Advertisement
English transcript
Prof: Well, I would like very briefly to
come back to Weber's theory of domination.
I deleted it from the questions, but I promise I will
get this back in one way or another for the next test.
So probably the last thing you want to think about now is a
test >
, but let me still talk about the theory of domination.
I think this is a very important theory--extremely
influential and extremely insightful.
So let me just very briefly sum up where we left it last time,
and then I'll move into Weber's theory of traditional authority.
And last time we were talking about the crucial distinction
Weber makes between Macht and Herrschaft.
Macht is translated in English as power;
there is no question about this.
The translation of Herrschaft varies.
It is translated either as authority, or it is translated
as domination.
And I think both translations are good.
I think, people whom I feel closer in my own Weber reading,
translated it more like domination rather than
authority.
And, in fact, I think just to emphasize you
the importance of the translational difference,
in the notion of Herrschaft,
the first four letters, Herr,
means the lord.
So I think the notion of herrschaft has very strong
implications of asymmetrical power relationships;
what I think domination captures better than authority.
Those who translated Weber's notion of Herrschaft as
authority, like Talcott Parsons,
wanted to emphasize that Weber looks at Herrschaft as
something which is authoritarian--
right?--where somebody acts out of authority.
Right?
This is not a false translation, but misses an
important point--namely, Weber's interest in the way how
power is being exercised.
In fact it, in a way, misses Max Weber's roots in
Friedrich Nietzsche, or probably even,
I may dare so, in Hobbes.
Right?
Human history is all about the history of struggle for power.
That's, in my reading, Weber's fundamental idea--power
with an important modification.
And I gave you the citation last lecture,
but let me come back to this.
Power means the likelihood that people will obey order,
even against resistance.
And domination means the likelihood that people will
actually follow orders, without being coerced to do so.
So the notion of domination, or Herrschaft,
does imply a degree of voluntariness,
a minimum level of belief that in fact those who issue orders
do have the right to do so; or at least it is reasonable
that they issue orders and I follow the orders.
Or to come up with an even more minimal definition of
Herrschaft, that I cannot see any real
alternative under the present circumstances but to obey the
orders to the one who issues these orders.
Right?
And this has everything to do with the idea of legitimacy.
And I put, at last lecture, this little
equation--right?--on one of the slides, that power plus
legitimation adds up to domination or authority.
So what is legitimation?
Weber said power is really an extreme case;
that very little, very--it happens very rarely
that the one who exercises authority, exercises simply by
exerting power, coercing people to obey.
Those who are in a position of authority try to legitimate
their authority, and try to come up with reasons
why people subjected to this authority should obey their
authority.
It's again very Nietzschian, the idea.
Right?
That those who are exercising power tries to internalize your
subjugation to power in one way or another,
and try to create in you a morality--
right?--a set of principles by which you would say,
"Well, this probably may be the right thing for me to
do."
Or, as I said, the minimum definition,
even if you don't particularly like obeying orders,
you say, "What else can I do?
The alternative, if I don't obey orders,
would be worse."
Or about the person who issues authority: you may not like the
person who issues authority, but you will say,
"But the alternative is worse." Right?
So you can pick a course.
You may not like the lecturer all that much,
or the way how he grades, but there were other courses
you did shop for and they were even worse.
So you picked the least worst course.
Right?
You picked the lecturer who seems to be the least boring,
and who seems to be the most reasonable grading your
assignment.
Right?
That doesn't mean that you are all that thrilled to be at
lectures, and to do assignments,
but you have to do it, and under the circumstances you
go for the less evil.
Right?
That's, I think, the kind of most extreme
interpretation of Weber's idea of legitimacy.
But Weber also--I pointed this word out to you--Weber said that
all legitimacy contains an element of a myth.
It doesn't mean that the person who tries to justify its
authority is telling the truth.
Whether it is truth or not truth is almost beside the
point.
The most important issue is that it creates a mythology
about the reason why you have to obey authority.
