Advertisement
English transcript
Prof: So today we will be talking about The German
Ideology, and Marx becoming a historical
materialist.
I just wanted to make a couple of more comments about "The
Theses on Feuerbach," where Marx is on the edge,
moving away from naturalism to historical materialism.
But the emphasis in "The Theses on Feuerbach"
is not so much on materialism, but it is much more on praxis,
action, change, the lack of
determination.
Marx, as a materialist, is usually seen as a
determinist.
And if you took other courses where much was--Marx was touched
upon, you were probably told Marx is a determinist,
economic determinist.
And there's a lot of truth to it, but half-truths,
and he is struggling in "The Theses on
Feuerbach"-- as I said, he's on his way from
naturalism to materialism, and the central idea is,
as I said, praxis, human practices.
And that's why I put down on the slides that it is a kind of
dialectical, what Marx represents in
"The Theses on Feuerbach".
Now Marx himself very rarely used the term 'dialectical'.
He had a clear enough mind to be suspicious about the word
'dialectics'.
Once, at an old age, he wrote a letter to Engels and
he said, "You know Friedrich what?
When I don't know what something, then I say it is
dialectical."
Right?
And so dialectical means when you couldn't really find out
what the relationship between two phenomena is,
when you say, "Well this is
dialectical."
Well it's a bit too simplistic.
The term 'dialectical', as I am sure you all know,
go back to Greek philosophy.
But even in Greek philosophy, the idea of dialectics was
emphasizing change and the process.
A famous Greek philosopher once said--and that tries to capture
the essence of dialectics--"You cannot
step in the same river twice.
Because if you step in the river, five minutes later it is
not quite the same river because the water is gone;
this is a different water." Right?
So that dialectics means that the world is in flux,
is in change.
That's, I think, one important idea of
dialectics.
And in "The Theses on Feuerbach",
Marx emphasizes--right?--that we are changing the world,
rather just taking it.
Right?
In this sense he's dialectical, and this is why he still
resists materialism and determinism.
There is another, more contemporary adaptation of
the word dialectics, which comes from Georg Hegel.
And Marx again was shying away to use it very often.
But his friend Friedrich Engels used it.
He even said there is a dialectical materialism.
Engels made a distinction between historical and
dialectical materialism.
Now what was dialectics in Hegel?
Hegel was trying to capturing the process of change.
Right?
Already in Greek philosophy the dialecticians emphasized that if
you are looking at the world, this is not a picture,
it is a movie-- right?--and every minute you
see something different.
Now Hegel tried to come to terms with what is the essence
of this change?
In this essence of this change, he was looking at
contradictions.
Contradictions drive the change.
So Hegel made a big distinction between thesis,
antithesis and synthesis.
So the change, what dialectics captures
normally in social life, it starts with a thesis,
and actual conditions, an antithesis,
which is the negation of the situation,
and then it leads to a synthesis, which is the negation
of the negation.
Right?
In some ways the original condition is reconstituted,
but in a different way; as Hegel put it,
"preserving it by abolishing it."
Right?
That's the Hegelian insight what actually was--this kind of
logic was attractive to Marx and the Marxists.
Anyway, so this is dialectical.
And Marx, from dialectical, from the philosophy of praxis
where praxis is crucial, eventually moves towards a more
clearly deterministic, positivistic social science in
which you have a very clearer idea what is the key cause and
the consequences.
Right?
Doing very much what positivist social science is doing today;
identifying the dependent variable and independent
variable, to come up with a hypothesis
how the dependent variable will cause variation,
and the independent variable will cause variation in the
dependent variable, and then to describe it.
That is very much the mature Marx.
And because Marx was moving into, today we will call it
normal science, he becomes a real scientist.
He was becoming so much of a scientist that at one point he
began to doubt there is much sense to make a distinction
between social sciences and sciences.
He himself began to see himself as the Darwin of social
sciences.
He was so much attracted with scientific reasoning--
the late Marx, the second Marx we will start
talking about-- that he actually for awhile
considered to dedicate the book, Kapital,
to Charles Darwin, because he saw himself as doing
for human history what Marx did to the evolution of the species.
He wanted to do an evolution of human societies.
Now luckily for Marx he did not do that.
Right?
