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MALE SPEAKER: Thanks everybody for coming.
I'm very pleased to introduce Dr. James Robinson,
a university professor at the Harris School of Public Policy
at University of Chicago.
Prior to his work in Chicago, he was a professor of government
at Harvard University.
He's a distinguished scholar of comparative economics
and political development with a focus on the long run.
His book "Why Nations Fail" is a summary
of nearly 20 years of academic research and publications.
Its central theme is that the economic fate of nations
is determined by their institutions.
Today, when you look around the world,
there are enormous differences in income
per capita, development outcomes, life expectancy,
education, and other measures of human development.
Professor Robinson proposes a framework
for understanding these differences.
And importantly, this framework is also
used to examine patterns of development
to better understand the historical context of today's
inequality.
So please join me in welcoming Professor James Robinson.
JAMES ROBINSON: OK, thanks very much.
So I'm gonna give a half hour version of the book,
"Why Nations Fail," and then I think people can ask questions
and things like that.
So there's lots of different ways of talking about this.
I'll introduce the argument in the book.
And in the book, the first chapter
is about the long run history of North America and South
America, and why North America ended up so different
from South America.
But that takes a bit of time to get into to do justice to it.
So I find in a short talk the easiest way
to explain everything that the book is
about is to look at this photograph
of the Korean peninsula at night.
And you can see quite a few things about this.
Because in South Korea, there's lots of electricity,
and light bulbs.
And it's very bright.
And North Korea is very dark.
You can see a little spot of light there in Pyongyang.
It's probably the presidential compound in Pyongyang.
The previous president, he used to have a big wave machine.
So you probably need a lot of electricity
to drive a wave machine and light bulbs
to light you while you're surfing or whatever.
So anyway, so you can see that.
There's a lot of electricity and light in South Korea,
and not very much in North Korea.
And this is a very interesting proxy for economic success.
Most unsuccessful countries in the world,
economically, if you look at them
at night, sub-Saharan Africa, they're very black.
There's a lot of electricity and light bulbs in South Korea.
North Korea has the level of income
per capita prosperity of a sub-Saharan African country.
South Korea is one of the most successful economies
in the world in the last 40, 50 years.
It's a member of the OECD.
So what's the difference between an economically successful
country, like South Korea, and an economically unsuccessful
country, like North Korea?
So that's what the book is about.
The book is called "Why Nations Fail."
Fail is an ambiguous word, but it's
really about comparative economic development,
and trying to propose a simple way of thinking
about these differences.
And you could be sitting there thinking, well,
we know the difference between North Korea and South Korea.
North Korea is a communist country,
and South Korea is a capitalist country.
But that's not the generalization
we make in the book.
And I don't think it's a very useful generalization,
actually.
A country like North Korea, though it
might be avowedly communist, actually has
a lot in common with nearly every poor country that
doesn't say it's communist or doesn't claim to be communist.
So that's not going to be the distinction, OK?
So what is the difference between North Korea and South
Korea?
Well, South Korea has a lot of technology, OK?
So here you can see it has electricity and light
bulbs, not very new technology, but it has a lot of technology.
And economists have known since the work
of Robert Solow in the 1950s that what
drives economic development over the long run is innovation.
So I don't need to say that to people sitting in Google,
I guess.
It's all about innovation, about new technologies,
raising living standards, raising productivity.
So what Solow showed is that that drove long
run economic development.
And if you look around the world today,
and you say what's the difference
in some kind of accounting sense between poor countries
and rich countries, it's that poor countries just
don't use all of this technology that
has such incredibly positive consequences for living
standards and productivity.
Like, they don't use electricity and light bulbs in North Korea.
OK?
So
Why is that?
It's not something mysterious.
I mentioned light bulbs and electricity
being around a long time.
It's not that Google just invented it,
and the North Koreans haven't heard about it yet.
So this has been around for a long, long time,
but somehow they just don't use it.
So why is that?
Well, the book provides a simple way of thinking about that.