So what I tried to underline already in last lecture,
that Weber's notion of legitimacy is so much more
sophisticated, so less liberal,
and so much more Nietzschian than the idea we normally hear
when you hear the word legitimation.
Right?
Legitimation, we see something very good.
Right?
A power is legitimated because it was somebody was elected in
fair and free elections to an office,
and we believe that this person will do a great job,
having been elected.
Well, Weber would be more likely to think something like
Karzai.
Well, under the circumstances, probably there is no
alternative to Afghanistan but to have this guy as the
president.
Though it's very doubtful, you know, what all those claims
about the legitimacy of the system are being made;
they are pretty much a mythology created around it.
But otherwise the alternative is chaos, and even this guy's
probably better than chaos, which would happen otherwise.
Right?
This is in my dark reading of Max Weber.
Now, as you can see, of course, the difference from
Marx is fundamental.
Marx did see human history as unfolding of modes of
production.
It was all struggle around ownership, means of production,
clash of economic interests.
For Weber, it is not economic interest which drives human
history but struggle for power.
And he can describe different systems of authority over time,
but it is all described on the quality and the nature of those
mythologies those in a position of power come up with to
legitimate what they are trying to do to you.
Right?
So that is one fundamental difference between Marx and
Weber.
There is another fundamental difference, and you will have to
bear this very much in mind as this lecture on traditional
authority unfolds.
Though Weber develops these different types of domination,
primarily to describe historical change--
grand societies, traditional authority,
charismatical authority, legal-rational authority,
kind of describe the evolution of humankind--
and has a similar kind of flavor than Marx's subsequent
modes of production.
But Weber does more than that.
These three types of authority do describe all kinds of
organizations or social units.
Today we can talk about legal-rational authority,
traditional authority, or charismatic authority in
contemporary society; though he would call liberal
market capitalism as the purest type--
and what pure type is, I will talk about this in a
minute-- of legal-rational authority.
He will say that even in contemporary society we have
organizations which are based on traditional authority.
The most obvious example of traditional authority--and bare
it in mind when we will be talking about this today--is the
family you live in.
Right?
The family is primarily bound together by tradition.
But the very institution where you are in now,
universities, do have a flavor of traditional
authority.
Right?
It has a kind of ethos where at least we teachers believe that
you have to pay some respect to the teachers.
And we have all kinds of traditional
rituals--right?--which makes the making, the functioning of a
university in a way a traditional organization.
Right?
There is the graduation ceremony, when you will be
wearing all these funny, you know, academic dress,
and then you are awarded a degree,
which is happening almost like awarding a lordship by the
queen.
Right?
The president will say, "By the power vested in
me", and then by this power
"will confer to you"-- right?--the degree of Bachelor
of Arts or Bachelor of Sciences.
Right?
This is very much like conferring the title of Lordship
on somebody, by the Queen of England, by the powers vested in
her.
Okay, so therefore Weber is more flexible with Marx.
No, it doesn't simply describe society, but in every society it
does describe certain organizations.
And in contemporary society we often talk about charisma.
And we have been talking a lot about charisma in the last
eighteen months.
When we were talking about Barack Obama and Barack Obama
being a charismatic leader.
Right?
So the charisma is also something what we very often
invoke today, describing the nature of
authority somebody is exercising.
Okay, so that's again, you know, just a backdrop to
the notion of authority, and I hope it will help you to
locate it more in the literature.
Now, as I mentioned also in last lecture,
there are three major types of authority.
Traditional authority, in which basically you have a
personal master in charge, and this personal master
somehow appeals to old, age-old, sacred rules,
to ask you to obey his or her commands--
mostly his, but occasionally her commands.
After all, there is a queen in England, and there were queens
in England for a long time.
Okay, so that's traditional authority.
The other one is charismatic authority,
where the person in charge calls for obedience on the
grounds that that person is believed to have some
supernatural, extraordinary powers.
And finally legal-rational authority: authority in which
the person who is issuing a command is also under the same
law as people who are obeying orders,
and in legal-rational authority you do not have a personal
master, you do not obey a person,
but you obey the rules and laws.