He did not become a social Darwinist.
Right?
He resisted the temptation.
But he was tempted.
Okay, I just want to go back very briefly to two "Theses
on Feuerbach," because they are very
important.
Right?
And this is the idea. Right?
He is now criticizing--right?--Feuerbach.
And the problem with Feuerbach, he said,
that Feuerbach, and other people who were
materialists before him, they thought that there are
things outside there, objective things,
which are outside of the subject,
which creates a knowledge about these objects--
he called that Gegenstand,
object-- and the knowledge is nothing
else but a reflection in human mind of the object outside
there.
This is a very typical theory of truth.
Right?
Very widely shared today, and probably a theory of truth
what many of you in this room share.
Right?
When is your knowledge accurate?
You think about your mind as a mirror.
If the image of the object, or the objective world outside,
is accurately reflected in the mirror of your mind,
then you got it.
Right?
So what we try to do is to have the most perfect mirror in our
mind, and capture the objective
reality as precisely and as much in detail as possible.
Well Marx says this is simply, you know, reflection,
and we should go beyond that.
Right?
He said, "What is good about what Feuerbach did,
what is good what"--for instance, what Montesquieu did.
These were the two people we discussed so far who were
clearly, you know, materialist;
though I mean Hobbes was pretty much a materialist as well,
believing that this is sort of biological conditions which
drive us and makes us what we are.
So they all started from sensuousness.
Right?
That the reality is something what we can get at through our
senses.
Right?
We smell it, we touch it,
we see it, and unless we touch it, we see it,
we smell it, we doubt whether it exists.
Right?
That's the difference--right?--between
materialist and idealist.
Ideas you don't get through your senses.
Right?
You get it through your mind.
But he said this is--this materialism is sensuous only in
the sense of contemplation.
The object is outside of the subject and you get a grasp of
it through your senses.
And he said, "Well, but what I am
suggesting in my new approach is sensuous--
all right?--but a sensuous human activity--
an activity, as such."
I mentioned very briefly that this, in the last lecture--let
me just make--come back to this point again.
This is what Jürgen Habermas, arguably the greatest
philosopher of the twentieth century--well he's still alive
but he may--you know?
The twenty-first century has a long way to go to decide who
will be the greatest philosopher.
But many thinks that Jürgen Habermas was the
greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.
He said, "Well yes, Marx in "The Theses on
Feuerbach" is right"
at one point.
I mean, Habermas had his 'culture' turn,
moved away from materialism.
But in most of his life he said, "I am a materialist
because I also believe that the ultimate reality has to come
through sensuous experiences, through the senses." Right?
But he said, "Marx later on,
the mature Marx became reductionist,
because the sensuous activity he identified with the economy,
with production, with economic activities."
And he said, "In "The Theses on
Feuerbach" he got it right.
All sensuous activity are material."
"So therefore," he says,
"let's not simply limit our analysis to production,
but let's look at human interaction."
When we interact with each other, this is also a sensuous
activity.
Right?
So he creates peace between Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx.
Many people try to do that.
Right?
That this is not an opposition, that it is either production or
your sexual drives.
You know, your sexual drives--your sexual interaction
with others--is very much sensuous.
Right?
It's actually more sensuous than doing a job--right?-- than,
you know, being in McDonald's and serving hamburgers.
That's sensuous activity.
But all right, you know, sexual interaction is
very much sensuous.
That's Habermas's point.
And Marx, in "The Theses on Feuerbach",
opens this possibility up.
It's a very open argument.
Okay?
This is actually one of the reasons why he does not publish
it.
It's too vague.
He wanted to be more precise, and then he wanted to go--
he was reading Adam Smith and Ricardo,
and spent all of his time in the British Library reading
these economists, and he wanted to bring it back
down to earth, to the economy and economic
interest.
And now let me start to this, because I think that's very
important the theory of truth.
And I want you to think about it.
I think this is very interesting.
So what is truth?
And to be very simplistic--right?--you have two
competing theories of truth.
One theory of truth, what I think most of you have
in your mind, is the kind of reflection
theory of truth--that our mind is a mirror.
More accurately it reflects the objective reality out there more
true, the knowledge what we have in our mind is.
