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English transcript
Prof: Okay, now let me--I actually would
like to spend as much time as I can on Durkheim's methodology.
I have lots of notes.
This is the twenty-fourth lecture, note,
this semester for this course.
But let me rush through of the test questions and just to tell
you how I would like to deal with them.
I think the first one is very obvious, probably a bit too
obvious.
The question is how can you make it interesting?
I hope that the distinction between power and domination is
clear.
Right?
Power means that somebody can impose its will on somebody
else, even if that other person opposes it.
There is a strong element of coercion involved.
Right?
You can coerce people to obey your command.
Domination implies that you do not have to use coercion
systematically, because people tend to
internalize the reasons those who have power use in order to
legitimate why they should have power.
Right?
And then this brings us to the notion of legitimacy.
Right?
Legitimacy are the claims which are made by those who have
power, which try to justify why it is
reasonable that they should issue commands and others should
obey it.
So far, very simple. Right?
What is kind of controversial about this?
It's controversial the way how Weber uses the notion of
legitimacy.
Normally we, in modern democratic theory,
we believe--right?--a system is legitimate when it has popular
consent.
We think about universal suffrage.
People go to free and fair elections, and then they elect
leaders, and then they follow those elected to office this
way.
Then power is legitimate.
But I think Weber wants to have a broader notion of legitimacy.
Because free and fair elections, operating with
universal suffrage, go back one-hundred years in
human history, and in some countries it still
does not exist.
And Weber does not want to describe the last ten minutes of
human history for human history's twenty-four hours.
Right?
He wants to offer some conceptual tools to understand
the whole twenty-four hours.
So that's why he has this interesting notion of
legitimacy; which it does imply that people
have to have a certain degree of belief in the validity of the
legitimacy claims.
But it is a rather passive notion of belief.
They don't have to love the person in position of authority;
they do not have to elect it.
They simply--it's enough if they think, "Well I cannot
think of a better alternative."
Right?
Another dictator could be worse than this one.
Right?
This is a dictator, but a reasonable one.
And Weber will say, as long as this is happening,
the person in authority will not have to use coercion
systematically, and therefore it will be
legitimate.
Right?
Let me also just say--of course, the coercive element is
also in domination.
Right?
If people disobey the law, then they will be coerced.
There is certainly a promise of coercion, even in modern free
democracies.
People are put in jail; in this country people are even
executed.
Right?
So there is an element of coercion.
Just the real question is how systematic that coercion should
be?
And for Weber, pure exercise of authority is
relatively rare and marginal.
I would say, for instance,
the sort of last year or two or three of Hitler was fairly
illegitimate.
Hitler had to use massive coercion.
Certain epochs of rule of Stalin in the Soviet Union were
illegitimate, not all the rule of Stalin.
During the Second World War he established some legitimacy.
But when he had to imprison ten million people--
right?--and to kill tens of thousands or hundreds of
thousands, that is an indication that this
is illegitimate.
Okay?
So that's the way how I would handle it--right?--to work
around this interesting conception of legitimacy,
and what is for and against this.
Well this is again a very simple question,
traditional and legal-rational authority.
Right?
The basic difference is--right?--that traditional
authority, you have a personal master.
In legal-rational authority you do not have a personal master.
You obey the laws, and the people who are in
charge, who are superiors, will also have to obey the same
laws, what you are required to do.
And traditional authority is legitimated by the sanctity of
age-old rules.
Here again I think the interesting issue,
if I would write about this, will be, well this is a big
historical distinction.
But Weber also uses it to describe, in contemporary
society, different types of organizations.
So contemporary theory has a big dose of traditional
authority in it--right?--and I would try to elaborate on this.
Well this is--right?--one of the trickier questions:
Why does Weber believe that bureaucracy is efficient?
And you may agree or may disagree with him.
So first of all, I would state why Weber
believes that bureaucracy is efficient.
I would emphasize that he thinks that bureaucracy is the
most efficient, in the technical terms--not
necessarily otherwise.
And then, of course, the way how he defines
bureaucracy.
People are put into position in terms of their competence.
There is a rule of law.
