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English transcript
Prof: All right, good morning.
I want to do what I did last time around the test;
just to walk very quickly through the test questions and
sort of test myself; how would I respond to them?
There is a lot for today to cover.
So I will rush.
Let me just one more time emphasize, you have plenty of
time to do that.
Right?
I have a discussion section at 7:00.
So I don't want to risk that something is going on wrong in
the internet.
So I will post this before my discussion section,
before 7:00; exactly when, I don't know.
I mean, I have these anxieties, what Hobbes was talking about,
and therefore I don't want--I prefer to be five minutes early,
rather than being an hour late.
Right?
So sometime before 7:00 you will find it,
and you have to send your answer around 9:00.
Some of you communicated that you need another time,
because you have already engagements;
it is always you have to work this out with your discussion
section leader--right?--and your discussion section leader will
take care of your needs.
And be brief. Right?
Sort of the two questions should be about--more like four
to six double-spaced pages, rather than much longer.
I mean, we will accept eight.
So you will not be penalized if you are longer.
But the point is not to be long, but to be crispy.
And again the point is, you know, you try to show the
different views of the authors, and then comment on it,
whether-- which is more sensible.
Right?
And a third, a third, a third--right?--of a
paper goes this way.
You spend a third presenting one author;
a third about an opponent of that author;
and then your reflections on it.
Right?
That's about it.
So let me then rush through.
This is not an easy question--right?--Marx's theory
of alienation; Nietzsche's or Freud's theory
of civilization.
I mean, there is a common feature--right?--between the
three authors.
This really asks to create a controversy between the two.
Right?
You can pick two, usually.
The common feature is that they are all concerned about
modernity and people's sense of being lost and being without
control in modernity.
And the problem of modernity: that we are too much
controlled, and the control is increasingly inside us,
rather than outside, and coercive.
Right?
I think that's the common feeling.
I think I made this point in the lecture.
If you read twentieth century literature, particularly first
half, you find this feeling expressed by a lot of novelists.
You read Franz Kafka--right?--you read Albert
Camus.
That's where you get that same feeling expressed,
to what Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are
responding to.
But there are big differences.
Right?
Marx tries to move away from Hegel and wants to come down to
earth and offer a theory of alienation which is rooted in
the economy, into the production process.
And Marx has a view what emancipated society will be,
and he even has a historic agent who will get us there,
to emancipation; the proletariat.
Now Nietzsche is very different.
Right?
The genealogical method does not really offer you the right
solution.
Right?
The genealogical method only shows you what is unique in
modernity, in modern morality,
in the Judeo-Christian morality,
what you think is so attractive and so noble.
And he shows--right?--how--right?--in
the workshop where ideas are produced, it's actually torture
and oppression what operates.
Right?
So there is no good society, and no agent who will get you
there.
Right?
You have to do it by yourself.
Now Freud also sees civilization as coming from
repression of sexual drives.
So he is in a critique of civilization.
Right?
But at the same time Freud has this dual attitude about
civilization.
Right?
Civilization is coming from repression,
but it is still sublimation, and the most beautiful things
in human society-- art and science--are coming
from this sublimation.
And he is also reflecting--he's writing in 1930,
through the rise of Nazism--an anti--right?--civilization,
and he does not want to support that.
Right?
So in a way, you know, one can say that he
does have- he does not offer you the vision of good society.
To some extent he is with Nietzsche.
He said, "You have to emancipate yourself.
You have to figure out for yourself what your problem
is."
And he certainly does not have a historic agent like Marx has.
Anyway, this is the way how I would be dealing with this.
And I will not tell you what my opinion is;
I want to hear your opinion about it.
Okay, the second question.
That's not easy either.
Practical theory of truth, and Nietzsche's genealogical
method.
Well there is, again, a common element between
Marx and Nietzsche.
Neither of them believes in objective abstract truth.
Right?
Marx says there is no objective abstract truth.
Truth is a practical question.
Truth is being achieved by human practices.
Right?
And Nietzsche, of course, does not believe in
objective truth.
Right?
He's trying to find truth.
But truth is being accomplished by comparing,
you know, different notions of morality,
and to show that in comparison with each other,
both have its upsides and downsides.