And Marx, in "The Theses on Feuerbach",
says, "Not so.
The truth is a practical question.
The problem with the reflection theory of truth is that it is
positivist and it is alienated."
I'll throw in another word coined by a major Marxist
philosopher of the twentieth century, Georg Lukács.
He called it this is reified consciousness.
Reified--you know, Lukács was writing in
German, and in German he used the term Verdinglichung.
Ding means a thing.
I think reification is a very good translation.
Only those of us who speak English but do not speak Latin
don't necessarily quite get it.
Right?
Rei in Latin means the thing.
Reification is the process in which we turn stuff,
what is not a thing, into an objective thing.
It's a kind of--right?--Lukácsian
reinterpretation of Marx's notion of alienation.
Marx's term, in German, for reification was
Entfremdung; fremd means alien. Right?
So alienation is a good translation.
Right?
You are alienated if you feel alien, if you feel homeless in
this world.
Now I think but Lukács has an interesting idea--
right?--that the essence of alienation is when we're
beginning to see the world, what actually we created--the
world is our creation and this objective world will rule us.
We do not see ourselves as the masters of the world,
but we see ourselves as ruled by the world.
Right?
And this is reified consciousness,
when we're beginning to see the objective reality,
we cannot do anything about it.
Right?
And the essence is the philosophy of praxis of the
young Marx, ending--right?--with "The
Theses on Feuerbach", the point is to change it;
the point is to change the world.
So in contemporary discourse we usually call this positivism.
Right?
Positivists are those social scientists who think there are
objective facts out there, and the purpose of social
investigation is to establish most objectively and most
concretely what those objective social facts are.
You are an economist, you describe the objective
facts.
Right?
You say, "Well you have to maximize profit,
because if you do not maximize profit,
then you will be wiped out of business."
Right?
This is almost like a force of nature.
Again, if I can recall Georg Lukács,
he coined this wonderful term second nature.
Right?
That we're beginning to think about social life as if it were
natural, as if it would have the power of nature;
the economic laws look like lightening.
You know?
Like, you know, this force-- like earthquakes.
Right?
You can't do virtually nothing about an earthquake.
If we can't predict what we can't predict,
we can just get into our car and get out of it.
Right?
But even we cannot really predict earthquakes.
That's one of the problems.
Right?
Well now we can predict when a hurricane is coming.
What can we do?
You get in the car and get out of there, where the hurricane
will come.
Now, you know, the point is that positivism
does posits social phenomena as if they had the force of nature.
And that's what Lukács called we create the social
world as if it were second nature, as if it had the force
of nature.
He said this is all wrong because this is the world what
we created.
We should rule it. Right?
That's the idea, to overcome alienation;
to become the master of your fate.
Right?
To be able--right?--to change the objective conditions.
And we will--you know, in The German Ideology,
Marx puts it very powerfully.
I would say it's almost the last word what in this debate he
said-- was said.
I don't think anybody really improved on it.
He said, "Well, humans change the conditions.
But we were born under certain conditions, and we can only
change the conditions we were born into."
Right?
So it's an interesting interaction between yes,
I mean we can't do anything--right?--
because we were born into conditions,
but within some limits we can change those conditions.
By the way, it's not all that different from
Hobbes--right?--and voluntary action, the theory of voluntary
action.
There is a similarity here.
Now I'll finish this and get onto The German Ideology.
But there is one thing what I cannot leave out,
too--I think too insightful and important to leave it out.
So let me come back to this subject and object issue.
Right?
What I've suggested, it is so extremely important,
not only for Marx but for the whole critical theory,
and, in fact, for anti-positivism of all
sorts in the twentieth and twenty-first century.
I mentioned, for instance,
cultural theory, which is very strongly
anti-positivist--right?--and rejects social science as normal
science.
So what we have is subject.
And that is you--right?--the person who has a consciousness
and is a cognitive subject--is involved in cognitive activity,
creating knowledge.
And then there are objects about which we create knowledge.
Reflection theory of truth said that this is a mirror and if the
objects are accurately described in the mirror of our mind,
that is truth.
This is the whole test of having verification of
hypotheses.
Right?
I develop a hypothesis.
Then I go there and test it on the social reality,
and if it is matches, then it is verified,
I got truth.