It is a predictable environment, a bureaucratic
environment.
There is a hierarchy of appeals; if somebody makes a mistake,
how to appeal.
This, of course, all makes it efficient.
Now we know that bureaucracies are often inefficient.
So how to reconcile this?
Well it's not that Weber was totally insensitive to the
problem of inefficiencies of bureaucracies,
and he formulated it how that bureaucracies are caught between
formal and substantive rationality.
That's the way how I would probably defend Weber--to say he
was not that naīve to believe that bureaucracies are
always efficient.
They would be efficient if they would be purely formally
rational, but they are not.
And one good example is welfare bureaucracies,
which do establish a kind of patron-client
relationships--right?--between bureaucracies and clients.
Some people refer to this as welfare dependency,
which makes it, of course, a cause of
inefficiency.
Well this is a nice question to answer, and we discussed this a
great deal.
We know that charismatic leaders appear in times of
crisis, when people are looking for a change.
Right?
So Barack Obama, during the presidential
campaign, he has read Weber carefully;
he knew how to frame--right?--his message
exactly as a charismatic message.
It was all about change, and it was about hope.
Right?
In contrast with Hillary Clinton or John McCain.
Both of them emphasized that "we are experienced'.
This is not what people wanted to hear when they wanted to have
change.
So yes, in this respect, Barack Obama did have a
charismatic appeal, and this charismatic appeal did
gel.
Right?
Many people responded to his charisma.
He was criticized by his opponent that he's a rock
star--right?--because people got so excited about him.
So he could appeal to the emotion of people.
Right?
He could appeal to them.
But, of course, as we again discussed in
discussion sections-- also briefly in class--Barack
Obama has a charismatic appeal, but he operates in a
legal-rational authority.
Right?
And we just have seen that very recently--right?--making a
decision about the war in Afghanistan.
Right?
Well he had to deal with realities.
Right?
So well Weber would--in the classical sense,
charisma in Weber is reserved to great religious leaders,
such as Muhammad or Jesus or whatever,
or the great prophets.
And in this sense charisma is not really applicable to
politicians operating in legal-rational authority.
So Weber would have some unease to call Barack Obama a
charismatic leader.
I would think he would concede that certainly Barack Obama had
charismatic features, as such.
Now the fifth question: Durkheim and the study of law.
Why on earth he starts from the study of law in analyzing
society?
Because he's a methodological collectivist,
and because he wants to capture something like the collective
conscience, which is more than the sum
total of individual consciousness.
But he's also a scientist, and I hope I will have a little
time to talk about the methodology.
He wants to be very rigorous, and he doesn't want to start
with ideas; he wants to start with facts.
Well he's caught in--right?--a contradiction.
So collective conscience is ideas.
Right?
How on earth you study them objectively?
And law is a great example, because law is written down.
Right?
There is written law.
You can study it objectively, and it is not only individual
consciousness what guides us all.
So I think this is the major reason why his point of
departure is--as an example--law because this is what he can
rigorously study.
It can be seen as a social fact--right?--
that this is the law, and to understand why this law
came into being, under what circumstances,
and how does it influence people?
Well, of course, the inspiration comes from
Montesquieu.
All right.
Well agreement and disagreement.
I think the real question is whether you buy into
methodological collectivism or not.
Some of you may be methodological individualists.
Especially if you are an Econ major, you tend to be an
economic individualist, a methodological individualist.
Right?
You tend to believe that there are rational individual actors
who pursue interest, and you are very skeptical
about anything which is assumedly above the individual.
So in that case, if you are a methodological
individualist-- and, in fact,
I think the dominant trend in social sciences today is
methodological individualism and a great deal of skepticism about
methodological collectivism-- that can be a kind of critical
handle on it.
Or at least you can show this is the way how it can be
criticized, and you can show why you
actually think that methodological collectivism is
reasonable.
Okay, the sixth question, organic and mechanical
solidarity, and how this is related to Weber's typology of
authority.
I mean, it's pretty simple.
There are very important distinctions--di
fferences--between Durkheim and Weber.
Durkheim looks at what brings society together.
