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JOHN BRACAGLIA: My name is John Bacaglia.
And I'm a Googler working in YouTube operations.
I also lead a group called the Singularity Network,
an internal organization focused on discussions
and rationality in artificial intelligence.
I'm pleased to be here today with Mr. John Searle.
As a brief introduction, John Searle
is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University
of California-Berkeley.
He is widely noted for his contributions
to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind,
and social philosophy.
John has received the Jean Nicod Prize, the National Humanities
Medal in the Mind and Brain prize for his work.
Among his noble concepts is the Chinese room argument
against strong artificial intelligence.
John Searle, everyone.
[APPLAUSE]
JOHN SEARLE: Thank you Thank you.
Many thanks.
It's great to be back at Google.
It is a university outside of a university.
And sometimes, I think, this is what a university
ought really to look like.
Anyway, it's just terrific to be here.
And I'm going to talk about some-- well,
I'm going to talk about a whole lot of stuff.
But, basically, I want to start with talking
about the significance of technological advances.
And America, especially, but everybody, really,
is inclined to just celebrate the advances.
If they got a self-driving car who the hell
cares about whether or not it's conscious.
But I'm going to say there are a lot of things that
matter for certain purposes about the understanding
of the technology.
And that's really what I'm going to talk about.
Now to begin with, I have to make a couple rather
boring distinctions because you won't really
understand contemporary intellectual life if you don't
understand these distinctions.
In our culture, there's a big deal about objectivity
and subjectivity.
We strive for an objective science.
The problem is that these notions are systematically
ambiguous in a way that produces intellectual catastrophes.
They're ambiguous between a sense, which is epistemic,
where epistemic means having to do with knowledge--
epistemic-- and a sense, which is ontological,
where ontological means having to do with existence.
I hate using a lot of fancy polysyllabic words.
And I'll try to keep them to a minimum.
But I need these two, epistemic and ontological.
Now the problem with objectivity and subjectivity
is that they're systematically ambiguous--
I'll just abbreviate subjectivity--
between an epistemic sense and an ontological sense.
Epistemically, the distinction is between types
of knowledge claims.
If I say, Rembrandt died in 1606, well-- no,
he didn't die then.
He was born then.
I'd say Rembrandt was born in 1606.
That is to say, it's a matter of objective fact.
That's epistemically objective.
But if I say Rembrandt is the greatest
painter that ever lived, well, that's a matter of opinion.
That is epistemically subject.
So we have epistemic objectivity and subjectivity.
Underlying that is a distinction in modes of existence.
Lots of things exist regardless of what anybody thinks.
Mountains, molecules, and tectonic plates
have a mode of existence that is ontologically objective.
But pains and pickles and itches,
they only exist insofar as they are experienced by a subject.
They are ontologically subjective.
So I want everybody to get that distinction
because it's very important because-- well,
for a lot of reasons, but one is lots of phenomena that
are ontologically subjective admit of an account which
is epistemically objective.
I first got interested in this kind of stuff.
I thought, well, why don't these brain guys solve
the problem of consciousness.
And I went over UCSF to their neurobiology gang
and told them, why the hell don't
you guys figure out how the brain causes consciousness?
What am I paying you to do?
And their reaction was, look, we're doing science.
Science is objective.
And you, yourself, admit that consciousness is subjective.
So there can't be a science of consciousness.
Now you'll all recognize that's a fallacy of ambiguity.
Science is indeed epistemically objective
because we strive for claims that
can be established as true or false,
independent of the attitudes of the makers
and interpreters of the claim.
But epistemic objectivity of the theory
does not preclude an epistemically objective account
of a domain that's ontologically subjective.
I promised you I wouldn't use too many big words,
but anyway there are a few.
The point is this.
You can have an epistemically objective science
of consciousness, even though consciousness
is ontologically subjective.
Now that's going to be important.
And there's another distinction.
Since not everybody can see this,
I'm going to erase as I go along.
There's another distinction which is crucial.
And that's between phenomena that are observer-independent.
And there I'm thinking of mountains and molecules
and tectonic plates, how they exist regardless
of what anybody thinks.
But the world is full of stuff that
matters to us that is observer-relative.
