.
The trade tends to dominate at the front months.
So, here's where most of the trade is.
They're trading May, and maybe this is July.
I forgot exactly.
Is that clear, what this means?
It's going up.
And it's going up pretty fast, isn't it?
From about less than $0.13 to $0.15.
What this means is that, in effect, the market is
expecting huge increases in the price of rice.
So, that's interesting.
Anyone who's doing business in rice looks at this and says,
look, there's price increases anticipated.
Now, I just want to talk about the world at this point in
history, and try to interpret this curve.
You must have heard that there is a food shortage in the
world developing.
And it's a source of crisis.
It's developing in the Middle East.
One reason why that's been given for the revolutions that
have happened in the Middle East are,
that people are hungry.
There's dissatisfaction when the price of food goes up.
A lot of people are living much more at the margin than
you'd imagine.
So, this increase in rice prices matters a lot.
So, it's very interesting that it's showing this steep
increase in the price of rice.
But the first thing you want to think of as a financier is
how much is this going up?
I didn't actually do the calculation.
It goes up from 14 --
under 13.75 to 15.5.
That's quite an increase in six months, right?
So, it sounds like there's a profit opportunity here.
Buy rice today and sell it on the futures market.
This is a good time to sell it.
I'll sell it in 2012.
And that's my futures profit.
I can lock in this price today, because that's what the
futures market does.
The contract is a c
…
Well, today I want to talk about what, to me, is a very
interesting topic, and that is futures markets.
Not very interesting to most people.
Most people have no idea what they are.
But I think that, well, futures markets, what we're
really talking about is --
There are different ways of viewing it.
Futures markets for things like agricultural commodities,
or interest rates, or financial securities, are
markets about the future.
They're markets that, in some sense, predict the future.
And future matters, right?
We live a life.
We have a long horizon.
I said before, I think that your planning horizon must be
at least a century, because you'll probably live that long
anyway, with modern medicine.
And you care about other people, too.
So, the beauty of futures markets is that we have prices
for the future.
We talked already about forward markets.
We talked about forward interest rates.
And that is related to what we're talking about.
Forwards and futures are similar concepts.
Futures is the more precise concept.
Or the more developed concept.
And I'll explain the difference between forwards
and futures.
But just in a nutshell, futures markets are organized
markets, like the stock market, that trade
standardized contracts, representing things that will
happen at future dates.
And because they're
standardized, they're worldwide.
Everybody looks at them and uses them.
Whereas forward markets are more specialized markets that,
typically, are not as easy to interpret or as clear.
So, futures markets are, in some sense, more fundamental
and important.
I have a particular interest --
I've been interested in futures markets myself for
many years.
And wondering, why they're not even
bigger and more important.
So, in 1993, I wrote a book called Macro Markets, about
let's make our markets bigger and more
important, and more pervasive.
And I've been trying to do that.
Notably, in 2006, I was working with the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, which is the biggest futures
market in the world.
And we created home price futures.
And they've been trading now for five years.
But I'm not really going to talk about them, because they
have so far disappointed.
They're not important, at least not yet.
But I'm going to talk about some
important futures markets.
First, I want to put just a couple of definitions up.
Futures, that's what we're going to talk about most in
this lecture, and it has a special meaning in finance.
And I was contrasting that to forwards.
But both of these together are derivatives.
And that means that the price in these markets derives from
a price in some other market.
There's a primary or underlying market, which has
its own price.
And then there's a derivative market that has a futures
price or a forward price.
I guess I'm speaking in kind of abstract terms. Well, let
me just start --
I want to give you an example, and we'll see better what I'm
talking about.
But let me just first comment just on this word,
derivatives.
To people in finance, derivatives are an exciting
development of financial markets.
We start out with a simple market and we develop
derivative markets, that add more detail and information
than was in the underlying or primary market.
That's exciting.
I find it exciting.
However --
I don't know how often you hear this word, derivative --
it's become a four-letter word.
It's become an ugly word.
Why is that?
I think it's, because people blame the current financial
crisis on derivatives, whether rightly or wrongly.
And it's because, I think, there's a public anger about
derivatives that is largely due to misunderstanding.
I mentioned before that I think that finance tends to
attract sociopaths.
I mentioned that, I defined that for you.
People who want to manipulate, and fool, and deceive people.
But I don't think the financial community is
particularly populated by sociopaths.
You might think so, reading some accounts.
But I think, it's not true.