Right?
So there is--by the way Nietzsche, don't misunderstand
him.
He is not a nihilist.
He does not say everything goes.
Nihilism is a very negative term for Nietzsche.
So he does not want to say there is no truth at all.
He said truth is just relative, and you can arrive at a
critical understanding of your situation by comparing your
situation with another one.
There is, of course, a very fundamental difference
again between Marx and Nietzsche.
Because what is this practical truth?
These are human activities, and Marx basically arrives at
these human activities through changing the physical work,
through the system of production.
And again, he has the agent who is--this is the revolutionary
practices of the proletariat, which will get you to the
truth.
There is nothing like that in Nietzsche.
Right?
Nietzsche does not have a historical agent,
and does not have the society where after all you will get to
true society.
Well this is actually a very simple question.
Many of you did not like it.
So I'm thinking very hard whether to put it on.
It's a bit narrow, but very simple.
German Ideology and the Grudrisse.
Very simple.
There are two unique features in the German Ideology.
One is when he--he does develop the notion of mode of production
for the first time in this book, '45--1845.
But he does identify the nature of mode of production primarily
by division of labor.
And this doesn't serve him very well,
because the division of labor does not capture the
conflictuous relationship between classes,
which eventually will have to lead to revolution.
So he abandons it--does not finish the book.
Because only at the very end of the book does he realize that
the two components of mode of production are forces of
production, technology, and relations of
production.
And relations of production, for most of the German
Ideology, is division of labor.
And then he realizes, no, no, no, it is not division
of labor, but property relations:
the relationship between those who have property and those who
do not have property.
And he also has a very deterministic view of history in
the German Ideology.
All societies have to go through the same modes of
production: tribalism, slave mode of production,
feudalism and capitalism.
In the Grundrisse, there are two big innovations.
Now the center is property relations;
the peak of history of capitalism, when the producer is
separated from the means of production completely.
And he breaks from the deterministic view of history.
Right?
Now he has this multi-linear development of history.
Not every society has to come through slavery and feudalism.
The Asiatic societies, in a quasi-communal society,
can move directly into capitalism.
Okay.
So that's basically a very simple question.
I probably did a very bad job in the lecture,
that this did not become clear.
So four, Marx as a historical materialist, and compare him
with Freud.
Well actually I am inspired here by Jürgen Habermas.
And Jürgen Habermas says, "Well, Marx in the 'Thesis
on Feuerbach' got it right when he said that the real point of
departure is sensuous human activity."
At that time, when Habermas was writing this,
he was still a materialist.
Then he had his culture turn, and he's probably not a
materialist any longer.
He said, "Materialism is if your point of departure is
what you can get from through your senses, not through your
ideas."
But he said Marx made a mistake; namely, that he reduced
sensuous human activities to the economy, and to production.
And well, he said, Freud is more interesting,
because he has a different kind of sensuous human activity.
And this is sensuous human activities between
people--right?--sexual relationships.
In fact, Habermas makes it more complicated;
I don't want to get into Habermas.
But his interpretation of Freud is that Freud also starts from
sensuous human activity, to understand what is in
people's mind.
But it is not economic reductionism;
if anything, it is sexual reductionism.
Right?
It is a pan-erotic explanation of history.
But, in some ways, you know, they all starts for
sensuous human activities, in explaining what can be in
people's minds--what is our ideas.
So the starting point is material sensuous
experience--right?--and the product are ideas.
Right?
This is, in this sense, they are both materialists,
but in different ways.
Is that--I suppose it should be pretty clear now.
Right?
Okay, Classes.
Well you can have different views on this,
and especially whether Marx's theory of classes are still
applicable.
You know, Marx defined classes in terms of property
relationship.
He had two classes in The Communist Manifesto,
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The question is does it still matter?
And you have to reflect on this.
Do you think property relations still is a major antagonistic
divide in American society, or not any longer?
And, of course, Marx believed in The
Communist Manifesto, yes there is still a
middle-class, but it will be done away;
middle-class will be become either bourgeois or become
proletarian.