It only exists relative to observers and users.
So, for example, the piece of paper in my wallet is money.
But the fact that makes it money is not a fact of its chemistry.
It's a fact about the attitudes that we have toward it.
So money is observer-relative.
Money, property, government, marriage, universities, Google,
cocktail parties, and summer vacations
are all observer-relative.
And that has to be distinguished from observer-independent.
And notice now, all observer-relative phenomenon
are created by human consciousness.
Hence, they contain an element of ontological subjectivity.
But you already know that you can have,
in some cases, an epistemically objective
science of a domain that is observer-relative.
That's why you can have an objective science of economics
even though the phenomena studied by economics
is, in general, observer-relative,
and hence contains an element of ontological subjectivity.
Economists tend to forget that.
They tend to think that economics
is kind of like physics, only it's harder.
When I studied economics, I was appalled.
We learned that marginal cost equals marginal revenue
in the same tone of voice that in physics we
learned that force equals mass times acceleration.
They're totally different because the stuff in economics
is all observer-relative and contains an element
of ontological subjectivity.
And when the subjectivity changes-- ffft--
the whole thing collapses.
That was discovered in 2008.
This is not a lecture about economics.
I want you to keep all that in mind.
Now that's important because a lot of the phenomena that
are studied in cognitive science,
particularly phenomena of intelligence, cognition,
memory, thought, perception, and all the rest of it
have two different senses.
They have one sense, which is observer-independent,
and another sense, which is observer-relative.
And, consequently, we have to be very careful
that we don't confuse those senses because many
of the crucial concepts in cognitive science
have as their reference phenomena
that are observer-relative and not observer-independent.
I'm going to get to that.
OK, everybody up with us so far?
I want everything to sound so obvious you
think, why does this guy bore us with these platitudes?
Why doesn't he say something controversial?
Now I'm going to go and talk about
some intellectual history.
Many years ago, before any of you were born,
a new discipline was born.
It was called cognitive science.
And it was founded by a whole bunch of us
who got sick of behaviorism in psychology, effectively.
That was the reason for it.
And the Sloan Foundation used to fly us around to lecture,
mostly to each other.
But anyway, that's all right.
We were called Sloan Rangers.
And I was invited to lecture to the Artificial Intelligence Lab
at Yale.
And I thought, well, christ, I don't know anything
about artificial intelligence.
So I went out and bought a book written by the guys at Yale.
And I remember thinking, $16.95 plus tax-- money wasted.
But it turned out I was wrong.
They had in there a theory about how computers could understand.
And the idea was that you give the computer a story.
And then you ask the computer questions about the story.
And the computer would give the correct answer to the questions
even though the answer was not contained in the story.
A typical story.
A guy goes into a restaurant and orders a hamburger.
When they brought him the hamburger,
it was burned to a crisp.
The guy stormed out of the restaurant
and didn't even pay his bill.
Question, did the guy eat the hamburger?
Well, all of you computers know the answer to that.
No, the guy didn't eat the hamburger.
And I won't tell you the story where the answer is yes.
It's equally boring.
Now, the point was this proves that the computer really
understands the story.
So there I was on my way to New Haven on United Airlines
at 30,000 feet.
And I thought, well, hell, they could give me
these stories in Chinese.
And I could follow the computer program for answering stories.
And I don't understand a word of the story.
And I thought, well, that's an objection
they must have thought of.
And besides that won't keep me going
for a whole week in New Haven.
Well, it turned out they hadn't thought of it.
And everybody was convinced I was wrong.
But interestingly they all had different reasons
for thinking I was wrong.
And the argument has gone on longer than a week.
It's gone on for 35 years.
I mean, how often do I have to refute these guys?
But anyway, let's go through it.
The way the argument goes in its simplest version
is I am locked in a room full of Chinese-- well,
they're boxes full of Chinese symbols and a rule book
in English for manipulating the symbols.
Unknown to me, the boxes are called a database,
and the rule book is called a program.
In coming in the room, I get Chinese symbols.
Unknown to me, those are questions.
I look up what I'm supposed to do.
And after I shuffle a lot of symbols,
I give back other symbols.