That's why Weber calls it legal-rational authority.
As a shorthand, I think it would be more
obvious to call it liberal authority or a liberal system of
authority.
I just want to make one more-- one very brief comment,
as we proceed to traditional authority;
namely, that the three types of authorities are not exactly of
the same ontological status.
Weber basically has two major types of authority:
traditional authority or legal-rational authority.
Charismatic authority does not have the longevity what
traditional authority or legal-rational authority has.
Charismatic authority, as we will talk about this a
great deal, is a revolutionary force.
Charismatic authority usually occurs for a relatively brief
period of time.
Typically the charismatic leader is one person,
and it is very lucky if that one person can maintain the
charisma for all the time this person is in charge.
I mean, just after nine months of the election of President
Obama, we see a little--right?--withering of his
sort of strong charismatic appeal.
So in order to maintain your charisma while you are in
office--and especially for a lifetime--is very difficult;
and even more difficult to transfer charisma to another
leader.
So charismatic authority is really a change,
basically--as I will argue later on--
from one form of traditional authority to another form of
traditional authority, in Max Weber.
So therefore really the two big types--
traditional authority and legal-rational authority--
and what Marx called the transition from feudalism to
capitalism; or what we understand,
modernization is really nothing else but the movement from
traditional authority to legal-rational authority.
Okay?
Now let me go into today's topic, and talk about
traditional authority.
And first about pure type.
I will describe his definition of the pure type,
but it needs a footnote what pure type is all about.
As I already pointed out, Max Weber was a Kantian.
That meant that Max Weber did not believe that human
knowledge, which completely describes the reality,
is possible.
Right?
The reality is so infinitely rich that the concepts what we
develop is only mental images of this object, what we are
developing a concept about.
Right?
It can never be fully describing the subject.
So these mental objects, what we have in our mind about
the object, from which we try to develop knowledge,
is what he calls ideal types.
They are abstractions from the world, not a precise description
of the world.
So therefore what he said: The best what we can aim at,
to develop ideal type, pure types;
and all realities will be always somewhat different from
the ideal type, what is in our mind.
And as human knowledge is progressing--
and that's what makes actually Weber a difficult reading--
is that in the process of knowledge we develop an ideal
type and conceptions about the world,
and then we go back to reality and we see that it does not
exhaust the reality as it is; the reality has other important
features we missed in the first instance.
So we go back and we redo our ideal type;
enrich the ideal type to fit--to create a better fit with
reality.
Right?
That's the fundamental idea.
And that's what makes Weber so difficult to read,
because he often comes up with an ideal type,
a pure type.
And he said, "Yes but when I am reading
a historical reality, it does not quite fit;
so therefore I'll redo a little my ideal type and enrich
it."
So you can easily get lost when you are reading Weber.
And this is not accidental.
Right?
This is the methodology how he proceeds.
He does not believe that we can attain absolute knowledge.
What he believes, that we have to strive to be
able to describe what we want to describe as precisely as we just
can--as we can.
So this is the idea of pure types.
So what is the pure type of legal-rational authority--of
traditional authority?
First of all we have to talk about the basis of legitimacy--
just very briefly something also about the patterns,
how a staff is being recruited, as such.
And here he comes with a very clear and simple definition.
In traditional authority, legitimacy is claimed for,
and believed in, by virtue of the sanctity of
age-old rules.
So the person who rules makes a claim that this has been always
this way, and there is some sacredness
in, in fact, obeying the person who by
age-old tradition was assigned to a position of authority.
Again, let me just go back to the family.
This is a classical example.
The parents do have some sacred rights to issue some commands,
and we do obey parents because it was always this way;
children always had to obey parents.
To what extent they have to obey, and what parents can do to
children, may vary a little over time.
But the parents are in charge and they are,
in fact, to have the rights to issue certain kinds of commands
is widely accepted.
But the word "believed in" is also very important.
Right?