And, of course, in the United States,
the received wisdom is that we are all middle-class.
Are we all middle-class?
I would like to hear your view about this.
Right?
But that's the big question.
Clearly Marx did get it wrong; that's undoubtedly,
I think everybody agrees.
I think Karl Marx, if he would be alive,
he would say, "Ah, I screwed it.
I made a mistake.
Of course there is a big middle-class."
Right?
So, I mean, you don't have to really hate Marx,
you know, that there is a middle-class.
He clearly made a mistake.
Right?
Anyway, but you can ask the question, who is the
middle-class?
Are we indeed all middle-class?
Is this sensible to talk about the big bourgeoisie?
Well there are no big bourgeoisie any longer.
This is people's capitalism we live in.
And these are the questions I would like you to deal with.
Okay, labor theory of value, and Adam Smith.
I thought this is a very easy question.
Right?
Adam Smith said that, you know, all value is created
by labor.
But then he said when it comes to distributing wealth or
income, it has to go to labor, capital and land.
Marx, on the other hand, said, "Well,
this is a contradiction.
If all labor goes to- if all value is created by labor,
it should go to labor.
And therefore if it is taken away from labor,
it should be understood as exploitation."
Is this an advance or is this a misunderstanding?
And you can say, "Well this is a
misunderstanding because Adam Smith was right.
He said all labor is--all value is created by labor,
in societies where capital is not accumulated and the land is
not privately owned, and therefore this is a
consistent argument."
Or you can say, "Well Marx actually got a
very important point, because there is indeed
exploitation; there are exploitive
relationships, and it does drive
history."
I mean, how you take your position, this is up to you.
You have to argue consistently--right?--and the
argument of consistency will be rewarded.
Seven: Well this is--again, a lot of people said don't do
it because we have not talked about domination.
I'll probably leave it, because I will talk in the
next-- how much have I got?--forty
minutes about this-- domination and mode of
production, and what domination is.
Well Protestant ethic; was he as an idealist?
Some people think this is a too narrow question.
Well I think you kind of can ask the question,
is this really an idealist view?
Some people said, what Weber is saying,
that it is Calvinism which created capitalism.
Is this his view?
What is exactly his view?
He is very critical of Marx.
He believes that Marx has a simplistic materialist
explanation: it is consciousness which--
it is existence which determines consciousness,
rather than the other way around.
Is Weber saying the opposite?
It is consciousness which determines existence or
capitalism.
And that's what The Protestant Ethic is trying
to do.
And, of course, he has this interesting notion
of elective affinity-- questions whether there is
really a causal relationship between ideas and the economy.
And you can labor on this, what he might mean.
And what you think--this is a cop-out--right?--that he
actually--is Marx more of a contemporary social theorist,
because he has a causal explanation?
He tries to give a causal explanation.
And that's what you are told in political science or economics.
"Real social science comes up with causal
explanations."
Right?
And Weber shies away, and Marx tries to do causal
analysis.
Okay.
Did I miss nine?
Well this is very much a--very similar to the previous
question.
Here only I ask you to compare the two: Is Marx really a
simple-minded economic deterministic--determinist?
It is existence which determines consciousness.
Or does he have a more complicated view?
Is there a contradiction in Marx?
Right?
The philosophy of praxis, that we are making history.
He also makes that claim.
How does it fit?
Does he simply contradict himself, or is this a consistent
ideology?
And, you know, Weber, is he an idealist,
or he is not really an idealist?
What does he mean by this elective affinity?
And then finally, with the final question,
I think people seem to be liking this.
Not easy, by the way.
Marx clearly has a notion of human nature.
Right?
Marx believes--is a Rousseauian--an even more
radical than Rousseauian theory of human nature,
especially in his theory of alienation.
Right?
We are good, and the problem comes as
society makes us alienated.
But I think he goes a little beyond Rousseau.
Because he thinks that in the state of nature we are actually
social; being social is in our nature.
Right?
Rousseau did not think so.
The noble savage has to be socialized into civil society.
Marx believes that this whole idea of state of nature is an
abstraction.
We are all born in society, and by nature we are social.
Only capitalism, which makes us
competitive--competitive bourgeois individuals,
makes us asocial and egoistic.