And I think, it's not true, because the financial
community knows about this problem
and ejects such people.
They get caught.
And you can't make a career in finance if you're a sociopath.
So, if you think you have this problem, that you have
sociopathic tendencies, I would advise you not to go
into finance, because you will get caught and ejected.
So, save yourself the trouble.
Don't go into finance.
Pick some field where you can't hurt anybody.
And that would be a smart thing to do, if
you have such a problem.
So, I think we need to regulate derivatives markets,
and that's what I'm talking about.
And we need self-regulation of the markets themselves, but we
need government regulation as well.
But there's nothing evil about derivatives.
And in fact, derivatives are fundamental to the way I think
a modern economy works.
So, I had you read an article --
I put it on an earlier section of the reading list --
by Charles Conant, who wrote a book in 1904 called Wall
Street and the Country.
And you should have read that by how.
He starts out by saying, it's just amazing, how public
opinion thinks that speculation is evil.
And they don't understand that speculation is just business.
I mean, business decisions involve
guesses about the future.
And so, when you have well-developed markets, these
guesses become market prices.
And so, the prices go into the calculations
that everyone makes.
And the calculations are just done better.
Somehow, there's just a failure for most people to
understand it.
And I'm hoping in this lecture to try to give some more
understanding of these markets.
I think they're fascinating.
Most people apparently don't, because you don't hear them
brought up very much.
I want to just say a little bit more about hostility
toward derivative markets and futures markets, and
speculation in general.
In 1991, that was 20 years ago, I wrote a joint
paper with a --
I don't remember whether I mentioned this,
probably not --
with a Russian, a young man from Russia that I met when I
was visiting the Soviet Union, just before the end of the
Soviet Union.
And we were talking about how antagonistic Russians are
toward capitalism.
And he said, this is a big problem.
Russia just can't embrace capitalism.
These people hate it.
They hate the profit makers and the financiers.
And I said to him, well, you know, it's the same in the
U.S. How do you know it's any worse in Russia?
And so, we decided to do a questionnaire survey.
And I was going to read one of the questions, comparing
people in Moscow and people in New York, to see, which one
understands capitalism better.
So, one of the questions that we had was the following --
We wrote these questions and translated them into Russian.
And we tried to make them exactly the same questions
between Russian and English.
So, here's the question we asked in both cities: ''Grain
traders in capitalist countries sometimes hold grain
without selling it, putting it in temporary storage in
anticipation of higher prices later.
Do you think this speculation will cause more frequent
shortages of flour, bread and other grain products?
Or will it cause such shortages to become rarer?''
What do you think, people said?
Does the process of speculating in grain cause
problems or solve problems?
Well, we found that, in the USA, 66% said it will make
shortages more common.
But in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, only 45% thought it
would make shortages more common.
Both of them were wrong.
A lot of them were wrong, but the Russians were better,
closer to the truth than the Americans.
Living in the financial capital of the USA, most
people think that speculating in grain creates problems. But
wait a minute, what is speculation in grain?
That means holding it off, expecting higher
prices later, right?
Isn't that what you have to do if you are
managing a grain market?
Now, think of it this way -- and I'm coming now to
agricultural futures.
In the simplest world, there's one harvest
of wheat every year.
And that harvest comes in a certain time of the year,
every year.
Once a year.
And it has to be held in storage over the year, right?
Because people don't eat it all at once.
You eat it over the whole year.
So, somebody is storing grain.
This is a fundamental problem.
That's a business.
So, you have to know that somewhere there's some
warehouse holding the grain that you will be consuming in
six months time.
And that warehouse is run by some
professionals who do that.
If they think prices are higher later, they'll keep it
longer in the warehouse.
And what does that do?
That evens out the price.
It doesn't make it worse.
If they think there's going to be a shortage of grain, they
hold it back now and the price of grain goes up.
And so, everyone starts consuming a little less
because of the higher price, and it smoothes things out and
it works better.
And this is elementary economics, but it's not
understood, I think, by most people.
And the futures markets are just sophisticated markets
that help that process.
So, I'm going to start with agricultural futures in
talking about this.
And I want to start also with a very homely -- it's not
homely -- it's a very elementary example, because
it's the first futures market.
So, where do you think futures markets started?
You would think, it started in New York, or Chicago, or
London, or Paris.
It actually started in Japan in a place called Dojima,
which is in the city of Osaka.
And they started in the 1600s.