The central concept is solidarity.
Weber looks at social conflict, what takes society apart.
So he looks at struggle around power.
Right?
Weber is coming from the lineage of, I would say,
Hobbes and Nietzsche.
Right?
That's where the Weberian view comes from.
There are, of course, similarities.
Organic solidarity is what legal-rational authority is for
Weber.
They try to capture modernity.
Both are similar in the sense that they are also social
typologies of societies, but also types of social
organizations in any given society, as such.
So these are some similarities.
Okay, I think that's probably about it.
Well the question of anomie.
I think we covered this recently.
So I don't have to refresh your memory as much.
The notion of anomie in Durkheim comes out of the
absence of sufficient regulation.
And this is a temporary product which emerges because mechanical
solidarity is breaking down and organic solidarity has not been
established yet.
And in the transition from mechanical solidarity--
traditional society--into a modern urban industrial society,
people have a problem of regulation in value systems,
and that's when they are anomic.
But this will go away.
What is the theory of human nature behind this?
This can be debated.
One possible argument is that since he believes that order has
to come from the outside, from above, he tends to believe
that without order, created by a societal level,
collective conscience, we would do evil things.
We need to be regulated. Right?
Well of course he knows that we can be overregulated,
and then that's also pathological.
But the main pathology, at least in the transition from
mechanical to organic solidarity,
is the absence of regulation and the problem that humans may
do abnormal, pathological, or evil acts.
So there is a notion of humans needing control over them.
Well this speaks to the eighth question: anomie and alienation.
They are in many ways the opposite to each other.
Right?
Alienation means that you are over-regulated.
You are not in control of your own life, of your own fate.
That is what alienation means.
Also Marx is inspired by Rousseau.
It's a kind of Rousseauian conception of nature behind
that.
The problem comes from society; it doesn't come from the
individual.
Right?
We are born in society, we are social by nature,
and if modernity, modern capitalism,
would be removed, we again would act socially and
collectively in a good way.
So that's--and in contrast, like Durkheim's notion is that
the absence of regulation, that's what causes pathologies.
All right?
Ninth question.
This is something what I think you find difficulties to deal
with, because you did not find the word 'disenchantment' in any
of the readings.
And indeed Weber did not use the word very often.
He did use it most critically in an essay what he wrote after
he was trying to combine his various sociology of religions.
But the word 'enchantment' is translated from the German word
magic.
So disenchantment means a situation in which the world
loses magic, when magic is moved out of life.
And this is happening with rationalization.
Right?
The big process of historical evolution is towards
rationalization and the loss of magic.
And the text what you have to support that is in The
Protestant Ethic, where Weber makes a big deal
out of it.
That's what especially Calvinism and the teaching of
predestination did, it got rid of magic.
Right?
But though he is, say, a rationalist,
he sees the downside of rationalism;
the loss of magic is the price what we have to pay for
rationalization.
And he's a bit nostalgic about the world, when it was magic,
when the relations were magical.
So that is kind of a permanent condition of modernity;
things are not getting any better.
That's, I think, one of the big differences with
Durkheim's notion of anomie.
The loss of magic actually does mean, like--there is roots in
Marx here.
Because the loss of magic means that actually you seem to be
more vulnerable to fate.
Right?
Magic, you were a magician, you had ways how to make God,
the omnipotent God, to do things for you;
for instance, to save you.
Right?
You could do it through magical means.
In a rationalized world, we are less in control of our
lives.
So in this sense I think Weber's notion of disenchantment
is closer to the Marxian notion of alienation,
rather than the Durkheimian notion of anomie.
Well social causes of suicide.
Well we just covered this the last lecture.
The argument is--right?--that we believe that suicide is the
most individual, intimate decision.
He actually does show, and demonstrate,
this is not the case, because there are great
differences in suicide rate across countries.
These differences tend to be very stable.
There are also strong relationships between suicide
and religion, and suicide and education,
and therefore there are-- right?--social determinants of
this very individualistic action,
as suicide.
Well there are these two dimensions in which you can
conceptualize suicide: how well integrated you are or
how well regulated you are.