Well does Weber has a theory of human nature?
It's a more difficult question to pose.
I think, if I would argue, I would say if Weber does have
one, it is closer to Hobbes,
because he does believe that people--
the history of humankind is a struggle for power;
yes, an ending struggle for power, and that's why he
explained human history with power struggles.
That's about it; that's the way how I would,
in a nutshell, try to deal with this.
And I hope this was somewhat helpful, and makes you
relaxed--right?--that this will not be a difficult test.
It will be actually a lot of fun, to deal with these
intriguing, interesting issues.
Okay?
And believe me, I really want you to have fun.
I think these are interesting questions.
Okay, now we come to Weber's theory of domination.
And that's almost impossible, what I am trying to do now.
But will try to rush you through.
And first of all we have to understand Weber's theory of
action which has some similarities to Hobbes and
Hobbes' theory of voluntaristic action.
But then we also have to deal with Weber's notion of
rationality, and then his distinction between power and
domination; his theory of legitimacy.
This is very, very important.
It's one of the most fundamental concepts,
particularly in political theory, but also in economics
and in sociology.
And finally his types of authority;
we will deal at great lengths with different types of
authority.
I'll just give you a sense what this is in the next twenty-five
minutes.
Okay, the four types of economic action.
He makes a distinction.
The question is, how can--how are we orienting
with each other?
What motivates us when we are interacting with other people?
He said well we can act instrumentally,
rationally, and I will explain it to you what he means.
And then he said we can also act value rationally;
and again we'll come--explain what this means.
In our interaction we can be led our emotions.
And he said this is--well, whether this is rational;
he said this is not irrational thing.
It is not necessarily irrational that we act out of
our emotions, and I will tell you when he
thinks this is becoming irrational,
acting out of emotion.
Or, in our interactions we can be led by tradition.
Now to understand this, that we actually interact with
each other in very different ways--
over time, with the same person, we can act occasionally
instrumentally or occasionally we can act affectually.
Right?
Occasionally we act towards somebody because we have a great
deal of emotion or feeling; love or hate.
And occasionally we can act instrumentally.
Right?
We use somebody in order to achieve somebody.
Can I borrow twenty dollars from you?
Right?
Then we act instrumentally.
But we also can act out of hate or love.
Right?
In a discussion section I really hate the guts of somebody
who is always speaking-- right?--in the discussion
section, and then I just will contradict,
because I just--it is my antagonism.
Or I just sympathize with somebody, and therefore I also
tend to disagree; basically driven by my emotion.
And now I'm not talking about love, which binds people more.
Now what is behind this is Weber's fundamental methodology.
He calls his approach to society 'interpretative
sociology.'
The term interpretative sociology is translated from
German.
The German term is Verstehen;
Verstehen means understanding.
Occasionally we also translate it into English,
that what Weber does is understand.
But Weber's strong commitment is that social analysts--
be it an economist, be a political scientist,
be a sociologist, be a historian,
be an anthropologist-- is not to pass value judgments
on others, but to try to understand what
drives other people.
Don't assume that other people, because they act differently
than you, would act in their situation, that they are dumb,
evil, or irrational.
Right?
This is particularly a debate with economists.
Economists tend to have--right?--a very strong
conception that there is one economically rational behavior.
Weber said, 'No; I mean, there are various types
of ways how we can act, and my job is not to say,
'Now you're very rational'.
My job is to try to put myself into your position,
and to understand why you did, and why you did the way how you
did it."
This is interpretive sociology.
Right?
This is understanding, Verstehen.
Right?
That I emotionally try to put myself into your situation,
and rather than saying, "This is what I would
do", I decide if I were you,
in your situation, would I do the same thing?
Why do you do that the way how you do do?
Assuming that you are not acting irrationally,
but try to understand why you act the way you act.
Okay?
Now let's talk about instrumentally rational action.
This comes to the closest what most economists,
especially neoclassical economists, regard as rational
economic action.
He said, "Instrumentally rational action"--
he calls it Zweckrational ität--
is when the ends and the means are all rationally taken
into account and weighted.
Right?