So, let's go back.
If we can go back to the year 1673, in Osaka in Japan.
Japan was heavily dependent on rice.
And the rice farmers would farm all over Japan, but there
was a rice market in Dojima, which was the
national rice market.
And I have data here.
According to a study, there were 91 rice warehouses in
Dojima in 1673.
That's a long time ago, isn't it?
So, it was a big storage place for rice, and they were
storing it all year.
And people would come, people who were merchants for rice,
and they would come to Dojima and they would sign contracts
to get rice.
I live in some town 20 miles from
here, I'm a rice merchant.
I need a regular supply of rice from your warehouse.
Can you supply it to me?
And the guy would give you a terms, and that would be a
forward contract.
And this is what was happening before the futures market.
Forward contracts precede futures contracts.
So, do you see what it is?
You're a rice merchant.
You make a deal.
You sign a contract that I will pay you so much in
currency at every month, and you'll give me so much rice.
And you'll deliver it here, and I'll take it, and I'll
sell it in my town.
Problems developed in the forward market that led to the
development of a futures market.
And the problem is, one of the problems is that there's
counterparty risk.
You are a rice merchant.
You make a deal with a warehouse.
That's one person dealing with one person, right?
What if one of the guys reneges on the deal?
So, for example, what if the price of rice falls?
Then you, the merchant, will say, I'm not going to go back
and buy according to this contract, because
it's cheaper now.
I'll buy it somewhere else.
So, I just don't show up, and then the warehouse is saying,
what happened to our contract?
And you're nowhere to be found.
Or if it goes the other way, if rice goes up, the warehouse
might renege.
They'd say, we signed this contract but there's something
wrong with it, and we're not going to honor it.
So, it messes up.
It is also possible that one of the two counterparties is
just a sociopath or something, or is an alcoholic, or
something is wrong.
So, the market doesn't work well.
So, what they invented in Japan was the first true
futures market.
And the market worked like this: There was a trading
floor in Dojima.
And rice traders would come there, and there were certain
hours of the day, when you would trade contracts for
future delivery.
But they were standardized contracts, mediated by the
exchange, so that there would be no
problem with the contract.
And then every day, there would be a trading time, and
you could buy and sell contracts for future delivery.
Moreover, they enforced trading hours.
And this is something that's kind of
an interesting invention.
They didn't have --
I guess they didn't have clocks.
I don't know what they had.
But they had a certain time, when trading would stop, and
they wanted to stop all the trading at the same time.
They didn't want people dribbling out.
They wanted it to be a good market.
So, they would light a fuse, and it would be a bright light
in the middle of the trading floor.
And you'd see the fuse burning down, and when it burned out,
all trading stopped.
So, they had trading hours.
Moreover, they had a problem that some of the traders
wouldn't stop trading.
So, this is something that they did in Dojima, they had
men called watermen, who came out with buckets of water.
And they would throw the buckets of water on anyone who
was still trading.
So that worked.
It stopped trading.
They also had hand signals.
This was big.
This is big time.
You were trading rice for all of Japan.
And you may think the 16- or 1700s are long ago, but a lot
of rice was traded and it got really noisy and difficult.
They found that it was so many people trading on the floor,
that you couldn't hear anyone talk.
And there'd be shouting and it was noisy, and so, they
devised a system of hand signals.
And the Dojima hand signals were, I don't know exactly,
but something like this.
If your hand was out, you put your hand
out, that means sell.
You put your hand this way, it meant buy.
And if you put three fingers up, it means
selling three contracts.
That kind of thing.
I don't know the whole system, but that's where it started.
That whole concept was copied all over the world in
subsequent centuries.
So, what is it that happened?
And the other thing is, what were the contracts that you
bought and sold?
The problem with the forward market is that the contracts
are all different.
One guy made a contract with one guy, and he said, I want
my delivery here.
And I don't like this kind of rice.
I want this kind.
And you better make sure that there's not a single insect in
it, or I'm going to reject the whole thing.
But that's all different.
So, you don't know what --
these contracts, you don't even know what the
price of rice is.
If someone said, I paid so much to get rice
in the future --
but you have to say, well, under what circumstances?
And what kind of rice?
And where?
And what are the terms for possible failure?
You know, there's so many terms in the contract, so you
don't even know what the price of rice is.
But at the futures market, they
standardized the contract.
So, it may not be exactly what you want, but it's
standardized.