Right?
Now the philosophy of praxis says that truth is not simply a
reflection, it's an interaction between subject and object;
that's where truth is.
And there is this wonderful philosopher-- not a very easy
read, but still I think a wonderful mind.
His name is Adorno.
Adorno belonged to the Frankfurt School and was active
mainly in the 1940s and '60s--'30s and '60s.
And well he formulated this so powerfully.
He said, "What is truth?"
He said, "The truth is the force-field between subject and
object."
Right?
"Not simply a reflection of the object,
but it is between the tension of subject and object."
Right?
I think this is beautifully done.
Right?
It is in the force-field of subject and object.
So let me also add one more point, and then we can move away
the theory of truth.
But I want you guys to think about what is truth?
Right?
When can you say an idea is true?
In fact, Adorno at one point said about Nazism.
You know?
He said--experiencing, he was Jewish and many of his
family were killed--right?--by the Nazis.
And he said, "The reality,
Nazi reality, is so miserable that it does
not deserve to be called true."
You see the point?
You also say that occasionally, when you see something horrible
and you can say, "No, that cannot be
true." Right?
This is exactly Adorno's point.
This can be so miserable that you say it cannot be true.
And the idea is that they are so miserable that you are
completely powerlessness about these nature-like forces though
it is unacceptable--right?
You should be able to do something about it.
Right?
We should have been able to do something about Auschwitz,
and they could not do anything about it.
And that's what Adorno said.
This reality was such that it should not be called true;
it cannot be truth.
You see what it is getting at?
A very final point about this theory of truth,
and this is through another guy, Karl Mannheim.
This is very much along this line.
He was very much not a Marxist.
He was a conservative philosopher.
His major work was done in England.
Mannheim once said, "The truth is not being.
The truth is becoming."
Bingo. Right?
Wonderfully put. Right?
The truth is not simply that you describe how things are.
You really know what the truth is when you know what it can be,
and what you can do about it.
The real purpose of cognition is not simply to describe the
world but to change it--right?--to make it a better
world.
That's when you have real truth, when you know how to make
the world better.
Right?
So the truth is not being but becoming.
And that's the philosophy of praxis.
But I think that's where Marx is in writing "The Theses
on Feuerbach", and that's what he is moving
away from when he's beginning to write The German
Ideology.
But he is writing together with Friedrich Engels.
And now you see he has to abandon--he cannot publish the
book-- "The Theses on Feuerbach"
because it is too voluntaristic.
Right?
He abandoned The Paris Manuscript because it was
fluffy.
Right?
"Nobody will believe me that the revolution will come
because the proletariat is alienated."
And then when he finished--I think this--I mean,
not all eleven sentences are great, but some of those
sentences are really great sentences.
He wrote it down and he never published it because he said,
"Well, this is too voluntaristic."
Right?
"I have to come up with a more- with a theory which will
prove to people that the revolution will come.
Capitalism has to fall.
It is not only a question whether we decide to change it
or we don't have to change it." Right?
"I have to come up with a theory which will prove that
capitalism will have to fall." Right?
That's what puts him into the deterministic mode.
He actually becomes never really deterministic.
It's a very simplistic reading of Marx.
You know, after all this guy is a theorist of the revolution.
He thought that revolutionary ideas should be put into
people's head.
This idea did not think that ideas do not matter.
If he would have believed ideas do not matter,
he would not have spent, you know, all of his time,
eight in the morning, nine-- until nine p.m.
in the British library, and writing books.
Right?
If ideas do not matter, why do you write down ideas?
Because he believed that ideas will change the world.
Right?
So he was never completely a deterministic.
But in the nature of the work he's moving towards economic
determinism.
And the reason is that now he wants to prove that
capitalism--yes, it had great achievement.
During the time of capitalism society developed more than ever
before capitalism.
But nevertheless it will have to come an end.
Capitalism will not last forever.
And now he has to prove that thesis, that it must come to an
end.
So that puts him on a deterministic trajectory.
That's what makes him--he has to become--he has to accept
materialism; that material conditions
determine human action and consciousness.
So that's what he--they are beginning to develop in The
German Ideology.
And this is the structure of the book.