This is kind of utili
…
I want to do what I did last time around the test;
just to walk very quickly through the test questions and
sort of test myself; how would I respond to them?
There is a lot for today to cover.
So I will rush.
Let me just one more time emphasize, you have plenty of
time to do that.
Right?
I have a discussion section at 7:00.
So I don't want to risk that something is going on wrong in
the internet.
So I will post this before my discussion section,
before 7:00; exactly when, I don't know.
I mean, I have these anxieties, what Hobbes was talking about,
and therefore I don't want--I prefer to be five minutes early,
rather than being an hour late.
Right?
So sometime before 7:00 you will find it,
and you have to send your answer around 9:00.
Some of you communicated that you need another time,
because you have already engagements;
it is always you have to work this out with your discussion
section leader--right?--and your discussion section leader will
take care of your needs.
And be brief. Right?
Sort of the two questions should be about--more like four
to six double-spaced pages, rather than much longer.
I mean, we will accept eight.
So you will not be penalized if you are longer.
But the point is not to be long, but to be crispy.
And again the point is, you know, you try to show the
different views of the authors, and then comment on it,
whether-- which is more sensible.
Right?
And a third, a third, a third--right?--of a
paper goes this way.
You spend a third presenting one author;
a third about an opponent of that author;
and then your reflections on it.
Right?
That's about it.
So let me then rush through.
This is not an easy question--right?--Marx's theory
of alienation; Nietzsche's or Freud's theory
of civilization.
I mean, there is a common feature--right?--between the
three authors.
This really asks to create a controversy between the two.
Right?
You can pick two, usually.
The common feature is that they are all concerned about
modernity and people's sense of being lost and being without
control in modernity.
And the problem of modernity: that we are too much
controlled, and the control is increasingly inside us,
rather than outside, and coercive.
Right?
I think that's the common feeling.
I think I made this point in the lecture.
If you read twentieth century literature, particularly first
half, you find this feeling expressed by a lot of novelists.
You read Franz Kafka--right?--you read Albert
Camus.
That's where you get that same feeling expressed,
to what Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are
responding to.
But there are big differences.
Right?
Marx tries to move away from Hegel and wants to come down to
earth and offer a theory of alienation which is rooted in
the economy, into the production process.
And Marx has a view what emancipated society will be,
and he even has a historic agent who will get us there,
to emancipation; the proletariat.
Now Nietzsche is very different.
Right?
The genealogical method does not really offer you the right
solution.
Right?
The genealogical method only shows you what is unique in
modernity, in modern morality,
in the Judeo-Christian morality,
what you think is so attractive and so noble.
And he shows--right?--how--right?--in
the workshop where ideas are produced, it's actually torture
and oppression what operates.
Right?
So there is no good society, and no agent who will get you
there.
Right?
You have to do it by yourself.
Now Freud also sees civilization as coming from
repression of sexual drives.
So he is in a critique of civilization.
Right?
But at the same time Freud has this dual attitude about
civilization.
Right?
Civilization is coming from repression,
but it is still sublimation, and the most beautiful things
in human society-- art and science--are coming
from this sublimation.
And he is also reflecting--he's writing in 1930,
through the rise of Nazism--an anti--right?--civilization,
and he does not want to support that.
Right?
So in a way, you know, one can say that he
does have- he does not offer you the vision of good society.
To some extent he is with Nietzsche.
He said, "You have to emancipate yourself.
You have to figure out for yourself what your problem
is."
And he certainly does not have a historic agent like Marx has.
Anyway, this is the way how I would be dealing with this.
And I will not tell you what my opinion is;
I want to hear your opinion about it.
Okay, the second question.
That's not easy either.
Practical theory of truth, and Nietzsche's genealogical
method.
Well there is, again, a common element between
Marx and Nietzsche.
Neither of them believes in objective abstract truth.
Right?
Marx says there is no objective abstract truth.
Truth is a practical question.
Truth is being achieved by human practices.
Right?
And Nietzsche, of course, does not believe in
objective truth.
Right?
He's trying to find truth.
But truth is being accomplished by comparing,
you know, different notions of morality,
and to show that in comparison with each other,
both have its upsides and downsides.