And Durkheim has this idea that too much integration and too
much regulation, or too little integration or
too little regulation, are both abnormal.
He's for the golden middle road.
Right?
Normality is in the middle road.
Sort of an anomic suicide happens when you are not
sufficiently regulated.
Egoistic suicide occurs when you are not sufficiently
integrated in society.
That's when you egoistically commit suicide,
because you don't care how yourself,
killing yourself, will affect your beloved ones--
right?--because you don't have beloved ones.
Right?
You are not integrated in society.
Right?
You do not commit egoistic suicide when you care about the
beloved ones, and you don't want to cause
them pain by killing yourself.
Right?
Anomic suicide happens if people are kind of not
sufficiently regulated, and therefore they,
in this anomic situation, may commit suicide.
Okay, so that's about it.
And let me then move on to Durkheim's methodology.
>
Yes, number twenty-four.
So this is The Rules of Sociological Method,
published in 1895, two years after The Division
of Labor and two years before the Suicide,
but foreshadows and combines elements from both.
I have a lot of stuff, so I will rush you through.
One question is--what he deals with--when is a fact social;
when can we talk about social facts?
Then he asks how can we observe social facts?
Then he makes a distinction between normal and pathological
states.
He also writes about nominalism and realism, and offers an
alternative to nominalism and realism, what is his system of
classifications.
And then he addresses the issue of the question of explanation
and causality--very path breaking ideas in his times.
So when is a fact social?
And the first point is, well we have to make a
distinction between social and biological or psychological
phenomena.
Well, and then he also--I will elaborate on this.
And then he asks the question, how objective are the social
facts?
The biological facts are obviously objective;
psychological, not so obviously; the social, the least so.
Why are they still objective?
And then he labors on what makes the social facts
collective, as such.
And that is--of course, education is the major
mechanism.
Okay, so let's ask the question, what is the social
fact, as distinct from biological or psychological?
Well he said, "Well, if all facts,
what affects human beings, would be regarded as social,
there would be no real discipline what should be called
sociology."
And as I pointed out before--right?--he is the first
person who identifies emphatically with the discipline
of sociology.
He actually has this notion of life sciences,
interestingly, right?
And sociology is part of life sciences.
Right?
There are three life sciences: sociology, biology,
and psychology.
But these three different life sciences deal with different
units of analysis, deal with different objects.
Right?
Biology deals with the body, psychology deals with the
personality, while sociology deals--this is
his shtick, right?--it deals with
collective representations.
Right?
He tries to move beyond the idea of collective
consciousness; collective representation,
which somehow objectively embodies, as a fact,
the states of collective consciousness.
And therefore he said, "This is indeed a set of
phenomena I will be able to distinguish with other facts.
So when do I act socially?"
he asks the question.
"I do so when I execute my contract."
Right?
"I perform duties--right?--which are
defined externally to me.
Right?
If I perform my duties, then I am acting socially;
I'm a socially responsible person".
Which seems to be--right?--straightforward and
obvious.
Okay, how objective they are?
That's very--at first look it doesn't look too objective,
because the sense of obligation seems to be very subjective.
Right?
You may occasionally say to your partner,
"You are irresponsible."
Right?
By which you mean you don't have enough of a feeling of a
duty towards me.
Right?
So there is this subjective element involved in this.
But he said nevertheless we can see this is still objective.
And one of the major ways how we can understand it is
objective, that in fact there is some
external enforcement-- right?--of these obligations,
if you keep breaking these obligations,
there will be penalties against you.
Right?
Well not all the time.
Occasionally you can get away with it.
But at one point there may be punishment.
You see others being punished by not fulfilling their duties
or obligations, and therefore you can see that
it is externally enforced-- it's not just a subjective
thing that you think you have duties,
right?--it will be externally implemented.
So well you have obligations--right?--at 7:00
p.m.
today to go on the internet and unload questions--right?--and to
answer two of them.
Well this, of course, will come as subjective
feelings of duty in you.
It's--have enough guilt feelings if you don't do it in a
timely manner, if you would be late--it's
sufficiently internalized in you.