The first chapter is a critique on Feuerbach;
takes on from "The Theses on
…
Ideology, and Marx becoming a historical
materialist.
I just wanted to make a couple of more comments about "The
Theses on Feuerbach," where Marx is on the edge,
moving away from naturalism to historical materialism.
But the emphasis in "The Theses on Feuerbach"
is not so much on materialism, but it is much more on praxis,
action, change, the lack of
determination.
Marx, as a materialist, is usually seen as a
determinist.
And if you took other courses where much was--Marx was touched
upon, you were probably told Marx is a determinist,
economic determinist.
And there's a lot of truth to it, but half-truths,
and he is struggling in "The Theses on
Feuerbach"-- as I said, he's on his way from
naturalism to materialism, and the central idea is,
as I said, praxis, human practices.
And that's why I put down on the slides that it is a kind of
dialectical, what Marx represents in
"The Theses on Feuerbach".
Now Marx himself very rarely used the term 'dialectical'.
He had a clear enough mind to be suspicious about the word
'dialectics'.
Once, at an old age, he wrote a letter to Engels and
he said, "You know Friedrich what?
When I don't know what something, then I say it is
dialectical."
Right?
And so dialectical means when you couldn't really find out
what the relationship between two phenomena is,
when you say, "Well this is
dialectical."
Well it's a bit too simplistic.
The term 'dialectical', as I am sure you all know,
go back to Greek philosophy.
But even in Greek philosophy, the idea of dialectics was
emphasizing change and the process.
A famous Greek philosopher once said--and that tries to capture
the essence of dialectics--"You cannot
step in the same river twice.
Because if you step in the river, five minutes later it is
not quite the same river because the water is gone;
this is a different water." Right?
So that dialectics means that the world is in flux,
is in change.
That's, I think, one important idea of
dialectics.
And in "The Theses on Feuerbach",
Marx emphasizes--right?--that we are changing the world,
rather just taking it.
Right?
In this sense he's dialectical, and this is why he still
resists materialism and determinism.
There is another, more contemporary adaptation of
the word dialectics, which comes from Georg Hegel.
And Marx again was shying away to use it very often.
But his friend Friedrich Engels used it.
He even said there is a dialectical materialism.
Engels made a distinction between historical and
dialectical materialism.
Now what was dialectics in Hegel?
Hegel was trying to capturing the process of change.
Right?
Already in Greek philosophy the dialecticians emphasized that if
you are looking at the world, this is not a picture,
it is a movie-- right?--and every minute you
see something different.
Now Hegel tried to come to terms with what is the essence
of this change?
In this essence of this change, he was looking at
contradictions.
Contradictions drive the change.
So Hegel made a big distinction between thesis,
antithesis and synthesis.
So the change, what dialectics captures
normally in social life, it starts with a thesis,
and actual conditions, an antithesis,
which is the negation of the situation,
and then it leads to a synthesis, which is the negation
of the negation.
Right?
In some ways the original condition is reconstituted,
but in a different way; as Hegel put it,
"preserving it by abolishing it."
Right?
That's the Hegelian insight what actually was--this kind of
logic was attractive to Marx and the Marxists.
Anyway, so this is dialectical.
And Marx, from dialectical, from the philosophy of praxis
where praxis is crucial, eventually moves towards a more
clearly deterministic, positivistic social science in
which you have a very clearer idea what is the key cause and
the consequences.
Right?
Doing very much what positivist social science is doing today;
identifying the dependent variable and independent
variable, to come up with a hypothesis
how the dependent variable will cause variation,
and the independent variable will cause variation in the
dependent variable, and then to describe it.
That is very much the mature Marx.
And because Marx was moving into, today we will call it
normal science, he becomes a real scientist.
He was becoming so much of a scientist that at one point he
began to doubt there is much sense to make a distinction
between social sciences and sciences.
He himself began to see himself as the Darwin of social
sciences.
He was so much attracted with scientific reasoning--
the late Marx, the second Marx we will start
talking about-- that he actually for awhile
considered to dedicate the book, Kapital,
to Charles Darwin, because he saw himself as doing
for human history what Marx did to the evolution of the species.
He wanted to do an evolution of human societies.
Now luckily for Marx he did not do that.
Right?
He did not become a social Darwinist.
Right?