And those are answers to the questions.
Now we will suppose-- I hope your bored
with this, because I am.
I mean, I've told this story many times.
We will suppose that they get so good at writing the program,
I get so good at shuffling the symbols,
that my answers are indistinguishable
from a native Chinese speaker.
I pass the Turing test for understanding Chinese.
All the same, I don't understand a word of Chinese.
And there's no way in the Chinese room
that I could come to understand Chinese because all I am
is a computer system.
And the rules I operate are a computer program.
And-- and this is the important point--
the program is purely syntactical.
It is defined entirely as a set of operations
over syntactical elements.
To put it slightly more technically,
the notion same implemented program
defines an equivalence class that
is specified completely independently of any physics
and, in particular, independent of the physics
of its realization.
The bottom line is if I don't understand
the questions and the answers on the basis of implementing
the program, then neither does any other digital computer
on that basis because no computer
has anything that I don't have.
Computers are purely syntactical devices.
Their operations are defined syntactically.
And human intelligence requires more than syntax.
It requires a semantics.
It requires an understanding of what's going on.
You can see this if you contrast my behavior in English
with my behavior in Chinese.
They ask me questions in English.
And I give answers in English.
They say, what's the longest river in the United States?
And I say, well, it's the Mississippi,
or the Mississippi-Missouri, depending
on if you count that as one river.
They ask me in Chinese, what's the longest river in China?
I don't know what the question is or what it means.
All I got are Chinese symbols.
But I look up what I'm supposed to do with that symbol,
and I give back an answer, which is the right answer.
It says, it's the Yangtze.
That's the longest river in China.
I don't know any of that.
I'm just a computer.
So the bottom line is that the implemented computer program
by itself is never going to be sufficient
for human understanding because human understanding has
more than syntax.
It has a semantics.
There are two fundamental principles
that underlie the Chinese room argument.
And both of them seem to me obviously true.
You can state each in four words.
Syntax is not semantics.
And simulation is not duplication.
You can simulate-- you're going to have
plenty of time for questions.
How much time we got, by the way?
I want to--
JOHN BRACAGLIA: We'll leave time for questions at the end.
JOHN SEARLE: I want everybody that
has a question to have a chance to ask the question.
Anyway, that's the famous Chinese room argument.
And it takes about five minutes to explain it.
Now you'd be amazed at the responses I got.
They were absolutely breathtaking
in their preposterousness.
Now let me give you some answers.
A favorite answer was this.
You were there in a room.
You had all those symbols.
You had a box.
You probably had scratch paper on which to work.
Now, it wasn't you that understood.
You're just a CPU, they would say with contempt, the Central
Processing Unit.
I didn't know what any of these words meant in those days.
CPU, it's the system that understands.
And when I first heard this, I mean,
the room understands Chinese, I said to the guy.
And he said, yes, the room understands Chinese.
Well, it's a desperate answer.
And I admire courage.
But it's got a problem.
And that is the reason I don't understand
is I can't get from the syntax to the semantics.
But the room can't either.
How does the room get from the syntax of the computer
program of the input symbols to the semantics
of the understanding of the symbols?
There's no way the room can get there
because that would require some consciousness
in the room in addition to my consciousness.
And there is no such consciousness.
Anyway, that was one of many answers.
One of my favorites was this.
This was in a public debate.
A guy said to me, but suppose we ask you,
do you understand Chinese?
And suppose you say, yes, I understand Chinese.
Well?
Well, OK, let's try that and see how far we get.
I get a question that looks like this.
Now, this will be in a dialect of Chinese some of you
won't recognize.
Unknown to me, that symbol means,
do you understand Chinese?
I look up what I'm supposed to do.
And I give them back a symbol that's
in the same dialect of Chinese.
And it looks like that.
And that says, why do you guys ask me such dumb questions?
Can't you see that I understand Chinese?
I could go on with the other responses and objections,
but I think they're all equally feeble.
The bottom line is there's a logical truth.
And that is that the implemented computer program
is defined syntactically.
And that's not a weakness.
That's the power.
The power of the syntactical definition of computation
is you can implement it on electronic machines that
can perform literally millions of computations
in a very small amount of time.