But you know that there were occa
…
like to spend as much time as I can on Durkheim's methodology.
I have lots of notes.
This is the twenty-fourth lecture, note,
this semester for this course.
But let me rush through of the test questions and just to tell
you how I would like to deal with them.
I think the first one is very obvious, probably a bit too
obvious.
The question is how can you make it interesting?
I hope that the distinction between power and domination is
clear.
Right?
Power means that somebody can impose its will on somebody
else, even if that other person opposes it.
There is a strong element of coercion involved.
Right?
You can coerce people to obey your command.
Domination implies that you do not have to use coercion
systematically, because people tend to
internalize the reasons those who have power use in order to
legitimate why they should have power.
Right?
And then this brings us to the notion of legitimacy.
Right?
Legitimacy are the claims which are made by those who have
power, which try to justify why it is
reasonable that they should issue commands and others should
obey it.
So far, very simple. Right?
What is kind of controversial about this?
It's controversial the way how Weber uses the notion of
legitimacy.
Normally we, in modern democratic theory,
we believe--right?--a system is legitimate when it has popular
consent.
We think about universal suffrage.
People go to free and fair elections, and then they elect
leaders, and then they follow those elected to office this
way.
Then power is legitimate.
But I think Weber wants to have a broader notion of legitimacy.
Because free and fair elections, operating with
universal suffrage, go back one-hundred years in
human history, and in some countries it still
does not exist.
And Weber does not want to describe the last ten minutes of
human history for human history's twenty-four hours.
Right?
He wants to offer some conceptual tools to understand
the whole twenty-four hours.
So that's why he has this interesting notion of
legitimacy; which it does imply that people
have to have a certain degree of belief in the validity of the
legitimacy claims.
But it is a rather passive notion of belief.
They don't have to love the person in position of authority;
they do not have to elect it.
They simply--it's enough if they think, "Well I cannot
think of a better alternative."
Right?
Another dictator could be worse than this one.
Right?
This is a dictator, but a reasonable one.
And Weber will say, as long as this is happening,
the person in authority will not have to use coercion
systematically, and therefore it will be
legitimate.
Right?
Let me also just say--of course, the coercive element is
also in domination.
Right?
If people disobey the law, then they will be coerced.
There is certainly a promise of coercion, even in modern free
democracies.
People are put in jail; in this country people are even
executed.
Right?
So there is an element of coercion.
Just the real question is how systematic that coercion should
be?
And for Weber, pure exercise of authority is
relatively rare and marginal.
I would say, for instance,
the sort of last year or two or three of Hitler was fairly
illegitimate.
Hitler had to use massive coercion.
Certain epochs of rule of Stalin in the Soviet Union were
illegitimate, not all the rule of Stalin.
During the Second World War he established some legitimacy.
But when he had to imprison ten million people--
right?--and to kill tens of thousands or hundreds of
thousands, that is an indication that this
is illegitimate.
Okay?
So that's the way how I would handle it--right?--to work
around this interesting conception of legitimacy,
and what is for and against this.
Well this is again a very simple question,
traditional and legal-rational authority.
Right?
The basic difference is--right?--that traditional
authority, you have a personal master.
In legal-rational authority you do not have a personal master.
You obey the laws, and the people who are in
charge, who are superiors, will also have to obey the same
laws, what you are required to do.
And traditional authority is legitimated by the sanctity of
age-old rules.
Here again I think the interesting issue,
if I would write about this, will be, well this is a big
historical distinction.
But Weber also uses it to describe, in contemporary
society, different types of organizations.
So contemporary theory has a big dose of traditional
authority in it--right?--and I would try to elaborate on this.
Well this is--right?--one of the trickier questions:
Why does Weber believe that bureaucracy is efficient?
And you may agree or may disagree with him.
So first of all, I would state why Weber
believes that bureaucracy is efficient.
I would emphasize that he thinks that bureaucracy is the
most efficient, in the technical terms--not
necessarily otherwise.
And then, of course, the way how he defines
bureaucracy.
People are put into position in terms of their competence.
There is a rule of law.