So the parents do not have to force you to obey;
you're beginning to believe that it is indeed the right
thing that the parents obey order.
It happens also if you particularly dislike what they
try to order.
And occasionally you may not like one of your parents,
or both of your parents.
Nevertheless, you think some degree of
obedience is necessary; unless you really break the law
and you run away.
Right?
But that is certainly an extreme case.
As it is an extreme case that parents will force children,
use coercion of children, to obey their rule.
Well occasionally they use some degree of coercion.
It's also very important in Weber;
you know, that coercion is always present in every type of
domination.
Do not think that legal-rational authority does
not have coercion.
In the United States, over three million people are
in jail.
Right?
They are being coerced.
In the United States, people occasionally are killed
by the government--right?--they are executed.
So there is coercion, even in legal-rational
authority.
In the most liberal democratic society, if you break the laws
you will be coerced.
And if you are not breaking the law, there is always the promise
of coercion.
Right?
It's said, "Well under certain circumstances you will
be coerced."
Now the second important point is--right?--
that the master who obeys the order is designated by
traditional rules-- right?--and they are obeyed
because of their Eigenwurde.
Well Eigenwurde is translated into English as
traditional status.
It's not a very good translation.
Eigenwurde really means that they are believed to have
virtues by themselves; that they have a virtue what
they themselves carry out.
So there is honor; I think the term honor is
extremely important--right?--for understanding traditional
authority.
The traditional master is always assumed to be an
honorable person.
Right?
And if that person becomes not honorable, it is likely that it
will lose its authority.
Again, think about parents.
Right?
The parents are supposed to be honorable, and if they are not
honorable any longer, there is a crisis in the
family.
Have you seen Arthur Miller's play, the Death of a
Salesman?
This is exactly what happens in the Death of a Salesman,
when his son catches the father, whom he admired so much,
is catching him with another woman than his mother.
Right?
Then suddenly the father loses his honor;
he's not honorable any longer--right?--and that creates
a lifelong crisis for the child.
So I think honor is very important to understand
traditional authority.
And it is based--traditional rule is based on personal
loyalty.
You personally feel that you have to be loyal to this person.
Again, all of these issues do apply to a substantial degree in
institutions like a university.
Right?
It is also kind of assumed--right?--
that, you know, professors should act in an
honorable way, and if they don't,
they are caught of being not honorable,
they will be losing their legitimacy.
And there is a great deal of personal loyalty in university
situations.
Well particularly in graduate school the relationship,
the mentor and the Ph.D.
student, is a highly personalized relationship of
mutual loyalties.
Right?
There is so much a mentor will be able to take;
that a Ph.D.
student in the dissertation will be too critical of the
professor who is supervising the dissertation.
It expects some degree of loyalty--right?--from the
student; and the student would be very
disappointed if it turns out that the mentor is writing bad
letters for him.
Right?
There is an expectation--right?--of mutual
loyalty in every type of traditional authority.
And what is therefore important, there is also a
personal element.
Whom you obey is a kind of a personal master;
not simply a supervisor, not a boss, but something of a
personal master, an honorable person to whom you
are linked to by loyalty.
Well how do you recruit staff under this system?
There are really two ways to do it.
There is a so-called patrimonial recruitment;
namely, that people are selected into position because
they are related to the chief, by tradition,
because they are known to the chief.
This happens to a great deal in various organizations even
today; especially university
organizations do exercise a substantial patrimonial system
of recruitment.
But there are extra-patrimonial ways when persons are judged to
be loyal by the master and are appointed to the office because
of their expected loyalty, as such.
Again, I can give you the example of the universities
where a lot of recruitment is happening through patrimonial
recruitment.
You are--well in the U.S.
universities, you are not supposed to recruit
your own students.
In Europe they do.
In the U.S. few universities do.
But you recruit the students of your buddies or your friends or
your colleagues.
Right?
There's a lot of patrimonialism going on in university
recruitment.
And, in fact, loyalty is very important when
it comes particularly to the appointment of administrators in
the university system.
Well there are--let me move on and let's have the broader
historical view.