And going back to innovation and technological change,
what Robert Solow called total factor productivity,
makes you ask what drives these differences between North
Korea and South Korea?
And that's got something to do with the way
the economy is organized.
So, yes, I said it's not about socialism and capitalism,
but it is about the way these different countries are
organized.
What's interesting about the Korean case,
of course, is that North Korea and South Korea were pretty
similar 50, 60 years ago.
So this divergence is not some deep, long run
historical thing.
It's something that happened pretty recently.
And the most obvious reason, I think, why it happened
is that North and South Korea got organized
in very different ways.
The economy got organized in very different ways.
And in South Korea, a society emerged
where there were incentives and opportunities for people
who wanted to innovate, who wanted
to create new technologies.
And in North Korea, there were neither incentives
nor opportunities for anyone who wanted
to do anything like that.
So I think the communism-socialism captures
some idea about opportunities and incentives,
but the whole problem is much different from that,
and much more general than communism versus capitalism.
So big differences in economic development,
big differences in the use of technology,
big differences in people's incentives and opportunities.
I'm gonna come back also to the last layer of it, which
is gonna be, how come North Korea and South
Korea got organized like that?
How come in South Korea a society got organized which
created incentives and opportunities for people
to innovate and adopt technology and North Korea didn't?
And that's also, obviously, something
to do with the politics of those societies.
So in the book, the book is about comparative economic
development.
It says, there's these layers of trying
to understand comparative economic development.
There's the economic layer, innovation,
technological change, what induces that?
What creates very different patterns
of that in different countries?
But then lying behind that is a deeper question in some sense,
which is why is it that some societies got organized
in a way that creates incentives and opportunities,
and other societies didn't, or don't?
So maybe I shouldn't show who this gentleman is in Google,
but I couldn't resist the temptation.
Let me give you another example which
does come up in the first book.
So I talked about it in the first chapter.
I talked about North Korea, South Korea.
Let me give you another example we use,
which has got us into a bit of trouble, which is the two
richest men in the world.
I know fortunes go up and down, but they're usually up there
in the top three or four-- Bill Gates and Carlos
Slim in Mexico.
So what we get you to think about in the first chapter
of the book is it's very telling to understand why the United
States is more economically successful than Mexico,
say, to think about how Carlos Slim and Bill
Gates made their money.
Bill Gates made his money by innovating.
This picture is very significant.
I'm gonna come back to it in a second.
Bill Gates made his money by innovating.
Carlos Slim made his money with monopolies.
Bill Gates, he made a fortune, but he also
created a lot of wealth for other people.
He created lots of positive externalities
in the computer industry.
So he created a lot more wealth than he
himself was able to grab.
Carlos Slim, according to the OECD,
reduced GDP in Mexico by about 2% a year.
So this is a very conservative kind of deadweight.
For the economists in the room, deadweight losses of monopoly
reduces the Mexican GDP by about 2% a year.
So he actually reduced GDP in Mexico, according to the OECD,
by more than his own fortune.
So it's not just a matter of taking wealth from Mexicans
and giving it to him.
It's actually reducing income in Mexico.
So in the US, innovation, you make a lot of money.
It has all these spillovers.
In Mexico, the way to make money is not through innovation.
The way to make money is to get monopolies,
and that actually makes you very rich,
but it actually reduces the prosperity of the society.
So this is the United States and Mexico,
but I want you to think this is really what goes on
in North Korea and South Korea.
In both cases, you have economies, some of which
are designed to create incentives and opportunities
for innovation, but other ones where you have
very different incentives, very different opportunities,
with very different consequences for the economy.
Now, I said Carlos Slim was a monopolist
and Bill Gates was an innovator.
But of course, this is not about people.
This is about systems.
Bill Gates wanted to be a monopolist too.
Everyone wants to be a monopolist.
Professors want to be intellectual monopolists.
Google, heaven forbid, they'd probably
like to be a monopolist too, if they could get away with it.