It is a predictable environment, a bureaucratic
environment.
There is a hierarchy of appeals; if somebody makes a mistake,
how to appeal.
This, of course, all makes it efficient.
Now we know that bureaucracies are often inefficient.
So how to reconcile this?
Well it's not that Weber was totally insensitive to the
problem of inefficiencies of bureaucracies,
and he formulated it how that bureaucracies are caught between
formal and substantive rationality.
That's the way how I would probably defend Weber--to say he
was not that naīve to believe that bureaucracies are
always efficient.
They would be efficient if they would be purely formally
rational, but they are not.
And one good example is welfare bureaucracies,
which do establish a kind of patron-client
relationships--right?--between bureaucracies and clients.
Some people refer to this as welfare dependency,
which makes it, of course, a cause of
inefficiency.
Well this is a nice question to answer, and we discussed this a
great deal.
We know that charismatic leaders appear in times of
crisis, when people are looking for a change.
Right?
So Barack Obama, during the presidential
campaign, he has read Weber carefully;
he knew how to frame--right?--his message
exactly as a charismatic message.
It was all about change, and it was about hope.
Right?
In contrast with Hillary Clinton or John McCain.
Both of them emphasized that "we are experienced'.
This is not what people wanted to hear when they wanted to have
change.
So yes, in this respect, Barack Obama did have a
charismatic appeal, and this charismatic appeal did
gel.
Right?
Many people responded to his charisma.
He was criticized by his opponent that he's a rock
star--right?--because people got so excited about him.
So he could appeal to the emotion of people.
Right?
He could appeal to them.
But, of course, as we again discussed in
discussion sections-- also briefly in class--Barack
Obama has a charismatic appeal, but he operates in a
legal-rational authority.
Right?
And we just have seen that very recently--right?--making a
decision about the war in Afghanistan.
Right?
Well he had to deal with realities.
Right?
So well Weber would--in the classical sense,
charisma in Weber is reserved to great religious leaders,
such as Muhammad or Jesus or whatever,
or the great prophets.
And in this sense charisma is not really applicable to
politicians operating in legal-rational authority.
So Weber would have some unease to call Barack Obama a
charismatic leader.
I would think he would concede that certainly Barack Obama had
charismatic features, as such.
Now the fifth question: Durkheim and the study of law.
Why on earth he starts from the study of law in analyzing
society?
Because he's a methodological collectivist,
and because he wants to capture something like the collective
conscience, which is more than the sum
total of individual consciousness.
But he's also a scientist, and I hope I will have a little
time to talk about the methodology.
He wants to be very rigorous, and he doesn't want to start
with ideas; he wants to start with facts.
Well he's caught in--right?--a contradiction.
So collective conscience is ideas.
Right?
How on earth you study them objectively?
And law is a great example, because law is written down.
Right?
There is written law.
You can study it objectively, and it is not only individual
consciousness what guides us all.
So I think this is the major reason why his point of
departure is--as an example--law because this is what he can
rigorously study.
It can be seen as a social fact--right?--
that this is the law, and to understand why this law
came into being, under what circumstances,
and how does it influence people?
Well, of course, the inspiration comes from
Montesquieu.
All right.
Well agreement and disagreement.
I think the real question is whether you buy into
methodological collectivism or not.
Some of you may be methodological individualists.
Especially if you are an Econ major, you tend to be an
economic individualist, a methodological individualist.
Right?
You tend to believe that there are rational individual actors
who pursue interest, and you are very skeptical
about anything which is assumedly above the individual.
So in that case, if you are a methodological
individualist-- and, in fact,
I think the dominant trend in social sciences today is
methodological individualism and a great deal of skepticism about
methodological collectivism-- that can be a kind of critical
handle on it.
Or at least you can show this is the way how it can be
criticized, and you can show why you
actually think that methodological collectivism is
reasonable.
Okay, the sixth question, organic and mechanical
solidarity, and how this is related to Weber's typology of
authority.
I mean, it's pretty simple.
There are very important distinctions--di
fferences--between Durkheim and Weber.
Durkheim looks at what brings society together.
The central concept is solidarity.