Right?
So there is--by the way Nietzsche, don't misunderstand
him.
He is not a nihilist.
He does not say everything goes.
Nihilism is a very negative term for Nietzsche.
So he does not want to say there is no truth at all.
He said truth is just relative, and you can arrive at a
critical understanding of your situation by comparing your
situation with another one.
There is, of course, a very fundamental difference
again between Marx and Nietzsche.
Because what is this practical truth?
These are human activities, and Marx basically arrives at
these human activities through changing the physical work,
through the system of production.
And again, he has the agent who is--this is the revolutionary
practices of the proletariat, which will get you to the
truth.
There is nothing like that in Nietzsche.
Right?
Nietzsche does not have a historical agent,
and does not have the society where after all you will get to
true society.
Well this is actually a very simple question.
Many of you did not like it.
So I'm thinking very hard whether to put it on.
It's a bit narrow, but very simple.
German Ideology and the Grudrisse.
Very simple.
There are two unique features in the German Ideology.
One is when he--he does develop the notion of mode of production
for the first time in this book, '45--1845.
But he does identify the nature of mode of production primarily
by division of labor.
And this doesn't serve him very well,
because the division of labor does not capture the
conflictuous relationship between classes,
which eventually will have to lead to revolution.
So he abandons it--does not finish the book.
Because only at the very end of the book does he realize that
the two components of mode of production are forces of
production, technology, and relations of
production.
And relations of production, for most of the German
Ideology, is division of labor.
And then he realizes, no, no, no, it is not division
of labor, but property relations:
the relationship between those who have property and those who
do not have property.
And he also has a very deterministic view of history in
the German Ideology.
All societies have to go through the same modes of
production: tribalism, slave mode of production,
feudalism and capitalism.
In the Grundrisse, there are two big innovations.
Now the center is property relations;
the peak of history of capitalism, when the producer is
separated from the means of production completely.
And he breaks from the deterministic view of history.
Right?
Now he has this multi-linear development of history.
Not every society has to come through slavery and feudalism.
The Asiatic societies, in a quasi-communal society,
can move directly into capitalism.
Okay.
So that's basically a very simple question.
I probably did a very bad job in the lecture,
that this did not become clear.
So four, Marx as a historical materialist, and compare him
with Freud.
Well actually I am inspired here by Jürgen Habermas.
And Jürgen Habermas says, "Well, Marx in the 'Thesis
on Feuerbach' got it right when he said that the real point of
departure is sensuous human activity."
At that time, when Habermas was writing this,
he was still a materialist.
Then he had his culture turn, and he's probably not a
materialist any longer.
He said, "Materialism is if your point of departure is
what you can get from through your senses, not through your
ideas."
But he said Marx made a mistake; namely, that he reduced
sensuous human activities to the economy, and to production.
And well, he said, Freud is more interesting,
because he has a different kind of sensuous human activity.
And this is sensuous human activities between
people--right?--sexual relationships.
In fact, Habermas makes it more complicated;
I don't want to get into Habermas.
But his interpretation of Freud is that Freud also starts from
sensuous human activity, to understand what is in
people's mind.
But it is not economic reductionism;
if anything, it is sexual reductionism.
Right?
It is a pan-erotic explanation of history.
But, in some ways, you know, they all starts for
sensuous human activities, in explaining what can be in
people's minds--what is our ideas.
So the starting point is material sensuous
experience--right?--and the product are ideas.
Right?
This is, in this sense, they are both materialists,
but in different ways.
Is that--I suppose it should be pretty clear now.
Right?
Okay, Classes.
Well you can have different views on this,
and especially whether Marx's theory of classes are still
applicable.
You know, Marx defined classes in terms of property
relationship.
He had two classes in The Communist Manifesto,
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The question is does it still matter?
And you have to reflect on this.
Do you think property relations still is a major antagonistic
divide in American society, or not any longer?
And, of course, Marx believed in The
Communist Manifesto, yes there is still a
middle-class, but it will be done away;
middle-class will be become either bourgeois or become
proletarian.
And, of course, in the United States,
the received wisdom is that we are all middle-class.