There
…
come back to Weber's theory of domination.
I deleted it from the questions, but I promise I will
get this back in one way or another for the next test.
So probably the last thing you want to think about now is a
test >
, but let me still talk about the theory of domination.
I think this is a very important theory--extremely
influential and extremely insightful.
So let me just very briefly sum up where we left it last time,
and then I'll move into Weber's theory of traditional authority.
And last time we were talking about the crucial distinction
Weber makes between Macht and Herrschaft.
Macht is translated in English as power;
there is no question about this.
The translation of Herrschaft varies.
It is translated either as authority, or it is translated
as domination.
And I think both translations are good.
I think, people whom I feel closer in my own Weber reading,
translated it more like domination rather than
authority.
And, in fact, I think just to emphasize you
the importance of the translational difference,
in the notion of Herrschaft,
the first four letters, Herr,
means the lord.
So I think the notion of herrschaft has very strong
implications of asymmetrical power relationships;
what I think domination captures better than authority.
Those who translated Weber's notion of Herrschaft as
authority, like Talcott Parsons,
wanted to emphasize that Weber looks at Herrschaft as
something which is authoritarian--
right?--where somebody acts out of authority.
Right?
This is not a false translation, but misses an
important point--namely, Weber's interest in the way how
power is being exercised.
In fact it, in a way, misses Max Weber's roots in
Friedrich Nietzsche, or probably even,
I may dare so, in Hobbes.
Right?
Human history is all about the history of struggle for power.
That's, in my reading, Weber's fundamental idea--power
with an important modification.
And I gave you the citation last lecture,
but let me come back to this.
Power means the likelihood that people will obey order,
even against resistance.
And domination means the likelihood that people will
actually follow orders, without being coerced to do so.
So the notion of domination, or Herrschaft,
does imply a degree of voluntariness,
a minimum level of belief that in fact those who issue orders
do have the right to do so; or at least it is reasonable
that they issue orders and I follow the orders.
Or to come up with an even more minimal definition of
Herrschaft, that I cannot see any real
alternative under the present circumstances but to obey the
orders to the one who issues these orders.
Right?
And this has everything to do with the idea of legitimacy.
And I put, at last lecture, this little
equation--right?--on one of the slides, that power plus
legitimation adds up to domination or authority.
So what is legitimation?
Weber said power is really an extreme case;
that very little, very--it happens very rarely
that the one who exercises authority, exercises simply by
exerting power, coercing people to obey.
Those who are in a position of authority try to legitimate
their authority, and try to come up with reasons
why people subjected to this authority should obey their
authority.
It's again very Nietzschian, the idea.
Right?
That those who are exercising power tries to internalize your
subjugation to power in one way or another,
and try to create in you a morality--
right?--a set of principles by which you would say,
"Well, this probably may be the right thing for me to
do."
Or, as I said, the minimum definition,
even if you don't particularly like obeying orders,
you say, "What else can I do?
The alternative, if I don't obey orders,
would be worse."
Or about the person who issues authority: you may not like the
person who issues authority, but you will say,
"But the alternative is worse." Right?
So you can pick a course.
You may not like the lecturer all that much,
or the way how he grades, but there were other courses
you did shop for and they were even worse.
So you picked the least worst course.
Right?
You picked the lecturer who seems to be the least boring,
and who seems to be the most reasonable grading your
assignment.
Right?
That doesn't mean that you are all that thrilled to be at
lectures, and to do assignments,
but you have to do it, and under the circumstances you
go for the less evil.
Right?
That's, I think, the kind of most extreme
interpretation of Weber's idea of legitimacy.
But Weber also--I pointed this word out to you--Weber said that
all legitimacy contains an element of a myth.
It doesn't mean that the person who tries to justify its
authority is telling the truth.
Whether it is truth or not truth is almost beside the
point.
The most important issue is that it creates a mythology
about the reason why you have to obey authority.