So, you deliver rice --
I don't know all the details of Dojima, but I'm talking
about futures markets, as they evolve.
In a modern futures market, agricultural futures market,
you deliver your --
the contract is to deliver some commodity like rice at a
specified future date, at a specified future warehouse,
which would be run by the exchange.
And there's inspectors at the warehouse who
are expert on grain.
And they verify, because they know rice.
They know it really well.
And they know that some rice has bugs in it.
They know how to find out.
They have a standard.
Of course, there can always be some bugs in it, but they have
a standard and they have a way of measuring,
and they get it right.
And so, all those contracts are exactly the same.
And so, they become the price.
It turns out, funny thing, the futures market almost becomes
the real market, because they're all standardized.
The futures price --
You know where it's delivered.
You know what's delivered, exactly.
The futures market becomes the market, in a sense.
The fact that it's in the future is, in effect, a help,
because since it's a comfortable time in the
future, it's well defined.
Whereas the spot market --
the spot market is the market for rice, or whatever it is,
today as it's traded.
The spot market is inscrutable.
It's hard to understand.
So, let's think about a farmer today, who grows rice, or
wheat, or soybeans, or something.
If you drive through farming countries, listen to the
radio, regularly they'll give prices.
Soybeans, wheat, rice, et cetera.
Why do they give that?
Because farmers care.
They're raising this stuff.
It's their whole livelihood, whether they make a profit or
not, depends on it.
What prices do they quote?
They quote the futures prices, even though
they're in the future.
But they quote them, because they mean something and
they're standardized.
So, that's why the futures market
becomes the central market.
I want to just say something about futures --
Japan started the futures markets in the 1600s, and they
were the world leader in rice futures until 1939.
And then, at World War II, the Japanese government shut the
futures market down.
And to this day since, there is no rice
futures market in Japan.
Believe it or not.
The inventors, they're talking now of starting it up again.
Where do they trade rice futures?
Well, the USA is the main market, even though you don't
think of the U.S. as a market for rice.
But the point is, that markets have to be centralized.
And that people want the centralized market, and if it
happens to be in Chicago, so be it.
So, it becomes a huge international rice market.
And so, I looked up --
this is called Rough Rice Futures, and this is the
futures curve as of last Friday
[addition: March 18, 2011].
So, what we have is different delivery months.
This is May of this year.
And then, there's other delivery months, and then
there's next year.
It goes out about a year, different delivery dates.
And this is cents per 100 weight.
100 weight is 100 pounds of rice.
And since this is USA, we mean 100 U.S. pounds of rice.
But anyone in the world can figure this out and trade in
this market.
And it's in dollars, because it's what we're
trading in the USA.
So, someone in Japan, who wants to trade in the futures
market, has to come to the USA, change their yen into
dollars, and do this.
Now, you see that the futures price is going up.
This was all quoted last Friday
[addition: March 18, 2011].
This is the market, essentially, right now.
But you see, it's a futures market, because it's giving
prices of rice at dates in the future.
These prices way out here, next year, are not so
reliable, because there's not much trade.
The trade tends to dominate at the front months.
So, here's where most of the trade is.
They're trading May, and maybe this is July.
I forgot exactly.
Is that clear, what this means?
It's going up.
And it's going up pretty fast, isn't it?
From about less than $0.13 to $0.15.
What this means is that, in effect, the market is
expecting huge increases in the price of rice.
So, that's interesting.
Anyone who's doing business in rice looks at this and says,
look, there's price increases anticipated.
Now, I just want to talk about the world at this point in
history, and try to interpret this curve.
You must have heard that there is a food shortage in the
world developing.
And it's a source of crisis.
It's developing in the Middle East.
One reason why that's been given for the revolutions that
have happened in the Middle East are,
that people are hungry.
There's dissatisfaction when the price of food goes up.
A lot of people are living much more at the margin than
you'd imagine.
So, this increase in rice prices matters a lot.
So, it's very interesting that it's showing this steep
increase in the price of rice.
But the first thing you want to think of as a financier is
how much is this going up?
I didn't actually do the calculation.
It goes up from 14 --
under 13.75 to 15.5.
That's quite an increase in six months, right?
So, it sounds like there's a profit opportunity here.
Buy rice today and sell it on the futures market.
This is a good time to sell it.
I'll sell it in 2012.
And that's my futures profit.
I can lock in this price today, because that's what the
futures market does.
The contract is a c
…