Weber looks at social conflict, what takes society apart.
So he looks at struggle around power.
Right?
Weber is coming from the lineage of, I would say,
Hobbes and Nietzsche.
Right?
That's where the Weberian view comes from.
There are, of course, similarities.
Organic solidarity is what legal-rational authority is for
Weber.
They try to capture modernity.
Both are similar in the sense that they are also social
typologies of societies, but also types of social
organizations in any given society, as such.
So these are some similarities.
Okay, I think that's probably about it.
Well the question of anomie.
I think we covered this recently.
So I don't have to refresh your memory as much.
The notion of anomie in Durkheim comes out of the
absence of sufficient regulation.
And this is a temporary product which emerges because mechanical
solidarity is breaking down and organic solidarity has not been
established yet.
And in the transition from mechanical solidarity--
traditional society--into a modern urban industrial society,
people have a problem of regulation in value systems,
and that's when they are anomic.
But this will go away.
What is the theory of human nature behind this?
This can be debated.
One possible argument is that since he believes that order has
to come from the outside, from above, he tends to believe
that without order, created by a societal level,
collective conscience, we would do evil things.
We need to be regulated. Right?
Well of course he knows that we can be overregulated,
and then that's also pathological.
But the main pathology, at least in the transition from
mechanical to organic solidarity,
is the absence of regulation and the problem that humans may
do abnormal, pathological, or evil acts.
So there is a notion of humans needing control over them.
Well this speaks to the eighth question: anomie and alienation.
They are in many ways the opposite to each other.
Right?
Alienation means that you are over-regulated.
You are not in control of your own life, of your own fate.
That is what alienation means.
Also Marx is inspired by Rousseau.
It's a kind of Rousseauian conception of nature behind
that.
The problem comes from society; it doesn't come from the
individual.
Right?
We are born in society, we are social by nature,
and if modernity, modern capitalism,
would be removed, we again would act socially and
collectively in a good way.
So that's--and in contrast, like Durkheim's notion is that
the absence of regulation, that's what causes pathologies.
All right?
Ninth question.
This is something what I think you find difficulties to deal
with, because you did not find the word 'disenchantment' in any
of the readings.
And indeed Weber did not use the word very often.
He did use it most critically in an essay what he wrote after
he was trying to combine his various sociology of religions.
But the word 'enchantment' is translated from the German word
magic.
So disenchantment means a situation in which the world
loses magic, when magic is moved out of life.
And this is happening with rationalization.
Right?
The big process of historical evolution is towards
rationalization and the loss of magic.
And the text what you have to support that is in The
Protestant Ethic, where Weber makes a big deal
out of it.
That's what especially Calvinism and the teaching of
predestination did, it got rid of magic.
Right?
But though he is, say, a rationalist,
he sees the downside of rationalism;
the loss of magic is the price what we have to pay for
rationalization.
And he's a bit nostalgic about the world, when it was magic,
when the relations were magical.
So that is kind of a permanent condition of modernity;
things are not getting any better.
That's, I think, one of the big differences with
Durkheim's notion of anomie.
The loss of magic actually does mean, like--there is roots in
Marx here.
Because the loss of magic means that actually you seem to be
more vulnerable to fate.
Right?
Magic, you were a magician, you had ways how to make God,
the omnipotent God, to do things for you;
for instance, to save you.
Right?
You could do it through magical means.
In a rationalized world, we are less in control of our
lives.
So in this sense I think Weber's notion of disenchantment
is closer to the Marxian notion of alienation,
rather than the Durkheimian notion of anomie.
Well social causes of suicide.
Well we just covered this the last lecture.
The argument is--right?--that we believe that suicide is the
most individual, intimate decision.
He actually does show, and demonstrate,
this is not the case, because there are great
differences in suicide rate across countries.
These differences tend to be very stable.
There are also strong relationships between suicide
and religion, and suicide and education,
and therefore there are-- right?--social determinants of
this very individualistic action,
as suicide.
Well there are these two dimensions in which you can
conceptualize suicide: how well integrated you are or
how well regulated you are.