But this is Bill Gates giving evidence
to the US antitrust authorities.
This is, I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth.
So here politics starts seeping in as well.
So it's not just that there's incentives and opportunities
in some places and not in other places,
but there's a system, what we call
institutions in social science.
There's a system of institutions that creates and sustains
those incentives and those opportunities.
And that involves, in this case, the state.
It involves the implementation of antitrust policy,
and that's an old story in the US.
This is a contemporary cartoon from early
in the last century, the octopus of the Standard Oil Company.
So the Standard Oil Company was one of the big, famous trusts,
Rockefeller's trust.
And here it is, with its tentacles
around Congress and the White House.
And this was the robber barons, the first age
of great monopolization in the US economy
in the late 19th century.
And what as the consequence of the robber barons?
The consequence was the origin of antitrust
and indeed, the Standard Oil Company
was broken up by US antitrust as was Bell Telephones, et cetera,
subsequently.
So there's an old history of fighting against monopolies
in the US, and sustaining an institutional environment which
creates these incentives and opportunities.
So in the book, I'm painting a dichotomy here.
The world's more complicated.
There's lots of nuances and gray areas.
But just for the sake of the argument,
it's helpful to think of two different types of societies,
societies where somehow things get organized,
institutions get organized in a way
which creates these incentives and opportunities.
That creates innovation.
It creates prosperity.
And there's other places where things work differently.
Maybe it's Mexico.
Maybe it's North Korea.
Maybe it's the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, where I do a lot of research.
Part of the story with electricity, of course,
is it's not just the private sector or innovation
in the private sector, but the public sector
has to be incentivized to provide
basic public goods, like roads.
So this is what they call interstate number one.
This is one of the main highways in the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
Now, the government doesn't bother
providing any infrastructure.
You can see what this is like.
This is the dry season.
You have to dig yourself out every kilometer or so.
If it was the wet season, you wouldn't be going anywhere.
So this is an even more dramatic failure
in terms of provision of basic public goods and services
than you'd find in North Korea.
So we put some labels on these different economic systems.
We say, what is it that South Korea and the United States
has in common with other prosperous places?
It has these economic institutions,
rules that incentivize people, and create opportunities.
And we call them inclusive.
So we say if you think about the economy, what's common
in these places is that they have
inclusive economic institutions.
So why this word inclusive?
So let me go back to the light bulb.
So here's Edison's patent for the light bulb.
So I have one thing in common with Thomas Edison.
He had very bad hearing.
He had very bad hearing as well.
So that's probably the only thing
I have in common with Thomas Edison.
So Edison patented the light bulb in 1880.
Now, patents are very interesting things.
Patents are very closely connected
to incentivizing innovation.
Patents have a long history.
Patents were in the US Constitution.
The first patent board met in 1790.
It was so important that Thomas Jefferson was on it.
So what was so important about the patents
and giving out patents and stuff?
Well, it was about creating incentives for innovation.
Innovation creates positive externalities.
So any person thinking about innovating
is never gonna benefit from all the wealth
that they create because of these externalities.
So the idea here was, patents bring the private return
to innovation closer to the social return.
Now, what's particularly interesting
about patents is if you study who took out patents in the US,
historically, like who was it that took out patents?
And what's interesting about the social background of patentees
is that they come from all over the social spectrum.
So I don't know if people have an analysis of who
works for Google, but economic historians
did an analysis of 19th century patenting in the US.
And what they showed was, who took out patents?
Artisans, farmers, elites, non-elites,
professional people, uneducated people.
Thomas Edison hardly had any formal schooling.
He was basically home schooled by his mother.
I'm not advocating lack of schooling
as a strategy for innovation, but I'm just
saying talent, ideas, creativity,
that's spread out very broadly in society.
You don't know where that is.
So you need to create a system which can harness
all of that latent talent.
And this was part of the system.
And why the word inclusive?
Well, because you need to include everybody in this.
Patenting, it didn't matter who you were.