Are we all middle-class?
I would like to hear your view about this.
Right?
But that's the big question.
Clearly Marx did get it wrong; that's undoubtedly,
I think everybody agrees.
I think Karl Marx, if he would be alive,
he would say, "Ah, I screwed it.
I made a mistake.
Of course there is a big middle-class."
Right?
So, I mean, you don't have to really hate Marx,
you know, that there is a middle-class.
He clearly made a mistake.
Right?
Anyway, but you can ask the question, who is the
middle-class?
Are we indeed all middle-class?
Is this sensible to talk about the big bourgeoisie?
Well there are no big bourgeoisie any longer.
This is people's capitalism we live in.
And these are the questions I would like you to deal with.
Okay, labor theory of value, and Adam Smith.
I thought this is a very easy question.
Right?
Adam Smith said that, you know, all value is created
by labor.
But then he said when it comes to distributing wealth or
income, it has to go to labor, capital and land.
Marx, on the other hand, said, "Well,
this is a contradiction.
If all labor goes to- if all value is created by labor,
it should go to labor.
And therefore if it is taken away from labor,
it should be understood as exploitation."
Is this an advance or is this a misunderstanding?
And you can say, "Well this is a
misunderstanding because Adam Smith was right.
He said all labor is--all value is created by labor,
in societies where capital is not accumulated and the land is
not privately owned, and therefore this is a
consistent argument."
Or you can say, "Well Marx actually got a
very important point, because there is indeed
exploitation; there are exploitive
relationships, and it does drive
history."
I mean, how you take your position, this is up to you.
You have to argue consistently--right?--and the
argument of consistency will be rewarded.
Seven: Well this is--again, a lot of people said don't do
it because we have not talked about domination.
I'll probably leave it, because I will talk in the
next-- how much have I got?--forty
minutes about this-- domination and mode of
production, and what domination is.
Well Protestant ethic; was he as an idealist?
Some people think this is a too narrow question.
Well I think you kind of can ask the question,
is this really an idealist view?
Some people said, what Weber is saying,
that it is Calvinism which created capitalism.
Is this his view?
What is exactly his view?
He is very critical of Marx.
He believes that Marx has a simplistic materialist
explanation: it is consciousness which--
it is existence which determines consciousness,
rather than the other way around.
Is Weber saying the opposite?
It is consciousness which determines existence or
capitalism.
And that's what The Protestant Ethic is trying
to do.
And, of course, he has this interesting notion
of elective affinity-- questions whether there is
really a causal relationship between ideas and the economy.
And you can labor on this, what he might mean.
And what you think--this is a cop-out--right?--that he
actually--is Marx more of a contemporary social theorist,
because he has a causal explanation?
He tries to give a causal explanation.
And that's what you are told in political science or economics.
"Real social science comes up with causal
explanations."
Right?
And Weber shies away, and Marx tries to do causal
analysis.
Okay.
Did I miss nine?
Well this is very much a--very similar to the previous
question.
Here only I ask you to compare the two: Is Marx really a
simple-minded economic deterministic--determinist?
It is existence which determines consciousness.
Or does he have a more complicated view?
Is there a contradiction in Marx?
Right?
The philosophy of praxis, that we are making history.
He also makes that claim.
How does it fit?
Does he simply contradict himself, or is this a consistent
ideology?
And, you know, Weber, is he an idealist,
or he is not really an idealist?
What does he mean by this elective affinity?
And then finally, with the final question,
I think people seem to be liking this.
Not easy, by the way.
Marx clearly has a notion of human nature.
Right?
Marx believes--is a Rousseauian--an even more
radical than Rousseauian theory of human nature,
especially in his theory of alienation.
Right?
We are good, and the problem comes as
society makes us alienated.
But I think he goes a little beyond Rousseau.
Because he thinks that in the state of nature we are actually
social; being social is in our nature.
Right?
Rousseau did not think so.
The noble savage has to be socialized into civil society.
Marx believes that this whole idea of state of nature is an
abstraction.
We are all born in society, and by nature we are social.
Only capitalism, which makes us
competitive--competitive bourgeois individuals,
makes us asocial and egoistic.