I'm not sure I believe this, but it always
says it in the textbooks, that Deep Blue
can do 250 million computations in a second.
OK, I take their word for it.
So it's not a weakness of computers.
Now, another argument I sometimes got
was, well, in programs, we often have
a section called the semantics of natural understanding
programs.
And that's right.
But, of course, what they do is they put in more computer
implementation.
They put in more syntax.
Now, so far, so good.
And I think if that's all there was to say,
I've said all of that before.
But now I want to go on to something much more
interesting.
And here goes with that.
Now how we doing?
I'm not-- everybody seems to understand
there's going to be plenty of time for questions.
I insist on a good question period.
So let me take a drink of water, and we
go to the next step, which I think is more important.
A lot of people thought, well, look,
maybe the computer doesn't understand Chinese,
but all the same, it does information processing.
And it does, after all, do computation.
That's what we define the machine to do.
And I had to review a couple of books recently.
One book said that we live in a new age,
the age of information.
And in a wonderful outburst, the author
said everything is information.
Now that ought to worry us if everything is information.
And I read another book.
This was an optimistic book.
I reviewed-- this for "The New York Review of Books"--
a less optimistic book by a guy who said computers are now
so smart they're almost as smart as we are.
And pretty soon, they'll be just as smart as we are.
And then I don't have to tell this audience the next step.
They'll be much smarter than we are.
And then look out because they might get
sick of being oppressed by us.
And they might simply rise up and overthrow us all.
And this, the author said modestly--
I guess this is how you sell books--
he said this may be the greatest challenge that humanity
has ever faced, the upcoming revolt
of super-smart computers.
Now, I want to say both of these claims are silly.
I mean, I'm speaking shorthand here.
There'll be plenty of chance to answer me.
And I want to say briefly why.
The notion of intelligence has two different senses.
It has an observer-independent sense
where it identifies something that is psychologically real.
So I am more intelligent than my dog Tarski.
Now, Tarski's pretty smart, I agree.
But overall, I'm smarter than Tarski.
I've had four dogs, by they way--
Frege, Russell, Ludwig, and Tarski.
And Tarski, he's a Bernese mountain dog.
I'm sorry I didn't bring him along,
but he's too big for the car.
Now, he's very smart.
But he does have intelligence in the same sense that I do.
Only he happens to have somewhat less than I do.
Now, my computer is also intelligent.
And it also processes information.
But-- and this is the key point-- it's observer-relative.
The only sense in which the computer has intelligence
is not in an intrinsic, but it's in an observer-relative sense.
We can interpret its operations in such a way
that we can make-- now, watch this terminology-- we can make
epistemically objective claims of intelligence
even though the intelligence in question
is entirely in the eye of the beholder.
This was brought home forcefully to me
when I read in the newspapers that IBM had designed
a computer program which could beat the world's leading chess
player.
And in the same sense in which Kasparov beat Karpov
so we were told Deep Blue beat Kasparov.
Now that ought to worry us because for Karpov and Kasparov
to play chess, they both have to be conscious
that they're playing chess.
They both have to know such things
as I opened with pawn to king four,
and my queen is threatened on the left-hand side
of the board.
But now notice, Deep Blue knows none on that
because it doesn't know anything.
You can make epistemically objective claims
about Deep Blue.
It made such and such a move.
But the attributions of intelligent chess playing,
this move or that move, it's all observer-relative.
None of it is intrinsic.
In the intrinsic sense in which I have more intelligence
than my dog, my computer has zero intelligence-- absolutely
none at all.
It's a very complex electronic circuit
that we have designed to behave as if it were thinking,
as if it were intelligent.
But in the strict sense, in the observer-independent sense
in which you and I have intelligence,
there is zero intelligence in the computer.
It's all observer-relative.
And what goes for intelligence goes
for all of the key notions in cognitive science.
The notions of intelligence, memory, perception,
decision-making, rationality-- all those
have two different senses, a sense
where they identify psychologically real phenomena
of the sort that goes on in you and me and the sort
where they identify observer-relative phenomena.
But in the intrinsic sense in which
you and I have intelligence, the machinery we're talking about
has zero intelligence
…

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