So what I tried to underline already in last lecture,
that Weber's notion of legitimacy is so much more
sophisticated, so less liberal,
and so much more Nietzschian than the idea we normally hear
when you hear the word legitimation.
Right?
Legitimation, we see something very good.
Right?
A power is legitimated because it was somebody was elected in
fair and free elections to an office,
and we believe that this person will do a great job,
having been elected.
Well, Weber would be more likely to think something like
Karzai.
Well, under the circumstances, probably there is no
alternative to Afghanistan but to have this guy as the
president.
Though it's very doubtful, you know, what all those claims
about the legitimacy of the system are being made;
they are pretty much a mythology created around it.
But otherwise the alternative is chaos, and even this guy's
probably better than chaos, which would happen otherwise.
Right?
This is in my dark reading of Max Weber.
Now, as you can see, of course, the difference from
Marx is fundamental.
Marx did see human history as unfolding of modes of
production.
It was all struggle around ownership, means of production,
clash of economic interests.
For Weber, it is not economic interest which drives human
history but struggle for power.
And he can describe different systems of authority over time,
but it is all described on the quality and the nature of those
mythologies those in a position of power come up with to
legitimate what they are trying to do to you.
Right?
So that is one fundamental difference between Marx and
Weber.
There is another fundamental difference, and you will have to
bear this very much in mind as this lecture on traditional
authority unfolds.
Though Weber develops these different types of domination,
primarily to describe historical change--
grand societies, traditional authority,
charismatical authority, legal-rational authority,
kind of describe the evolution of humankind--
and has a similar kind of flavor than Marx's subsequent
modes of production.
But Weber does more than that.
These three types of authority do describe all kinds of
organizations or social units.
Today we can talk about legal-rational authority,
traditional authority, or charismatic authority in
contemporary society; though he would call liberal
market capitalism as the purest type--
and what pure type is, I will talk about this in a
minute-- of legal-rational authority.
He will say that even in contemporary society we have
organizations which are based on traditional authority.
The most obvious example of traditional authority--and bare
it in mind when we will be talking about this today--is the
family you live in.
Right?
The family is primarily bound together by tradition.
But the very institution where you are in now,
universities, do have a flavor of traditional
authority.
Right?
It has a kind of ethos where at least we teachers believe that
you have to pay some respect to the teachers.
And we have all kinds of traditional
rituals--right?--which makes the making, the functioning of a
university in a way a traditional organization.
Right?
There is the graduation ceremony, when you will be
wearing all these funny, you know, academic dress,
and then you are awarded a degree,
which is happening almost like awarding a lordship by the
queen.
Right?
The president will say, "By the power vested in
me", and then by this power
"will confer to you"-- right?--the degree of Bachelor
of Arts or Bachelor of Sciences.
Right?
This is very much like conferring the title of Lordship
on somebody, by the Queen of England, by the powers vested in
her.
Okay, so therefore Weber is more flexible with Marx.
No, it doesn't simply describe society, but in every society it
does describe certain organizations.
And in contemporary society we often talk about charisma.
And we have been talking a lot about charisma in the last
eighteen months.
When we were talking about Barack Obama and Barack Obama
being a charismatic leader.
Right?
So the charisma is also something what we very often
invoke today, describing the nature of
authority somebody is exercising.
Okay, so that's again, you know, just a backdrop to
the notion of authority, and I hope it will help you to
locate it more in the literature.
Now, as I mentioned also in last lecture,
there are three major types of authority.
Traditional authority, in which basically you have a
personal master in charge, and this personal master
somehow appeals to old, age-old, sacred rules,
to ask you to obey his or her commands--
mostly his, but occasionally her commands.
After all, there is a queen in England, and there were queens
in England for a long time.
Okay, so that's traditional authority.
The other one is charismatic authority,
where the person in charge calls for obedience on the
grounds that that person is believed to have some
supernatural, extraordinary powers.
And finally legal-rational authority: authority in which
the person who is issuing a command is also under the same
law as people who are obeying orders,
and in legal-rational authority you do not have a personal
master, you do not obey a person,
but you obey the rules and laws.