And Durkheim has this idea that too much integration and too
much regulation, or too little integration or
too little regulation, are both abnormal.
He's for the golden middle road.
Right?
Normality is in the middle road.
Sort of an anomic suicide happens when you are not
sufficiently regulated.
Egoistic suicide occurs when you are not sufficiently
integrated in society.
That's when you egoistically commit suicide,
because you don't care how yourself,
killing yourself, will affect your beloved ones--
right?--because you don't have beloved ones.
Right?
You are not integrated in society.
Right?
You do not commit egoistic suicide when you care about the
beloved ones, and you don't want to cause
them pain by killing yourself.
Right?
Anomic suicide happens if people are kind of not
sufficiently regulated, and therefore they,
in this anomic situation, may commit suicide.
Okay, so that's about it.
And let me then move on to Durkheim's methodology.
>
Yes, number twenty-four.
So this is The Rules of Sociological Method,
published in 1895, two years after The Division
of Labor and two years before the Suicide,
but foreshadows and combines elements from both.
I have a lot of stuff, so I will rush you through.
One question is--what he deals with--when is a fact social;
when can we talk about social facts?
Then he asks how can we observe social facts?
Then he makes a distinction between normal and pathological
states.
He also writes about nominalism and realism, and offers an
alternative to nominalism and realism, what is his system of
classifications.
And then he addresses the issue of the question of explanation
and causality--very path breaking ideas in his times.
So when is a fact social?
And the first point is, well we have to make a
distinction between social and biological or psychological
phenomena.
Well, and then he also--I will elaborate on this.
And then he asks the question, how objective are the social
facts?
The biological facts are obviously objective;
psychological, not so obviously; the social, the least so.
Why are they still objective?
And then he labors on what makes the social facts
collective, as such.
And that is--of course, education is the major
mechanism.
Okay, so let's ask the question, what is the social
fact, as distinct from biological or psychological?
Well he said, "Well, if all facts,
what affects human beings, would be regarded as social,
there would be no real discipline what should be called
sociology."
And as I pointed out before--right?--he is the first
person who identifies emphatically with the discipline
of sociology.
He actually has this notion of life sciences,
interestingly, right?
And sociology is part of life sciences.
Right?
There are three life sciences: sociology, biology,
and psychology.
But these three different life sciences deal with different
units of analysis, deal with different objects.
Right?
Biology deals with the body, psychology deals with the
personality, while sociology deals--this is
his shtick, right?--it deals with
collective representations.
Right?
He tries to move beyond the idea of collective
consciousness; collective representation,
which somehow objectively embodies, as a fact,
the states of collective consciousness.
And therefore he said, "This is indeed a set of
phenomena I will be able to distinguish with other facts.
So when do I act socially?"
he asks the question.
"I do so when I execute my contract."
Right?
"I perform duties--right?--which are
defined externally to me.
Right?
If I perform my duties, then I am acting socially;
I'm a socially responsible person".
Which seems to be--right?--straightforward and
obvious.
Okay, how objective they are?
That's very--at first look it doesn't look too objective,
because the sense of obligation seems to be very subjective.
Right?
You may occasionally say to your partner,
"You are irresponsible."
Right?
By which you mean you don't have enough of a feeling of a
duty towards me.
Right?
So there is this subjective element involved in this.
But he said nevertheless we can see this is still objective.
And one of the major ways how we can understand it is
objective, that in fact there is some
external enforcement-- right?--of these obligations,
if you keep breaking these obligations,
there will be penalties against you.
Right?
Well not all the time.
Occasionally you can get away with it.
But at one point there may be punishment.
You see others being punished by not fulfilling their duties
or obligations, and therefore you can see that
it is externally enforced-- it's not just a subjective
thing that you think you have duties,
right?--it will be externally implemented.
So well you have obligations--right?--at 7:00
p.m.
today to go on the internet and unload questions--right?--and to
answer two of them.
Well this, of course, will come as subjective
feelings of duty in you.
It's--have enough guilt feelings if you don't do it in a
timely manner, if you would be late--it's
sufficiently internalized in you.
But you know that there were occa
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