He resisted the temptation.
But he was tempted.
Okay, I just want to go back very briefly to two "Theses
on Feuerbach," because they are very
important.
Right?
And this is the idea. Right?
He is now criticizing--right?--Feuerbach.
And the problem with Feuerbach, he said,
that Feuerbach, and other people who were
materialists before him, they thought that there are
things outside there, objective things,
which are outside of the subject,
which creates a knowledge about these objects--
he called that Gegenstand,
object-- and the knowledge is nothing
else but a reflection in human mind of the object outside
there.
This is a very typical theory of truth.
Right?
Very widely shared today, and probably a theory of truth
what many of you in this room share.
Right?
When is your knowledge accurate?
You think about your mind as a mirror.
If the image of the object, or the objective world outside,
is accurately reflected in the mirror of your mind,
then you got it.
Right?
So what we try to do is to have the most perfect mirror in our
mind, and capture the objective
reality as precisely and as much in detail as possible.
Well Marx says this is simply, you know, reflection,
and we should go beyond that.
Right?
He said, "What is good about what Feuerbach did,
what is good what"--for instance, what Montesquieu did.
These were the two people we discussed so far who were
clearly, you know, materialist;
though I mean Hobbes was pretty much a materialist as well,
believing that this is sort of biological conditions which
drive us and makes us what we are.
So they all started from sensuousness.
Right?
That the reality is something what we can get at through our
senses.
Right?
We smell it, we touch it,
we see it, and unless we touch it, we see it,
we smell it, we doubt whether it exists.
Right?
That's the difference--right?--between
materialist and idealist.
Ideas you don't get through your senses.
Right?
You get it through your mind.
But he said this is--this materialism is sensuous only in
the sense of contemplation.
The object is outside of the subject and you get a grasp of
it through your senses.
And he said, "Well, but what I am
suggesting in my new approach is sensuous--
all right?--but a sensuous human activity--
an activity, as such."
I mentioned very briefly that this, in the last lecture--let
me just make--come back to this point again.
This is what Jürgen Habermas, arguably the greatest
philosopher of the twentieth century--well he's still alive
but he may--you know?
The twenty-first century has a long way to go to decide who
will be the greatest philosopher.
But many thinks that Jürgen Habermas was the
greatest philosopher of the twentieth century.
He said, "Well yes, Marx in "The Theses on
Feuerbach" is right"
at one point.
I mean, Habermas had his 'culture' turn,
moved away from materialism.
But in most of his life he said, "I am a materialist
because I also believe that the ultimate reality has to come
through sensuous experiences, through the senses." Right?
But he said, "Marx later on,
the mature Marx became reductionist,
because the sensuous activity he identified with the economy,
with production, with economic activities."
And he said, "In "The Theses on
Feuerbach" he got it right.
All sensuous activity are material."
"So therefore," he says,
"let's not simply limit our analysis to production,
but let's look at human interaction."
When we interact with each other, this is also a sensuous
activity.
Right?
So he creates peace between Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx.
Many people try to do that.
Right?
That this is not an opposition, that it is either production or
your sexual drives.
You know, your sexual drives--your sexual interaction
with others--is very much sensuous.
Right?
It's actually more sensuous than doing a job--right?-- than,
you know, being in McDonald's and serving hamburgers.
That's sensuous activity.
But all right, you know, sexual interaction is
very much sensuous.
That's Habermas's point.
And Marx, in "The Theses on Feuerbach",
opens this possibility up.
It's a very open argument.
Okay?
This is actually one of the reasons why he does not publish
it.
It's too vague.
He wanted to be more precise, and then he wanted to go--
he was reading Adam Smith and Ricardo,
and spent all of his time in the British Library reading
these economists, and he wanted to bring it back
down to earth, to the economy and economic
interest.
And now let me start to this, because I think that's very
important the theory of truth.
And I want you to think about it.
I think this is very interesting.
So what is truth?
And to be very simplistic--right?--you have two
competing theories of truth.
One theory of truth, what I think most of you have
in your mind, is the kind of reflection
theory of truth--that our mind is a mirror.
More accurately it reflects the objective reality out there more
true, the knowledge what we have in our mind is.
And Marx, in "The Theses on Feuerbach",
says, "Not so.