That's why Weber calls it legal-rational authority.
As a shorthand, I think it would be more
obvious to call it liberal authority or a liberal system of
authority.
I just want to make one more-- one very brief comment,
as we proceed to traditional authority;
namely, that the three types of authorities are not exactly of
the same ontological status.
Weber basically has two major types of authority:
traditional authority or legal-rational authority.
Charismatic authority does not have the longevity what
traditional authority or legal-rational authority has.
Charismatic authority, as we will talk about this a
great deal, is a revolutionary force.
Charismatic authority usually occurs for a relatively brief
period of time.
Typically the charismatic leader is one person,
and it is very lucky if that one person can maintain the
charisma for all the time this person is in charge.
I mean, just after nine months of the election of President
Obama, we see a little--right?--withering of his
sort of strong charismatic appeal.
So in order to maintain your charisma while you are in
office--and especially for a lifetime--is very difficult;
and even more difficult to transfer charisma to another
leader.
So charismatic authority is really a change,
basically--as I will argue later on--
from one form of traditional authority to another form of
traditional authority, in Max Weber.
So therefore really the two big types--
traditional authority and legal-rational authority--
and what Marx called the transition from feudalism to
capitalism; or what we understand,
modernization is really nothing else but the movement from
traditional authority to legal-rational authority.
Okay?
Now let me go into today's topic, and talk about
traditional authority.
And first about pure type.
I will describe his definition of the pure type,
but it needs a footnote what pure type is all about.
As I already pointed out, Max Weber was a Kantian.
That meant that Max Weber did not believe that human
knowledge, which completely describes the reality,
is possible.
Right?
The reality is so infinitely rich that the concepts what we
develop is only mental images of this object, what we are
developing a concept about.
Right?
It can never be fully describing the subject.
So these mental objects, what we have in our mind about
the object, from which we try to develop knowledge,
is what he calls ideal types.
They are abstractions from the world, not a precise description
of the world.
So therefore what he said: The best what we can aim at,
to develop ideal type, pure types;
and all realities will be always somewhat different from
the ideal type, what is in our mind.
And as human knowledge is progressing--
and that's what makes actually Weber a difficult reading--
is that in the process of knowledge we develop an ideal
type and conceptions about the world,
and then we go back to reality and we see that it does not
exhaust the reality as it is; the reality has other important
features we missed in the first instance.
So we go back and we redo our ideal type;
enrich the ideal type to fit--to create a better fit with
reality.
Right?
That's the fundamental idea.
And that's what makes Weber so difficult to read,
because he often comes up with an ideal type,
a pure type.
And he said, "Yes but when I am reading
a historical reality, it does not quite fit;
so therefore I'll redo a little my ideal type and enrich
it."
So you can easily get lost when you are reading Weber.
And this is not accidental.
Right?
This is the methodology how he proceeds.
He does not believe that we can attain absolute knowledge.
What he believes, that we have to strive to be
able to describe what we want to describe as precisely as we just
can--as we can.
So this is the idea of pure types.
So what is the pure type of legal-rational authority--of
traditional authority?
First of all we have to talk about the basis of legitimacy--
just very briefly something also about the patterns,
how a staff is being recruited, as such.
And here he comes with a very clear and simple definition.
In traditional authority, legitimacy is claimed for,
and believed in, by virtue of the sanctity of
age-old rules.
So the person who rules makes a claim that this has been always
this way, and there is some sacredness
in, in fact, obeying the person who by
age-old tradition was assigned to a position of authority.
Again, let me just go back to the family.
This is a classical example.
The parents do have some sacred rights to issue some commands,
and we do obey parents because it was always this way;
children always had to obey parents.
To what extent they have to obey, and what parents can do to
children, may vary a little over time.
But the parents are in charge and they are,
in fact, to have the rights to issue certain kinds of commands
is widely accepted.
But the word "believed in" is also very important.
Right?
So the parents do not have to force you to obey;
you're beginning to believe that it is indeed the right
thing that the parents obey order.