Well does Weber has a theory of human nature?
It's a more difficult question to pose.
I think, if I would argue, I would say if Weber does have
one, it is closer to Hobbes,
because he does believe that people--
the history of humankind is a struggle for power;
yes, an ending struggle for power, and that's why he
explained human history with power struggles.
That's about it; that's the way how I would,
in a nutshell, try to deal with this.
And I hope this was somewhat helpful, and makes you
relaxed--right?--that this will not be a difficult test.
It will be actually a lot of fun, to deal with these
intriguing, interesting issues.
Okay?
And believe me, I really want you to have fun.
I think these are interesting questions.
Okay, now we come to Weber's theory of domination.
And that's almost impossible, what I am trying to do now.
But will try to rush you through.
And first of all we have to understand Weber's theory of
action which has some similarities to Hobbes and
Hobbes' theory of voluntaristic action.
But then we also have to deal with Weber's notion of
rationality, and then his distinction between power and
domination; his theory of legitimacy.
This is very, very important.
It's one of the most fundamental concepts,
particularly in political theory, but also in economics
and in sociology.
And finally his types of authority;
we will deal at great lengths with different types of
authority.
I'll just give you a sense what this is in the next twenty-five
minutes.
Okay, the four types of economic action.
He makes a distinction.
The question is, how can--how are we orienting
with each other?
What motivates us when we are interacting with other people?
He said well we can act instrumentally,
rationally, and I will explain it to you what he means.
And then he said we can also act value rationally;
and again we'll come--explain what this means.
In our interaction we can be led our emotions.
And he said this is--well, whether this is rational;
he said this is not irrational thing.
It is not necessarily irrational that we act out of
our emotions, and I will tell you when he
thinks this is becoming irrational,
acting out of emotion.
Or, in our interactions we can be led by tradition.
Now to understand this, that we actually interact with
each other in very different ways--
over time, with the same person, we can act occasionally
instrumentally or occasionally we can act affectually.
Right?
Occasionally we act towards somebody because we have a great
deal of emotion or feeling; love or hate.
And occasionally we can act instrumentally.
Right?
We use somebody in order to achieve somebody.
Can I borrow twenty dollars from you?
Right?
Then we act instrumentally.
But we also can act out of hate or love.
Right?
In a discussion section I really hate the guts of somebody
who is always speaking-- right?--in the discussion
section, and then I just will contradict,
because I just--it is my antagonism.
Or I just sympathize with somebody, and therefore I also
tend to disagree; basically driven by my emotion.
And now I'm not talking about love, which binds people more.
Now what is behind this is Weber's fundamental methodology.
He calls his approach to society 'interpretative
sociology.'
The term interpretative sociology is translated from
German.
The German term is Verstehen;
Verstehen means understanding.
Occasionally we also translate it into English,
that what Weber does is understand.
But Weber's strong commitment is that social analysts--
be it an economist, be a political scientist,
be a sociologist, be a historian,
be an anthropologist-- is not to pass value judgments
on others, but to try to understand what
drives other people.
Don't assume that other people, because they act differently
than you, would act in their situation, that they are dumb,
evil, or irrational.
Right?
This is particularly a debate with economists.
Economists tend to have--right?--a very strong
conception that there is one economically rational behavior.
Weber said, 'No; I mean, there are various types
of ways how we can act, and my job is not to say,
'Now you're very rational'.
My job is to try to put myself into your position,
and to understand why you did, and why you did the way how you
did it."
This is interpretive sociology.
Right?
This is understanding, Verstehen.
Right?
That I emotionally try to put myself into your situation,
and rather than saying, "This is what I would
do", I decide if I were you,
in your situation, would I do the same thing?
Why do you do that the way how you do do?
Assuming that you are not acting irrationally,
but try to understand why you act the way you act.
Okay?
Now let's talk about instrumentally rational action.
This comes to the closest what most economists,
especially neoclassical economists, regard as rational
economic action.
He said, "Instrumentally rational action"--
he calls it Zweckrational ität--
is when the ends and the means are all rationally taken
into account and weighted.
Right?
This is kind of utili
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