The truth is a practical question.
The problem with the reflection theory of truth is that it is
positivist and it is alienated."
I'll throw in another word coined by a major Marxist
philosopher of the twentieth century, Georg Lukács.
He called it this is reified consciousness.
Reified--you know, Lukács was writing in
German, and in German he used the term Verdinglichung.
Ding means a thing.
I think reification is a very good translation.
Only those of us who speak English but do not speak Latin
don't necessarily quite get it.
Right?
Rei in Latin means the thing.
Reification is the process in which we turn stuff,
what is not a thing, into an objective thing.
It's a kind of--right?--Lukácsian
reinterpretation of Marx's notion of alienation.
Marx's term, in German, for reification was
Entfremdung; fremd means alien. Right?
So alienation is a good translation.
Right?
You are alienated if you feel alien, if you feel homeless in
this world.
Now I think but Lukács has an interesting idea--
right?--that the essence of alienation is when we're
beginning to see the world, what actually we created--the
world is our creation and this objective world will rule us.
We do not see ourselves as the masters of the world,
but we see ourselves as ruled by the world.
Right?
And this is reified consciousness,
when we're beginning to see the objective reality,
we cannot do anything about it.
Right?
And the essence is the philosophy of praxis of the
young Marx, ending--right?--with "The
Theses on Feuerbach", the point is to change it;
the point is to change the world.
So in contemporary discourse we usually call this positivism.
Right?
Positivists are those social scientists who think there are
objective facts out there, and the purpose of social
investigation is to establish most objectively and most
concretely what those objective social facts are.
You are an economist, you describe the objective
facts.
Right?
You say, "Well you have to maximize profit,
because if you do not maximize profit,
then you will be wiped out of business."
Right?
This is almost like a force of nature.
Again, if I can recall Georg Lukács,
he coined this wonderful term second nature.
Right?
That we're beginning to think about social life as if it were
natural, as if it would have the power of nature;
the economic laws look like lightening.
You know?
Like, you know, this force-- like earthquakes.
Right?
You can't do virtually nothing about an earthquake.
If we can't predict what we can't predict,
we can just get into our car and get out of it.
Right?
But even we cannot really predict earthquakes.
That's one of the problems.
Right?
Well now we can predict when a hurricane is coming.
What can we do?
You get in the car and get out of there, where the hurricane
will come.
Now, you know, the point is that positivism
does posits social phenomena as if they had the force of nature.
And that's what Lukács called we create the social
world as if it were second nature, as if it had the force
of nature.
He said this is all wrong because this is the world what
we created.
We should rule it. Right?
That's the idea, to overcome alienation;
to become the master of your fate.
Right?
To be able--right?--to change the objective conditions.
And we will--you know, in The German Ideology,
Marx puts it very powerfully.
I would say it's almost the last word what in this debate he
said-- was said.
I don't think anybody really improved on it.
He said, "Well, humans change the conditions.
But we were born under certain conditions, and we can only
change the conditions we were born into."
Right?
So it's an interesting interaction between yes,
I mean we can't do anything--right?--
because we were born into conditions,
but within some limits we can change those conditions.
By the way, it's not all that different from
Hobbes--right?--and voluntary action, the theory of voluntary
action.
There is a similarity here.
Now I'll finish this and get onto The German Ideology.
But there is one thing what I cannot leave out,
too--I think too insightful and important to leave it out.
So let me come back to this subject and object issue.
Right?
What I've suggested, it is so extremely important,
not only for Marx but for the whole critical theory,
and, in fact, for anti-positivism of all
sorts in the twentieth and twenty-first century.
I mentioned, for instance,
cultural theory, which is very strongly
anti-positivist--right?--and rejects social science as normal
science.
So what we have is subject.
And that is you--right?--the person who has a consciousness
and is a cognitive subject--is involved in cognitive activity,
creating knowledge.
And then there are objects about which we create knowledge.
Reflection theory of truth said that this is a mirror and if the
objects are accurately described in the mirror of our mind,
that is truth.
This is the whole test of having verification of
hypotheses.
Right?
I develop a hypothesis.
Then I go there and test it on the social reality,
and if it is matches, then it is verified,
I got truth.
Right?