It happens also if you particularly dislike what they
try to order.
And occasionally you may not like one of your parents,
or both of your parents.
Nevertheless, you think some degree of
obedience is necessary; unless you really break the law
and you run away.
Right?
But that is certainly an extreme case.
As it is an extreme case that parents will force children,
use coercion of children, to obey their rule.
Well occasionally they use some degree of coercion.
It's also very important in Weber;
you know, that coercion is always present in every type of
domination.
Do not think that legal-rational authority does
not have coercion.
In the United States, over three million people are
in jail.
Right?
They are being coerced.
In the United States, people occasionally are killed
by the government--right?--they are executed.
So there is coercion, even in legal-rational
authority.
In the most liberal democratic society, if you break the laws
you will be coerced.
And if you are not breaking the law, there is always the promise
of coercion.
Right?
It's said, "Well under certain circumstances you will
be coerced."
Now the second important point is--right?--
that the master who obeys the order is designated by
traditional rules-- right?--and they are obeyed
because of their Eigenwurde.
Well Eigenwurde is translated into English as
traditional status.
It's not a very good translation.
Eigenwurde really means that they are believed to have
virtues by themselves; that they have a virtue what
they themselves carry out.
So there is honor; I think the term honor is
extremely important--right?--for understanding traditional
authority.
The traditional master is always assumed to be an
honorable person.
Right?
And if that person becomes not honorable, it is likely that it
will lose its authority.
Again, think about parents.
Right?
The parents are supposed to be honorable, and if they are not
honorable any longer, there is a crisis in the
family.
Have you seen Arthur Miller's play, the Death of a
Salesman?
This is exactly what happens in the Death of a Salesman,
when his son catches the father, whom he admired so much,
is catching him with another woman than his mother.
Right?
Then suddenly the father loses his honor;
he's not honorable any longer--right?--and that creates
a lifelong crisis for the child.
So I think honor is very important to understand
traditional authority.
And it is based--traditional rule is based on personal
loyalty.
You personally feel that you have to be loyal to this person.
Again, all of these issues do apply to a substantial degree in
institutions like a university.
Right?
It is also kind of assumed--right?--
that, you know, professors should act in an
honorable way, and if they don't,
they are caught of being not honorable,
they will be losing their legitimacy.
And there is a great deal of personal loyalty in university
situations.
Well particularly in graduate school the relationship,
the mentor and the Ph.D.
student, is a highly personalized relationship of
mutual loyalties.
Right?
There is so much a mentor will be able to take;
that a Ph.D.
student in the dissertation will be too critical of the
professor who is supervising the dissertation.
It expects some degree of loyalty--right?--from the
student; and the student would be very
disappointed if it turns out that the mentor is writing bad
letters for him.
Right?
There is an expectation--right?--of mutual
loyalty in every type of traditional authority.
And what is therefore important, there is also a
personal element.
Whom you obey is a kind of a personal master;
not simply a supervisor, not a boss, but something of a
personal master, an honorable person to whom you
are linked to by loyalty.
Well how do you recruit staff under this system?
There are really two ways to do it.
There is a so-called patrimonial recruitment;
namely, that people are selected into position because
they are related to the chief, by tradition,
because they are known to the chief.
This happens to a great deal in various organizations even
today; especially university
organizations do exercise a substantial patrimonial system
of recruitment.
But there are extra-patrimonial ways when persons are judged to
be loyal by the master and are appointed to the office because
of their expected loyalty, as such.
Again, I can give you the example of the universities
where a lot of recruitment is happening through patrimonial
recruitment.
You are--well in the U.S.
universities, you are not supposed to recruit
your own students.
In Europe they do.
In the U.S. few universities do.
But you recruit the students of your buddies or your friends or
your colleagues.
Right?
There's a lot of patrimonialism going on in university
recruitment.
And, in fact, loyalty is very important when
it comes particularly to the appointment of administrators in
the university system.
Well there are--let me move on and let's have the broader
historical view.
There
…