You could take out a patent.
You paid a fee, and the state enforced your patent.
The government enforced your patent
like the government enforced antitrust.
This inspired this word inclusive in the research
we do, but that's the economics of it.
If you want to have innovation, you want to have prosperity,
you need to have these inclusive economic institutions.
What's the opposite of that?
Well, extractive economic institutions.
That's what they have in North Korea,
or that's what they have in Mexico.
You could say, North Korea and Mexico,
those place are really different, aren't they?
Well, yeah, they are.
But what one thing we do in the book is to say,
if you look at poor countries in the world today,
they look terribly different.
Uzbekistan, North Korea, Sierra Leone,
Columbia, what do those places have in common?
All the details look different, but this idea
of extractive institutions or inclusive institutions
is supposed to say, yes, all these details look very
different, but actually, from the economic point of view,
they all have this consequence of blocking
talent and creativity.
So that's the economics of it.
But what's more interesting, I think,
and more innovative, at least academically, is to say,
but you need to get beyond that.
We need to ask why was it that in the US
they were so obsessed with setting up this patent system?
Or, why was it they created a state
that was able to enforce antitrust, and drag the richest
man in the world into a court?
Why was it that the US created such a political society,
or such a set of political institutions?
So we emphasize, again, something
which is obvious from the Korean example, which
is lying behind these different economic systems
are different political systems somehow.
So what creates inclusive economic institutions
are inclusive political institutions.
And what creates extracting economic institutions
are extractive political institutions.
So we emphasize two dimensions of political institutions,
both of which will come up in-- I was gonna say the discussion,
but it's not a discussion.
It's more like a pontification.
So why was it?
What does it take?
I'm asking what does it take to create an inclusive economy?
What does it take to create a patent system which
is open to everybody on the same terms,
with a state which can come along and enforce
that system once it's set up?
Well, we emphasize two dimensions of that, one,
which is really something like state capacity,
or we call it political centralization, which
is that what happened in the United States was,
they created a state, a model state, which
was able to enforce rules.
So this is a crucial part of having
inclusive economic institutions.
A problem in the Congo, for example,
is the Congo doesn't have a state, which is actually
capable of raising resources or enforcing rules.
The state doesn't exist.
The state is so corrupt and patrimonial and ineffective,
so that's part of the story.
The other thing we emphasize is that political power
has to be broadly distributed in society.
So the reason that the patent system got set up
the way it did in the United States
is because the United States in 1790
wasn't the modern democracy in the way political scientists
would describe it.
But it was a situation where political power
was very broadly based in society, at least
amongst adult males.
So power was too broadly distributed
to create some oligarchic patent system.
So these are the two elements of inclusive political
institutions.
So when those things fail, when you either have a weak state
or you lack a state, or political power is narrowly
concentrated, that's a situation where
we say you have extractive political institutions.
So here's an example of extractive political
institutions.
It's a fun example.
President Mugabe, who's been President of Zimbabwe
since 1980, you might know he's a very successful politician.
He's also a very lucky man.
He won the lottery here.
So that's impressive.
He's the President, and he wins the lottery.
So here's a situation where there's
a very narrow concentration of political power.
There's a lack of accountability.
That's not a circumstance in which
you're gonna get inclusive economic institutions.
So if you were gonna put the whole thesis in a matrix--
they wouldn't let us put this in the book.
This was too complicated.
No, no.
You can't put that in the book.
But it's very useful when you give talks.
Again, this dichotomy is very simplistic,
and I'm happy to talk about nuance.
But the idea is to say, think about the matrix.
Then poor countries, where are poor countries?
Poor countries are in this cell of the matrix
here, with extractive economic institutions
underpinned by extractive political institutions.
Economically successful countries
are in the cell of the matrix where
there's inclusive economic institutions.
That drives innovation, drives growth.
But they have to be underpinned by inclusive political
institutions.
So what about the off diagonals?
Well, what we say about the off diagonals
is that the off diagonals are u
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