Now the philosophy of praxis says that truth is not simply a
reflection, it's an interaction between subject and object;
that's where truth is.
And there is this wonderful philosopher-- not a very easy
read, but still I think a wonderful mind.
His name is Adorno.
Adorno belonged to the Frankfurt School and was active
mainly in the 1940s and '60s--'30s and '60s.
And well he formulated this so powerfully.
He said, "What is truth?"
He said, "The truth is the force-field between subject and
object."
Right?
"Not simply a reflection of the object,
but it is between the tension of subject and object."
Right?
I think this is beautifully done.
Right?
It is in the force-field of subject and object.
So let me also add one more point, and then we can move away
the theory of truth.
But I want you guys to think about what is truth?
Right?
When can you say an idea is true?
In fact, Adorno at one point said about Nazism.
You know?
He said--experiencing, he was Jewish and many of his
family were killed--right?--by the Nazis.
And he said, "The reality,
Nazi reality, is so miserable that it does
not deserve to be called true."
You see the point?
You also say that occasionally, when you see something horrible
and you can say, "No, that cannot be
true." Right?
This is exactly Adorno's point.
This can be so miserable that you say it cannot be true.
And the idea is that they are so miserable that you are
completely powerlessness about these nature-like forces though
it is unacceptable--right?
You should be able to do something about it.
Right?
We should have been able to do something about Auschwitz,
and they could not do anything about it.
And that's what Adorno said.
This reality was such that it should not be called true;
it cannot be truth.
You see what it is getting at?
A very final point about this theory of truth,
and this is through another guy, Karl Mannheim.
This is very much along this line.
He was very much not a Marxist.
He was a conservative philosopher.
His major work was done in England.
Mannheim once said, "The truth is not being.
The truth is becoming."
Bingo. Right?
Wonderfully put. Right?
The truth is not simply that you describe how things are.
You really know what the truth is when you know what it can be,
and what you can do about it.
The real purpose of cognition is not simply to describe the
world but to change it--right?--to make it a better
world.
That's when you have real truth, when you know how to make
the world better.
Right?
So the truth is not being but becoming.
And that's the philosophy of praxis.
But I think that's where Marx is in writing "The Theses
on Feuerbach", and that's what he is moving
away from when he's beginning to write The German
Ideology.
But he is writing together with Friedrich Engels.
And now you see he has to abandon--he cannot publish the
book-- "The Theses on Feuerbach"
because it is too voluntaristic.
Right?
He abandoned The Paris Manuscript because it was
fluffy.
Right?
"Nobody will believe me that the revolution will come
because the proletariat is alienated."
And then when he finished--I think this--I mean,
not all eleven sentences are great, but some of those
sentences are really great sentences.
He wrote it down and he never published it because he said,
"Well, this is too voluntaristic."
Right?
"I have to come up with a more- with a theory which will
prove to people that the revolution will come.
Capitalism has to fall.
It is not only a question whether we decide to change it
or we don't have to change it." Right?
"I have to come up with a theory which will prove that
capitalism will have to fall." Right?
That's what puts him into the deterministic mode.
He actually becomes never really deterministic.
It's a very simplistic reading of Marx.
You know, after all this guy is a theorist of the revolution.
He thought that revolutionary ideas should be put into
people's head.
This idea did not think that ideas do not matter.
If he would have believed ideas do not matter,
he would not have spent, you know, all of his time,
eight in the morning, nine-- until nine p.m.
in the British library, and writing books.
Right?
If ideas do not matter, why do you write down ideas?
Because he believed that ideas will change the world.
Right?
So he was never completely a deterministic.
But in the nature of the work he's moving towards economic
determinism.
And the reason is that now he wants to prove that
capitalism--yes, it had great achievement.
During the time of capitalism society developed more than ever
before capitalism.
But nevertheless it will have to come an end.
Capitalism will not last forever.
And now he has to prove that thesis, that it must come to an
end.
So that puts him on a deterministic trajectory.
That's what makes him--he has to become--he has to accept
materialism; that material conditions
determine human action and consciousness.
So that's what he--they are beginning to develop in The
German Ideology.
And this is the structure of the book.
The first chapter is a critique on Feuerbach;
takes on from "The Theses on
…